

The Labor Demand and Labor Supply Channels of Monetary Policy

Sebastian Graves¹, Christopher Huckfeldt², and Eric Swanson³

¹University of Cambridge

²Federal Reserve Board

³UC Irvine & NBER

May 13, 2025

Bank of Finland and CEPR Joint Conference on Frontiers of Monetary
Economics in the 21st century: Where and Where to?

The views expressed in this paper/presentation are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System.

What we do

- ▶ Study response of labor market flows to identified monetary policy shocks
 - ▶ Estimate impulse responses from proxy SVAR with HFI monetary policy shocks à la Gertler and Karadi (2015)
 - ▶ Use shocks from Bauer and Swanson (2023)

What we do

- ▶ Study response of labor market flows to identified monetary policy shocks
 - ▶ Estimate impulse responses from proxy SVAR with HFI monetary policy shocks à la Gertler and Karadi (2015)
 - ▶ Use shocks from Bauer and Swanson (2023)
- ▶ Focus on response of supply-driven labor market flows:
 - ▶ Flows between unemployment (U) and nonparticipation (N)
 - ▶ Quits from employment (E) to non-employment

What we do

- ▶ Study response of labor market flows to identified monetary policy shocks
 - ▶ Estimate impulse responses from proxy SVAR with HFI monetary policy shocks à la Gertler and Karadi (2015)
 - ▶ Use shocks from Bauer and Swanson (2023)
- ▶ Focus on response of supply-driven labor market flows:
 - ▶ Flows between unemployment (U) and nonparticipation (N)
 - ▶ Quits from employment (E) to non-employment
- ▶ After contractionary monetary policy shock:
 - ▶ Heightened job-search by non-employed: U-to-N rate ↓ & N-to-U rate ↑
 - ▶ Quit rate to non-employment ↓

What we do

- ▶ Study response of labor market flows to identified monetary policy shocks
 - ▶ Estimate impulse responses from proxy SVAR with HFI monetary policy shocks à la Gertler and Karadi (2015)
 - ▶ Use shocks from Bauer and Swanson (2023)
- ▶ Focus on response of supply-driven labor market flows:
 - ▶ Flows between unemployment (U) and nonparticipation (N)
 - ▶ Quits from employment (E) to non-employment
- ▶ After contractionary monetary policy shock:
 - ▶ Heightened job-search by non-employed: U-to-N rate ↓ & N-to-U rate ↑
 - ▶ Quit rate to non-employment ↓
- ▶ Apply standard accounting framework: Response of employment twice as large holding supply-driven flows fixed

What we do (II)

- ▶ What do IRFs of supply-driven labor flows say about household labor supply response to a monetary policy shock?
 - ▶ Change in composition, or broad-based increase in labor supply?

What we do (II)

- ▶ What do IRFs of **supply-driven labor flows** say about household **labor supply response** to a **monetary policy shock**?
 - ▶ Change in **composition**, or broad-based increase in **labor supply**?
- ▶ To answer, we study **heterogeneous agent model** with **labor market frictions** and **endogenous participation** à la Krusell et al. (2017)
- ▶ Estimate **key model parameters** to match response of **labor market flows** to contractionary monetary policy shock
 - ▶ Study by feeding in responses for layoff rate, job-finding rate, interest rate and wages

What we do (II)

- ▶ What do IRFs of **supply-driven labor flows** say about household **labor supply response** to a **monetary policy shock**?
 - ▶ Change in **composition**, or broad-based increase in **labor supply**?
- ▶ To answer, we study **heterogeneous agent model** with **labor market frictions** and **endogenous participation** à la Krusell et al. (2017)
- ▶ Estimate **key model parameters** to match response of **labor market flows** to contractionary monetary policy shock
 - ▶ Study by feeding in responses for layoff rate, job-finding rate, interest rate and wages
- ▶ Model achieves **close fit** for aggregate **labor market flows**
- ▶ While also **consistent** with micro evidence on **MPCs and MPEs**
- ▶ Model implies quantitatively important, broad-based **labor supply response**:
Fix labor supply policy functions at steady-state, **employment falls $\approx 70\%$ more**

Why we do it

- ▶ **Conventional wisdom:** monetary policy affects employment through **labor demand**
 - ▶ Little role (if any!) for **labor supply**

Why we do it

- ▶ **Conventional wisdom:** monetary policy affects employment through **labor demand**
 - ▶ Little role (if any!) for **labor supply**
- ▶ Many NK models imply no short-run effect of labor supply on employment
 - ▶ **Sticky wages** + **neoclassical** labor market \Rightarrow employment is **demand-determined**
 - ▶ E.g. Gali, Smets, and Wouters (2011), Broer et al (2020), Wolf (2023)
 - ▶ **NK** + **search-and-matching** \Rightarrow labor supplied **inelastically**
 - ▶ E.g. Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016)

Why we do it

- ▶ **Conventional wisdom:** monetary policy affects employment through **labor demand**
 - ▶ Little role (if any!) for **labor supply**
- ▶ Many NK models imply no short-run effect of labor supply on employment
 - ▶ **Sticky wages** + **neoclassical** labor market \Rightarrow employment is **demand-determined**
 - ▶ E.g. Gali, Smets, and Wouters (2011), Broer et al (2020), Wolf (2023)
 - ▶ **NK** + **search-and-matching** \Rightarrow labor supplied **inelastically**
 - ▶ E.g. Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016)
- ▶ **This paper:** New evidence that decline in employment from a **contractionary monetary policy shock** significantly attenuated by **increase in labor supply**

Why we do it

- ▶ **Conventional wisdom:** monetary policy affects employment through **labor demand**
 - ▶ Little role (if any!) for **labor supply**
- ▶ Many NK models imply no short-run effect of labor supply on employment
 - ▶ **Sticky wages** + **neoclassical** labor market \Rightarrow employment is **demand-determined**
 - ▶ E.g. Gali, Smets, and Wouters (2011), Broer et al (2020), Wolf (2023)
 - ▶ **NK** + **search-and-matching** \Rightarrow labor supplied **inelastically**
 - ▶ E.g. Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016)
- ▶ **This paper:** New evidence that decline in employment from a **contractionary monetary policy shock** significantly attenuated by **increase in labor supply**
- ▶ Potentially relevant for understanding **post-Covid period**: large fiscal transfers to households, quits \uparrow , labor force participation \downarrow , inflation \uparrow

Data & Methodology

Labor Market Flows

- ▶ Time series data on labor market flows from CPS microdata
- ▶ Three states: employment (E), unemployment (U), nonparticipation (N)

Labor Market Flows

- ▶ Time series data on labor market flows from CPS microdata
- ▶ Three states: employment (E), unemployment (U), nonparticipation (N)
- ▶ Interpret dynamics of labor market stocks through response of flows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} E \\ U \\ N \end{bmatrix}_{t+1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 - p_{EU} - p_{EN} & p_{UE} & p_{NE} \\ p_{EU} & 1 - p_{UE} - p_{UN} & p_{NU} \\ p_{EN} & p_{UN} & 1 - p_{NE} - p_{NU} \end{bmatrix}_{t+1} \begin{bmatrix} E \\ U \\ N \end{bmatrix}_t$$

Labor Market Flows

- ▶ Time series data on labor market flows from CPS microdata
- ▶ Three states: employment (E), unemployment (U), nonparticipation (N)
- ▶ Interpret dynamics of labor market stocks through response of flows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} E \\ U \\ N \end{bmatrix}_{t+1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 - p_{EU} - p_{EN} & p_{UE} & p_{NE} \\ p_{EU} & 1 - p_{UE} - p_{UN} & p_{NU} \\ p_{EN} & p_{UN} & 1 - p_{NE} - p_{NU} \end{bmatrix}_{t+1} \begin{bmatrix} E \\ U \\ N \end{bmatrix}_t$$

- ▶ Particular focus on response of supply-driven flows to monetary policy
 - ▶ Decision to search from non-employment, e.g. U-to-N and N-to-U
 - ▶ Quits to unemployment and nonparticipation (new!)

Estimating the Effects of Monetary Policy

- ▶ Begin with reduced-form VAR:

$$Y_t = \alpha + B(L)Y_{t-1} + u_t \quad (1)$$

- ▶ Six monthly variables for baseline specification: two-year Treasury yield, unemployment rate, participation rate, log CPI, log IP, excess bond premium

Estimating the Effects of Monetary Policy

- ▶ Begin with reduced-form VAR:

$$Y_t = \alpha + B(L)Y_{t-1} + u_t \quad (1)$$

- ▶ Six monthly variables for baseline specification: two-year Treasury yield, unemployment rate, participation rate, log CPI, log IP, excess bond premium
- ▶ Assume structural shocks:

$$u_t = S\varepsilon_t \quad (2)$$

where the first structural shock is a “monetary policy shock”, ε_t^{mp}

- ▶ First column of S , denoted s_1 , describes the impact effect of the structural monetary policy shock ε_t^{mp} on u_t and Y_t .
- ▶ Use an external instrument z_t to identify s_1

External Instrument

- ▶ External instrument z_t needs to satisfy:

$$\mathbb{E} \{ z_t \varepsilon_t^{mp} \} \neq 0 \quad (\text{relevance})$$

$$\mathbb{E} \{ z_t \varepsilon_t^{-mp} \} = 0 \quad (\text{exogeneity})$$

- ▶ Use HFI changes in interest rate futures as external instrument in VAR
 - ▶ e.g., Stock and Watson (2012), Mertens and Ravn (2013), Gertler & Karadi (2015)

External Instrument

- ▶ External instrument z_t needs to satisfy:

$$\mathbb{E} \{ z_t \varepsilon_t^{mp} \} \neq 0 \quad (\text{relevance})$$

$$\mathbb{E} \{ z_t \varepsilon_t^{-mp} \} = 0 \quad (\text{exogeneity})$$

- ▶ Use HFI changes in interest rate futures as external instrument in VAR
 - ▶ e.g., Stock and Watson (2012), Mertens and Ravn (2013), Gertler & Karadi (2015)
- ▶ Implement methodology from Bauer & Swanson (2023)
 - ▶ Use interest rate changes around FOMC announcements and Fed Chair speeches
 - ▶ Orthogonalized with respect to recent macro/financial news
- ▶ Both speeches and orthogonalizing necessary for accurate estimates of flow IRFs
 - ▶ Avoids known issues of HFI estimation (e.g., Ramey 2016)
 - ▶ Additional noise from labor market flows requires more valid instrument

External Instrument

- ▶ External instrument z_t needs to satisfy:


$$\mathbb{E} \{ z_t \varepsilon_t^{mp} \} \neq 0 \quad (\text{relevance})$$

$$\mathbb{E} \{ z_t \varepsilon_t^{-mp} \} = 0 \quad (\text{exogeneity})$$

- ▶ Use HFI changes in interest rate futures as external instrument in VAR
 - ▶ e.g., Stock and Watson (2012), Mertens and Ravn (2013), Gertler & Karadi (2015)
- ▶ Implement methodology from Bauer & Swanson (2023)
 - ▶ Use interest rate changes around FOMC announcements and Fed Chair speeches
 - ▶ Orthogonalized with respect to recent macro/financial news
- ▶ Both speeches and orthogonalizing necessary for accurate estimates of flow IRFs
 - ▶ Avoids known issues of HFI estimation (e.g., Ramey 2016)
 - ▶ Additional noise from labor market flows requires more valid instrument
- ▶ Labor market flows added one-by-one to the main VAR


Estimates

Baseline VAR




- ▶ Monthly data, 1978:M1–2019:M12
- ▶ Dark and light shaded regions report **68%** and **90%** confidence intervals

Response of Labor Market Flows




Response of Labor Market Flows




► $p_{EU} \uparrow$, $p_{UE} \downarrow$, & $p_{NE} \downarrow \Rightarrow$ Consistent with narrative of decline in labor demand

Response of Labor Market Flows




- ▶ $p_{EU} \uparrow$, $p_{UE} \downarrow$, & $p_{NE} \downarrow \Rightarrow$ Consistent with narrative of **decline** in labor demand
- ▶ $p_{NU} \uparrow$, $p_{UN} \downarrow$, & $p_{EN} \downarrow$ (via quits) \Rightarrow Consistent with **increase** in labor supply

Response of Labor Market Flows



- ▶ $p_{EU} \uparrow$, $p_{UE} \downarrow$, & $p_{NE} \downarrow \Rightarrow$ Consistent with narrative of **decline** in labor demand
- ▶ $p_{NU} \uparrow$, $p_{UN} \downarrow$, & $p_{EN} \downarrow$ (via quits) \Rightarrow Consistent with **increase** in labor supply

Response of EU & EN Flows: Quits vs Layoffs



- ▶ Increase in layoffs explains rise in EU rate
- ▶ Decline in quits explains fall in EN rate

Additional Results

After **contractionary** monetary policy shock we also find:

1. Increase in “**intensive margins**” of search from non-employment 

Additional Results

After contractionary monetary policy shock we also find:

1. Increase in “intensive margins” of search from non-employment ▶
2. Decline in participation driven by labor force exit (through increase in unemployment); attenuated by increase in labor force entry ▶

Additional Results

After **contractionary** monetary policy shock we also find:

1. Increase in “**intensive margins**” of search from non-employment ▶
2. **Decline in participation** driven by labor force **exit** (through increase in **unemployment**); attenuated by increase in labor force **entry** ▶
3. **Cyclical composition** plays **limited role** in shaping response of aggregate flows ▶

Additional Results

After **contractionary** monetary policy shock we also find:

1. Increase in “**intensive margins**” of search from non-employment ▶
2. **Decline in participation** driven by labor force **exit** (through increase in **unemployment**); attenuated by increase in labor force **entry** ▶
3. **Cyclical composition** plays **limited role** in shaping response of aggregate flows ▶
4. Larger response of supply-driven flows among less-educated ▶

Additional Results

After **contractionary** monetary policy shock we also find:

1. Increase in “**intensive margins**” of search from non-employment ▶
2. **Decline in participation** driven by labor force **exit** (through increase in **unemployment**); attenuated by increase in labor force **entry** ▶
3. **Cyclical composition** plays **limited role** in shaping response of aggregate flows ▶
4. Larger response of supply-driven flows among less-educated ▶
5. No response of **job-to-job transitions** ▶

Additional Results

After **contractionary** monetary policy shock we also find:

1. Increase in “**intensive margins**” of search from non-employment ▶
2. **Decline in participation** driven by labor force **exit** (through increase in **unemployment**); attenuated by increase in labor force **entry** ▶
3. **Cyclical composition** plays **limited role** in shaping response of aggregate flows ▶
4. Larger response of supply-driven flows among less-educated ▶
5. No response of **job-to-job transitions** ▶
6. Significant **decline in vacancies** ▶

Additional Results

After **contractionary** monetary policy shock we also find:

1. Increase in “**intensive margins**” of search from non-employment ▶
2. **Decline in participation** driven by labor force **exit** (through increase in **unemployment**); attenuated by increase in labor force **entry** ▶
3. **Cyclical composition** plays **limited role** in shaping response of aggregate flows ▶
4. Larger response of supply-driven flows among less-educated ▶
5. No response of **job-to-job transitions** ▶
6. Significant **decline in vacancies** ▶
7. Nominal **wages decline** slowly ▶

Additional Results

After **contractionary** monetary policy shock we also find:

1. Increase in “**intensive margins**” of search from non-employment ▶
2. **Decline in participation** driven by labor force **exit** (through increase in **unemployment**); attenuated by increase in labor force **entry** ▶
3. **Cyclical composition** plays **limited role** in shaping response of aggregate flows ▶
4. Larger response of supply-driven flows among less-educated ▶
5. No response of **job-to-job transitions** ▶
6. Significant **decline in vacancies** ▶
7. Nominal **wages decline** slowly ▶

Using Flows to Account for Dynamics of Labor Market Stocks

Flow-Based Accounting for Dynamics of Stocks

- ▶ Assess role of supply-driven flows (e.g., p_{NU}) in shaping response of employment

Flow-Based Accounting for Dynamics of Stocks

- ▶ Assess role of **supply-driven flows** (e.g., p_{NU}) in shaping response of **employment**
- ▶ Recall **law of motion** for **stocks** in terms of **transition probabilities** (i.e., flows)

$$\begin{bmatrix} E \\ U \\ N \end{bmatrix}_{t+1} = \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 - p_{EU} - p_{EN} & p_{UE} & p_{NE} \\ p_{EU} & 1 - p_{UE} - p_{UN} & p_{NU} \\ p_{EN} & p_{UN} & 1 - p_{NE} - p_{NU} \end{bmatrix}}_{\equiv P_{t+1}} \begin{bmatrix} E \\ U \\ N \end{bmatrix}_t$$

Flow-Based Accounting for Dynamics of Stocks

- ▶ Assess role of **supply-driven flows** (e.g., p_{NU}) in shaping response of **employment**
- ▶ Recall **law of motion** for **stocks** in terms of **transition probabilities** (i.e., flows)

$$\begin{bmatrix} E_{t+k} \\ U_{t+k} \\ N_{t+k} \end{bmatrix} = \left(\prod_{j=1}^k P_{t+j} \right) \begin{bmatrix} E_t \\ U_t \\ N_t \end{bmatrix}$$

Flow-Based Accounting for Dynamics of Stocks

- ▶ Assess role of **supply-driven flows** (e.g., p_{NU}) in shaping response of **employment**
- ▶ Recall **law of motion** for **stocks** in terms of **transition probabilities** (i.e., flows)

$$\begin{bmatrix} E_{t+k} \\ U_{t+k} \\ N_{t+k} \end{bmatrix} = \left(\prod_{j=1}^k P_{t+j} \right) \begin{bmatrix} E_t \\ U_t \\ N_t \end{bmatrix}$$

- ▶ Construct **hypothetical** IRF of **employment** holding response of p_{NU} constant
- ▶ Substitute $\{p_{NU}\}_{t+j}$ in P_{t+j} with steady-state value \bar{p}_{NU} , then solve forward
- ▶ Difference of **hypothetical** and **actual** response of **employment** reflects role of p_{NU}

Flow-Based Accounting for Dynamics of Stocks

- ▶ Assess role of **supply-driven flows** (e.g., p_{NU}) in shaping response of **employment**
- ▶ Recall **law of motion** for **stocks** in terms of **transition probabilities** (i.e., flows)

$$\begin{bmatrix} E_{t+k} \\ U_{t+k} \\ N_{t+k} \end{bmatrix} = \left(\prod_{j=1}^k P_{t+j} \right) \begin{bmatrix} E_t \\ U_t \\ N_t \end{bmatrix}$$


- ▶ Construct **hypothetical** IRF of **employment** holding response of p_{NU} constant
- ▶ Substitute $\{p_{NU}\}_{t+j}$ in P_{t+j} with steady-state value \bar{p}_{NU} , then solve forward
- ▶ Difference of **hypothetical** and **actual** response of **employment** reflects role of p_{NU}
- ▶ Repeat for all supply-driven flows, in various combinations

▶ Ins and Outs of Employment


▶ Ins and Outs of Unemployment

▶ Ins and Outs of Participation


Decomposing Employment Response to a Monetary Policy Shock




Decomposing Employment Response to a Monetary Policy Shock



Decomposing Employment Response to a Monetary Policy Shock



Decomposing Employment Response to a Monetary Policy Shock



► Holding **supply-driven** flows fixed \Rightarrow Employment falls **twice as much**

► Controls for composition

► Participation

► Unemployment

Model

Model

- ▶ What do IRFs of **supply-driven labor flows** say about household **labor supply response** to a monetary policy shock?

Model

- ▶ What do IRFs of **supply-driven labor flows** say about household **labor supply response** to a monetary policy shock?
- ▶ To answer, we study **heterogeneous agent model** with **labor market frictions** and **endogenous participation** à la Krusell et al (2017)
 - ▶ Households face **employment risk** (job-finding/layoff) + shocks to **labor productivity**
 - ▶ Choose **consumption/savings** and **labor supply** (quit, search, accept)
- ▶ Estimate **key model parameters** to match response of **labor market flows** to contractionary monetary policy shock
 - ▶ Study by feeding in responses of job finding and layoff rates, interest rate and wages
 - ▶ Overall **response of labor market flows** also determined by endogenous changes in **policy functions** + **distribution** of households across labor market states
 - ▶ Impulse response matching à la Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans (2005)

Value Functions

Let $V_E(a, z)$, $V_U(a, z, \kappa)$, and $V_N(a, z, \kappa)$ represent the values of being employed, UI-eligible non-employed, and UI-ineligible non-employed:

Defined over

- ▶ a = assets
- ▶ z = idiosyncratic productivity: $\log z' = \rho_z \log z + \varepsilon_z$, $\varepsilon_z \sim N(0, \sigma_z^2)$
- ▶ κ = cost of job search, iid from logistic distribution: mean = μ_κ , scale = σ_κ

Value Functions

Let $V_E(a, z)$, $V_U(a, z, \kappa)$, and $V_N(a, z, \kappa)$ represent the values of being employed, UI-eligible non-employed, and UI-ineligible non-employed:

$$V_E(a, z) = \max_{c, a'} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \max \left\{ \underbrace{\mathbb{E} V_N(a', z', \kappa')}_{\text{Quit}}, \underbrace{\mathbb{E} [\delta_L V_U(a', z', \kappa') + (1 - \delta_L) V_E(a', z')]}_{\text{Do Not Quit}} \right\} \right\}$$

subject to

$$c + a' = Ra + (1 - \tau)wz + T, \quad a' \geq 0$$

Value Functions

Let $V_E(a, z)$, $V_U(a, z, \kappa)$, and $V_N(a, z, \kappa)$ represent the values of being employed, UI-eligible non-employed, and UI-ineligible non-employed:

$$V_U(a, z, \kappa) = \max_{c, a'} \left\{ u(c) + \max \left\{ \underbrace{(1 - \kappa)\psi + \beta V_U^s(a', z)}_{\text{Search}}, \underbrace{\psi + \beta V_U^{ns}(a', z)}_{\text{Do Not Search}} \right\} \right\}$$

subject to

$$c + a' = Ra + (1 - \tau) \min\{\phi w z, \bar{\phi}\} + T, \quad a' \geq 0$$

Value Functions

Let $V_E(a, z)$, $V_U(a, z, \kappa)$, and $V_N(a, z, \kappa)$ represent the values of being employed, UI-eligible non-employed, and UI-ineligible non-employed:

$$V_U(a, z, \kappa) = \max_{c, a'} \left\{ u(c) + \max \left\{ \underbrace{(1 - \kappa)\psi + \beta \mathcal{V}_U^s(a', z)}_{\text{Search}}, \underbrace{\psi + \beta \mathcal{V}_U^{ns}(a', z)}_{\text{Do Not Search}} \right\} \right\}$$

subject to

$$c + a' = Ra + (1 - \tau) \min\{\phi w z, \bar{\phi}\} + T, \quad a' \geq 0$$

where

$$\mathcal{V}_U^s(a', z) = f_s \cdot \max \left\{ \mathbb{E} V_E(a', z'), \mathbb{E} \tilde{V}_U(a', z', \kappa') \right\} + (1 - f_s) \mathbb{E} \tilde{V}_U(a', z', \kappa')$$

$$\mathcal{V}_U^{ns}(a', z) = f_{ns} \cdot \max \left\{ \mathbb{E} V_E(a', z'), \mathbb{E} V_N(a', z', \kappa') \right\} + (1 - f_{ns}) \mathbb{E} V_N(a', z', \kappa')$$

$$\tilde{V}_U(a, z, \kappa) = \delta_{UI} V_N(a, z, \kappa) + (1 - \delta_{UI}) V_U(a, z, \kappa).$$

Value Functions

Let $V_E(a, z)$, $V_U(a, z, \kappa)$, and $V_N(a, z, \kappa)$ represent the values of being employed, UI-eligible non-employed, and UI-ineligible non-employed:

$$V_N(a, z, \kappa) = \max_{c, a'} \left\{ u(c) + \max \left\{ \underbrace{(1 - \kappa)\psi + \beta V_N^s(a', z)}_{\text{Search}}, \underbrace{\psi + \beta V_N^{ns}(a', z)}_{\text{Do Not Search}} \right\} \right\}$$


subject to


$$c + a' = Ra + T, \quad a' \geq 0$$

where


$$\begin{aligned} V_N^s(a', z) &= f_s \cdot \max \{ \mathbb{E} V_E(a', z'), \mathbb{E} V_N(a', z', \kappa') \} + (1 - f_s) \mathbb{E} V_N(a', z', \kappa') \\ V_N^{ns}(a', z) &= f_{ns} \cdot \max \{ \mathbb{E} V_E(a', z'), \mathbb{E} V_N(a', z', \kappa') \} + (1 - f_{ns}) \mathbb{E} V_N(a', z', \kappa') \end{aligned}$$

Results: Steady State



1. Model almost exactly fits steady-state transition rates between E, U and N 
2. Model produces quarterly MPC of 7-8%, annual MPE of 2-3%
In line with (recent) literature

Response of Labor Market Flows: Model vs Data



- Labor market flows from model (magenta lines) largely fall within 68% CI's


The Role of Labor Supply

- ▶ Ability of model to match response of labor market flows could reflect endogenous changes in **composition** or household **labor supply**
- ▶ For example, **decrease in UN** flows could reflect
 - ▶ **Greater mass of “likely searchers”** in non-employment, or
 - ▶ **Higher propensity to search** for employment of all workers

The Role of Labor Supply

- ▶ Ability of model to match response of labor market flows could reflect endogenous changes in **composition** or household **labor supply**
- ▶ For example, **decrease in UN** flows could reflect
 - ▶ **Greater mass of “likely searchers”** in non-employment, or
 - ▶ **Higher propensity to search** for employment of all workers
- ▶ To assess relative importance of two channels, simulate model holding labor supply policy functions at steady state
 - ▶ If changes in **labor supply** do not matter, **employment** should be **unaffected**

The Role of Labor Supply: Employment Response



- ▶ **Finding:** Employment drops by additional $\approx 70\%$
 - ▶ Indicates **broad-based increase** in **labor supply** to contractionary monetary shock

Conclusion

Conclusion

- ▶ New evidence from labor market flows consistent with **substantial increase** in **labor supply** to a **contractionary monetary policy shock**
 - ▶ **Increase** in **search** activity + **decline** in **quits** to non-employment
 - ▶ Holding response of **supply-driven flows** constant, decline in employment **doubles**
- ▶ Interpret findings through estimated **heterogenous agent** model with **frictional labor markets** and **participation margin**
 - ▶ Model matches response of labor flows through **broad-based increase** in **labor supply**
- ▶ **Empirical evidence** + **model findings** consistent with important role of **labor supply** in **monetary transmission mechanism**
- ▶ Future/ongoing work: study labor supply response to Covid-era transfers (e.g., “**Great Resignation**”) and evaluate role in for subsequent inflation

Thanks!

Cyclical Properties of Labor Market Stocks and Flows

Cyclical Properties of Labor Market Stocks

	Employment- Population Ratio	Unemployment Rate	Participation Rate
$\text{mean}(x)$	61.14	6.19	65.16
$\text{std}(x)/\text{std}(Y)$	0.72	8.25	0.23
$\text{corr}(x, Y)$	0.83	-0.85	0.35







Note: x denotes the variable in each column, Y denotes HP-filtered log real GDP. Standard deviations and correlations are computed for HP-filtered quarterly averages. The sample is 1978-2019.

Cyclical Properties of Labor Market Flows

	EU	EN	UE	UN	NE	NU
$\text{mean}(x)$	0.014	0.030	0.255	0.226	0.046	0.025
$\text{std}(x)/\text{std}(Y)$	5.20	2.46	5.69	4.14	3.00	5.22
$\text{corr}(x, Y)$	-0.83	0.49	0.78	0.71	0.65	-0.68

Note: x denotes the variable in each column, Y denotes HP-filtered log real GDP. Standard deviations and correlations are computed for HP-filtered quarterly averages. The sample is 1978-2019.

Decomposition of EU Flows



Relevance of Distinction Between Quits and Layoffs

Post-EU Transition Rates: Quits vs Layoffs

<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>		
	E	U	N
E – U(Quit)	0.448	0.399	0.153
E – U(Layoff)	0.426	0.468	0.106

Note: Transition rates are shown for individuals that are in their first month of unemployment following an employment spell, split by reason for unemployment.

Relevance of Distinction Between Quits and Layoffs

	Average Probability
Want Job E-N(Quit)	0.224
Want Job E-N(layoff)	0.528
NE Want Job	0.152
NE Do Not Want Job	0.039
NU Want Job	0.177
NU Do Not Want Job	0.013

Note: The top section shows the probability that individuals want a job, split by the reason for leaving to nonparticipation. The bottom section shows the probabilities of moving to employment, split by whether or not nonparticipants report wanting a job.

Robustness of Quit/Layoff Distinction

Sequences of Reasons for U among E-U-U Individuals

<i>Sample period</i>	<i>Pr(Quit Layoff)</i>	<i>Pr(Layoff Quit)</i>
pre-Redesign	0.039	0.208
post-Redesign	0.007	0.026


Note: The first row shows the probability of individuals switching their reason for unemployment from layoff to quit (in the first column), or from quit to layoff (in the second column), prior to the 1994 CPS redesign. The second row shows the same, but for the period following the redesign.

Transition Rates Across E-U-U Individuals

	<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>		
		E	U	N
(a)	E – U(Quit) – U(Layoff)	0.339	0.553	0.108
(b)	E – U(Quit) – U(Quit)	0.343	0.536	0.121
(c)	E – U(Layoff) – U(Quit)	0.352	0.557	0.091
(d)	E – U(Layoff) – U(Layoff)	0.264	0.667	0.068


Note: Transition rates are shown for individuals that are in their second month of unemployment following an employment spell, split by reason for unemployment. The rates are computed for the period prior to the 1994 CPS redesign.

Fraction of EN Transitions with Missing Reason



Note: The red line shows the proportion of individuals making an EN transition for which there is missing data on the reason for leaving the last job. The blue line shows the same calculation for individuals that were employed in each of the first three months before moving to nonparticipation. Series are smoothed using a centered 5-month moving average.


Labor Market Flows: No Speeches (Not Orthogonalized)



Robust F -statistic from Baseline VAR: 9.30

- ▶ High-frequency shocks from FOMC announcements only
- ▶ Dashed red lines report our baseline estimates


Labor Market Flows: No Speeches (Orthogonalized)



Robust F -statistic from Baseline VAR: 0.48


- ▶ FOMC announcements only, orthogonalized as in Bauer & Swanson (2023)
- ▶ Dashed red lines report our baseline estimates

Labor Market Flows: Holding Composition Fixed




- Composition-adjusted flows by ex-ante characteristics, à la Elsby et al. (2015)
- Fix shares using bins for age \times gender \times education \times reason for unemployment
- Dashed red lines report our baseline estimates

Decomposing Employment Response: Holding Composition Fixed




Labor Market Flows: Holding Composition Fixed (Full Controls)



- Fix shares using bins for age \times gender \times education \times reason for unemployment \times labor market status one year ago
- Dashed red lines are responses for unadjusted flows with the same sample



Labor Market Flows: Corrected for Time-Aggregation





Intensive Margins of Labor Supply

Intensive margins of job search consistent with behavior of NU/UN flows:

- ▶ For N : share that want a job
- ▶ For U : number of search methods





Intensive Margins: Time-Series





[← Back](#)

Participation: Response of Labor Force Entry and Exit



- Participation falls due to higher exit rate, offset by rise in entry

Participation: Response of Labor Force Entry and Exit




- ▶ Participation falls due to **higher exit rate**, offset by **rise in entry**
- ▶ Increase in exits driven by u_{t-1} , attenuated by UN_t and EN_t

$$(\text{Labor Force Entry Rate})_t = NU_t + NE_t,$$

$$(\text{Labor Force Exit Rate})_t = u_{t-1} \cdot UN_t + (1 - u_{t-1}) \cdot EN_t,$$

where u_{t-1} denotes the unemployment rate (and $\overline{UN} \gg \overline{EN}$)

Heterogeneity in Labor Market Responses: Education









► Decline in E-to-N concentrated among less educated

► Flows: Coll+







► Flows: HS+

◀ Back


Labor Market Flows: Higher-Educated



Labor Market Flows: Lower-Educated




Response of Job-to-Job Flows (1995-2019)



- ▶ Use measures from Fujita, Moscarini, Postel-Vinay (2024)
- ▶ No response of EE rate to contractionary MPS
- ▶ Cyclicalities of EE series from CPS possibly muted by workers who “jump ship”


Response of Labor Market Flows (1995-2019)





Robust F -statistic from Baseline VAR: 5.44

► Dashed red lines report impulse responses using full sample

Response of Vacancies




Response of Wages




- ▶ Nominal wages **decline more slowly** than CPI
- ▶ So **real wages rise slightly** in the short-run

Participation Response to a Monetary Policy Shock









► With response of **supply-driven flows** fixed \Rightarrow Participation far **more procyclical**

Unemployment Response to a Monetary Policy Shock




- Response of **quits** not important for unemployment dynamics

Time Series of Labor Market Flows




The Ins and Outs of Participation




- $E \rightarrow U$ and $U \rightarrow E$ are important for participation cycle

The Ins and Outs of Unemployment



- $E \rightarrow U$ and $U \rightarrow E$ roughly equally responsible for rise in unemployment

The Ins and Outs of Employment



► $N \rightarrow U$ more important than $U \rightarrow N$ for supporting employment

Timing within a Model Period

1. All individuals draw a new value of **productivity**, z . Non-employed individuals draw an **i.i.d. search cost**, κ .
2. Employed individuals make **consumption/saving** decisions and choose whether or not to **quit their job**. Non-employed individuals make **consumption/saving** decisions and choose whether or not to **search for a job**.
3. Employed individuals who do not quit are exogenously **laid off** with probability δ . Non-employed individuals receive **job offers** with probabilities f_s of f_{ns} , depending on whether or not they actively search.
4. Non-employed individuals who receive job offers **decide whether or not to accept** such offers.
5. UI-eligible non-employed individuals who search and either do not receive a job offer or do not accept an offer are subject to **UI expiry** with probability δ_{UI} .

Estimation: A Monetary Policy Shock in the Model

- ▶ Feed in response of job-finding rate, layoff rate, real interest rates and wages from the data
- ▶ Overall response of labor market flows also determined by endogenous changes in policy functions + distribution of households across labor market states

Estimation: A Monetary Policy Shock in the Model

- ▶ Feed in response of job-finding rate, layoff rate, real interest rates and wages from the data
- ▶ Overall response of labor market flows also determined by endogenous changes in policy functions + distribution of households across labor market states
- ▶ Calibrate a number of parameters, $\theta_{EXT} \equiv \{\beta, \gamma, \bar{R}, \delta_{UI}, w, \alpha, \phi, \bar{\phi}, \tau, T\}$
 - ▶ Assume $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}-1}{1-\gamma}$, $f_{ns} = \alpha f_s$

Estimation: A Monetary Policy Shock in the Model

- ▶ Feed in response of job-finding rate, layoff rate, real interest rates and wages from the data
- ▶ Overall response of labor market flows also determined by endogenous changes in policy functions + distribution of households across labor market states
- ▶ Calibrate a number of parameters, $\theta_{EXT} \equiv \{\beta, \gamma, \bar{R}, \delta_{UI}, w, \alpha, \phi, \bar{\phi}, \tau, T\}$
- ▶ Estimate remaining parameters to match IRFs of labor market flows
 - ▶ À la Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans (2005) or Auclert, Rognlie, Straub (2020)

$$\theta_{EST} \equiv \{\rho_z, \sigma_z, \mu_\kappa, \sigma_\kappa, \psi, \delta_L, f_s\}$$

$$\hat{J} = \{EU_t, EN_t, UE_t, UN_t, NE_t, NU_t\}_{t=0}^{50}$$

$$\hat{\theta}_{EST} = \arg \min_{\theta_{EST}} (J(\theta_{EST}) - \hat{J})' \Sigma^{-1} (J(\theta_{EST}) - \hat{J})$$

Model Parameters


Calibrated			
Parameter	Description	Value	Source/Target
β	Discount Factor	0.988	Quarterly MPC of 7-8%
R	Steady-State Real Interest Rate	1.001	1% Annual
γ	Risk Aversion Coefficient	2	Standard value
δ^{UI}	Benefit Exhaustion Probability	0.167	Expected duration of UI
w	Steady-State Wage	1	Normalization
α	Efficiency of Passive Search	0.6	Job-finding rate from N
ϕ	UI Replacement Rate	0.50	Graves (2023)
$\bar{\phi}$	Maximum UI Payments	1.85	Graves (2023)
τ	Labor Income Tax Rate	0.33	Auclert et al. (2021)
T	Lump-sum Transfer	0.24	Auclert et al. (2021)
Estimated			
Parameter	Description	Value	Standard Error
ρ_z	Persistence of Labor Productivity	0.960	(0.004)
σ_z	Standard Deviation of Labor Productivity	0.362	(0.023)
μ_κ	Mean Value of Search Cost	0.783	(0.105)
σ_κ	Dispersion of Search Cost	0.167	(0.022)
ψ	Value of Leisure	0.421	(0.107)
δ	Steady-State Layoff Rate	0.019	(0.002)
f_s	Steady-State Job-Finding Rate	0.273	(0.028)

Steady-State Labor Market Flows


Transition Rate	Model	Data
EU	0.0143	0.0143
EN	0.0297	0.0296
UE	0.2547	0.2547
UN	0.2260	0.2262
NE	0.0462	0.0461
NU	0.0253	0.0252

◀ Back

Response of Quits and Layoffs: Model vs Data









Response of Labor Market Stocks: Model vs Data



◀ Back

Decomposing Response of Labor Market Flows



Related Literature

- ▶ **Labor Market Flows:** Fujita & Ramey (2009), Elsby et al (2009), Shimer (2012), Elsby et al (2015), Hobijn & Şahin (2021), Fujita et al (2023)
 - ▶ We provide a **new decomposition** of EN transitions into **quits/layoffs**

Related Literature

- ▶ **Labor Market Flows:** Fujita & Ramey (2009), Elsby et al (2009), Shimer (2012), Elsby et al (2015), Hobijn & Şahin (2021), Fujita et al (2023)
 - ▶ We provide a **new decomposition** of EN transitions into **quits/layoffs**
- ▶ **Labor Market Response To Monetary Policy:** White (2018), Broer et al (2022), Faia et al (2022), Cantore et al (2023)
 - ▶ We **extend** state-of-the-art proxy SVAR to consider response of **labor market flows**
 - ▶ Document a **quantitatively important** response of **supply-driven flows**

Related Literature

- ▶ **Labor Market Flows:** Fujita & Ramey (2009), Elsby et al (2009), Shimer (2012), Elsby et al (2015), Hobijn & Şahin (2021), Fujita et al (2023)
 - ▶ We provide a **new decomposition** of EN transitions into **quits/layoffs**
- ▶ **Labor Market Response To Monetary Policy:** White (2018), Broer et al (2022), Faia et al (2022), Cantore et al (2023)
 - ▶ We **extend** state-of-the-art proxy SVAR to consider response of **labor market flows**
 - ▶ Document a **quantitatively important** response of **supply-driven flows**
- ▶ **NK Transmission Mechanism:** Christiano et al (2005), Christiano (2011), Auclert et al (2020), Broer et al (2020), McKay and Wolf (2023)
 - ▶ We argue for importance of **labor supply** in shaping **employment response** to monetary policy

Related Literature

- ▶ **Labor Market Flows:** Fujita & Ramey (2009), Elsby et al (2009), Shimer (2012), Elsby et al (2015), Hobijn & Şahin (2021), Fujita et al (2023)
 - ▶ We provide a **new decomposition** of EN transitions into **quits/layoffs**
- ▶ **Labor Market Response To Monetary Policy:** White (2018), Broer et al (2022), Faia et al (2022), Cantore et al (2023)
 - ▶ We **extend** state-of-the-art proxy SVAR to consider response of **labor market flows**
 - ▶ Document a **quantitatively important** response of **supply-driven flows**
- ▶ **NK Transmission Mechanism:** Christiano et al (2005), Christiano (2011), Auclert et al (2020), Broer et al (2020), McKay and Wolf (2023)
 - ▶ We argue for importance of **labor supply** in shaping **employment response** to monetary policy
- ▶ **Models with Frictional Labor Markets:** Krusell et al (2017), Cairo et al (2022), Alves & Violante (2023)
 - ▶ Provide evidence showing importance of **participation margin**
 - ▶ New estimates that NK **search and matching** models can target

Related Literature

- ▶ **Labor Market Flows:** Fujita & Ramey (2009), Elsby et al (2009), Shimer (2012), Elsby et al (2015), Hobijn & Şahin (2021), Fujita et al (2023)
 - ▶ We provide a **new decomposition** of EN transitions into **quits/layoffs**
- ▶ **Labor Market Response To Monetary Policy:** White (2018), Broer et al (2022), Faia et al (2022), Cantore et al (2023)
 - ▶ We **extend** state-of-the-art proxy SVAR to consider response of **labor market flows**
 - ▶ Document a **quantitatively important** response of **supply-driven flows**
- ▶ **NK Transmission Mechanism:** Christiano et al (2005), Christiano (2011), Auclert et al (2020), Broer et al (2020), McKay and Wolf (2023)
 - ▶ We argue for importance of **labor supply** in shaping **employment response** to monetary policy
- ▶ **Models with Frictional Labor Markets:** Krusell et al (2017), Cairo et al (2022), Alves & Violante (2023)
 - ▶ Provide evidence showing importance of **participation margin**
 - ▶ New estimates that NK **search and matching** models can target

