



Beliefs and Settlement Risk

- ◆ Original (static) model (KMR, 2003) showed:
 - ◆ Increase in liquidity helps reaching an equilibrium with settlement
 - ◆ In some cases net settlement would ensure settlement where RTGS (Non-DvP) could result in gridlock
 - ◆ RTGS-mechanisms could be enhanced by introducing collateral or by making incoming payments attachable
 - ◆ Ignore credit risk associated with (deferred) net settlement
 - ◆ But highlight the liquidity risks inherent in RTGS



Beliefs and Settlement Risk

- ◆ In comparison the dynamic model introduces:
 - ◆ “Beliefs” (uncertainty in banks’ behavior)
 - ◆ Base beliefs on their experience
 - ◆ Trust increase likelihood of settlement
 - ◆ “Reach” (no. of outgoing/incoming links)
 - ◆ Reach reduces effect of liquidity injections in resolving gridlocks (?)
 - ◆ “Variance” in initial money holdings
 - ◆ Increase probability of settlement (given reach)
 - ◆ “Rich” banks have greater incentive to pay and the “poor” banks know that (?)



Beliefs and Settlement Risk

- ◆ What policy implications could you derive from this analysis?
 - ◆ Improvements in system design of RTGS
 - ◆ Requirements for participants
 - ◆ Other