

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Nolivar

Thanks

IVIOLIVALIOI

Achieveme

Contents

Background

_ _ - - - - 8 · - - - - -

EL Simulation

Daaiilka

EL distribution

Conclusion

References

Stress Testing SPEI:

Policy Recommendations about the Mexican Payment System Simulating Distressed Liquidity Scenarios

Marco Nolivari

14th Payment and Settlement System Simulation Seminar Bank of Finland Helsinki

26th August 2016



Acknowledgment

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Noliva

Thanks

....

Backgroup

Background

NL Algorithm

Impact Timir

Conclusion

Reference

Many thanks to all those who contributed to this work:

- Dr Biliana Alexandrova-Kabadjova¹,
- Dr Javier Pérez Estrada²,
- Dr Steve Phelps³

GD Payment Systems and Corporate Services, Banco de México. E-mail:balexandrova@banxico.org.mx

²International Economic Affairs, Banco de México. E-mail:javierpe@banxico.org.mx

³ Informatics department, KCL. E-mail: steve.phelps@kcl.ac.uk □ → ← 🗗 → ← 🖫 → ← 📜 → → へ 🤆



Conceptual Framework

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Noliva

Thanks

Framework

Literature

. . . .

C--+--+-

Da ali muai in

.


EL Simulation NL Algorithm

EL distribution

Conclus

D . C

This work is part of a campaign promoted by Bank of Mexico with the purpose of achieving a more thorough knowledge of the country's financial structure.





Why Stress Testing?

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Noliva

I hanks

Motivation

Contents

Backgroun

NL Algorithm

EL distributions

Conclus

Reference

 While a full comprehension of causes of crises is unlikely to be achieved, the way in which they unwind is easier to be understood.

- Knowing in advance the effects of potential disruptions can help to prevent those disruptions from happening.
- Knowing in advance the effects of potential disruptions can help to intervene promptly in case those disruptions happen.
- A more thorough knowledge of the System can help to assess the current policies.



Literature Review I

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Nolivai

Thank

IVIOLIVALIOI

Literature

Achievem

Contents

Background

Methodology EL Simulations NL Algorithm

EL distributions

Conclus

Reference

 Many have analised the topology of Payment System networks. The study about SPEI revealed a tiered, highly clustered, and highly interconnected structure [1].

- Few have access to real data and thus rely on data simulators [2]. SPEI keeps track of every transaction with its timestamp attached.
- When simulating disruptions in a Payment System, we want to estimate the amount of additional liquidity that participants will need. Some proposed to calculate an Upper and Lower Bound [3].



Literature Review II

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Noliva

Thank

Framewo

iviotivatio

Literature

Achieveme

Contents

Background

EL Simulations

Results

EL distribution

Conclusion

References

 Liquidity flows analysis in SPEI has highlighted the importance of the timing of payments.

 It has also detected recycling tendency of the participants that generally manage to efficiently exploit incoming payments as a source of liquidity.



Main Results

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Noliva

Thanks

iviotivatio

Literatur

Achievement

Contents

Background

Methodology EL Simulations NL Algorithm

EL distributions

Conclusion

References

 Simulation of the operational failure of each participant of the system at different hours in order to calculate the extra funds needed by every other institution.

- Construction of the distributions of Extraordinary Liquidity.
- Analysis of the time-dependence of the Systemic Impact.



Table of Contents:

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Nolivar

Thanks

Motivation

Achieveme

Contents

Background

N A = 4 | = 1 = 1 = = =

NL Algorithm

EL distribution

Conclus

- Background
- Methodology
 - EL Simulations
 - NL Algorithm
- Results
 - EL distributions
 - Impact Timing
- 4 Conclusion



Structure of the connection between Mexican FMIs

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Nolivar

Thanks

Tamewo

Motivati

Literati

Acmeveme

Content

Background


EL Simulati

Results

EL distribution Impact Timing

Conclusion

Referenc



SPEI is particular **RTGS** that settles both **Large** and **Low** value transactions while operating on a Settlement Cycles basis.



Distribution of Payments

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Nolivar

Thombo

Framewo

Motivatio

Literature

Achievem

Contents

 ${\sf Background}$

Methodolog


Results

EL distributions Impact Timing

Conclusion

Reference

Previous studies showed that the distribution of payments is **inhomogeneous**. The bulk of transactions is spread between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m.





Methodology - EL Simulations

Stress Testing SPEI:

IVIAICO IVOIIVA

Thanks

....

Literature

Contents

Background

Methodology

NL Algorithm Results

EL distributions Impact Timing

Conclusion

Reference:

• Hypotheses:

- Exogenous Shocks
- No Recovery
- No Reaction
- Unlimited Liquidity
- Calculate Ordinary Liquidity⁴
- Select hour
- Remove payments
- Calculate Extraordinary Liquidity⁴

⁴The algorithm used to calculate Ordinary and and Extraordinary Liquidity is the same.



Methodology - Ordinary Liquidity Algorithm[4]

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Noliva

Thanks

IVIOLIVALIO

Contents

Background

Methodology EL Simulation NL Algorithm

Results

EL distributions Impact Timing

Conclus

References

• Hypotheses:

- Accounts start at zero
- There are only two sources of liquidity
- Payments within a Settlement Cycle are offset
- ② Let P_{it}^r and P_{it}^s be namely the total amount received and sent by participant i during cycle t, then the **net amount received**, A_{it} , the **liquidity reserve**, S_{it} , and the **liquidity borrowed**, F_{it} , are defined as follows:

$$\begin{cases} A_{it} = P_{it}^{r} - P_{it}^{s} \\ F_{it} = F_{it-1} - \min\{0; S_{it-1} + A_{it}\}. \\ S_{it} = \max\{0; S_{it-1} + A_{it}\} \end{cases}$$

- **3** Provided that $\forall i, A_{i0} = S_{i0} = F_{i0} = 0, F_{iT}$ is the **Ordinary Liquidity, NL**_i.
- **Extraordinary Liquidity** is therefore $EL_i = F_{iT} NL_i$



Distributions of EL - Core

Frequency (%)

Frequency (%)

50

30

20

50 40 30 Percentile

50: 0.0

75: 0.0

Percentile

p(EL>DRM): 0.0

25:00

50: 0.0 75: 0.0

p(EL>DRM): 0.7

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Noliva

Thanks

Tamework

Motivation

Literature

Achievem

Contents

Background

Methodolog EL Simulation

IVE AIGOI

EL distributions

Conclusion


Conclusion

References




EL (% Total Transactions)

(a) 6:00 am











Distribution of EL - Periphery


Stress Testing SPEI:

EL distributions















Distribution of EL - Core - Periphery

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Noliva

Thanks

Motivation

Literature

Contents


Background

EL Simulation

Results

EL distributions Impact Timing

Conclusion





Distribution of EL - Periphery - NBFI

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Noliva

Thanks

Framework

Motivation

Literature

Content

Background


Methodolog

NL Algorithm

Results

EL distributions Impact Timing

Conclusion





Impact Timing

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Noliva

Thanks

Framewor

Literatui

Achieveme

Contents

Background

Methodolo


Results


EL distributions Impact Timing

Conclusion

Referenc

The **Systemic Impact** is defined as the sum of the Extraordinary Liquidity triggered onto the other participants by an event.





Fit using a *logistic function:* $S(h) = \frac{K}{1+qe^{-rh}}$



Sink Rank

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Nolivar

Thanks

Framewo

Motivatio

Literatur

Contents


Background

Methodolo

NL Algorith

EL distributions

C = = = |...=! = =





Conclusion

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Noliva

Thanks

IVIOLIVALIC

Contents

Background

EL Simulations NL Algorithm

EL distributions

Conclusion

- The system as a whole will **unlikely be severely impacted** by a failure.
 - Core Banks: hardly require extra funds and trigger the most severe consequences;
 - Periphery Banks: likely not to require any fund, but if they do, the amount can be significant (maximum ranges from 40% to 100%);
 - Periphery NBFI: extra funds required in the majority of the cases. If their counterparts fails, they are turned from perfect recycler to free rider.
- The Systemic Impact shows a trend that can be accurately fitted with a logistic curve. Obtaining a a sound understanding of the underlying mechanism is key to be able to make forecasts.



Further Reading

Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Nolivai

Thanks

Framewo

Motivatio

Literature

Achievemen

Contents

Background

Mathadalaa

Results

EL distributions Impact Timing

Conclusion

References



Martínez-Jaramillo S. et al.

An Empirical Study of the Mexican Banking System's Network and its Implications for Systemic Risk Bank of Mexico Working Papers, August 2012.



Koponen, R. and Soramäki, K.

Intraday Liquidity Needs in a Modern Interbank Payment System: A Simulation Approach Bank of Finland Studies, E:14, 1999.



Leinonen, H. and Soramäki, K.

Simulating Interbank Payment and Securities Settlement Mechanisms with the BoF-PSS2 Simulator Bank of Finland Discussion Papers, 23, October 2003.



Alexandrova-Kabadjova, B. et *al.* Intraday Liquidity Flows within the Financial Market Infrastructures in Mexico

in Analyzing the Economics of Financial Market Infrastructures, Chapter 10, 2016



Stress Testing SPEI:

Marco Noliva

Thanks

Framework

Motivation

Literature

C

Rackground

Duckground

EL Simulations

Reculte

EL distribution

Conclusion

References

Thank you for your attention!