# Foreign bank presence and its effect on firm entry and exit in transition economies

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October 7, 2010





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- Related literature :
  - The impact of foreign bank penetration on lending to SMEs (Berger et al., 2001, 2008; Clarke et al., 2006; Mian, 2006; Degryse et al., 2009).





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  - The impact of financial development, (Aghion et al., 2007) banking competition (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell'Ariccia, 2004) and banking deregulation (Kerr and Nanda, 2009; Kerr and Nanda, 2010) on firm demographics.

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
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  - Greenfield: segmentation of the market is the outcome and opaque borrowers benefit.
  - Acquisition of domestic banks : number of domestic banks and their ability to service opaque borrowers decline

## Firm creation rate vs. share of banks acquired by foreign investors





#### Data

- Eurostat : firm entry, exit, survival rates on the industry level.
- Amadeus: compute industry characteristics based on balance sheet and income statement data on firm level.
- Analyzed period : 2000 2005
- Region : Central and Eastern Europe
- Whereas 75 percent of banking assets are owned by foreign banks, only 14 percent of firms have relationship with a foreign bank.



### Identification strategy

- Implication of theoretical models: Foreign bank entry should disproportionally affect firms from transparent and opaque industries.
- Difference-in-difference (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).

$$Demo_{i,j,t}=a_1Initial_{i,j}+a_2Opaqueness_i*Foreign_{j,t-1}+a_3Industry_i+a_4Country_j+a_5Year_{t-1}+e_{i,j,t}$$






## How do we measure industry opacity?

- Opaqueness measures :
  - Ratio of assets to fixed assets in the industry for all firms (or for young ones only).
  - Dependance on skilled labour at the industry level.
- Ratio of small firms in the industry.
- Size vs opaqueness.





## Opacity of industries







## The impact of foreign bank entry on firm demographics

	Entry	Exit	Net entry	Survival
5				
Panel A				
Initial industry share	-0.030	0.0685	-0.135*	0.336*
Acquired*opacity (fixed assets)	-0.527***	0.322	-0.674***	-0.447
Greenfield*opacity (fixed assets)	0.612	1.286*	-0.693	-0.480
Foreign*Share of small firms	-0.003	0.0604	-0.131	-0.726*
Observations	4399	4063	3999	2368
R-squared	0.083	0.085	0.130	0.270
Panel B				
Initial industry share	-0.028	0.042	-0.117	0.349*
Acquired*opacity (skill dependence)	-0.049**	0.037	-0.105***	0.0361
Greenfield*opacity (skill dependence)	-0.0244	0.074	-0.029	0.342**
Foreign*Share of small firms	0.107	-0.019	0.106	-0.893*
Observations	4318	3996	3933	2320
R-squared	0.082	0.085	0.134	0.274





## The impact of foreign bank entry on firm demographics

	Entry	Exit	Net entry	Survival
Panel A				
Initial industry share	0.004	0.107**	-0.134*	0.265*
Acquired*opacity (no employees)	-0.204	0.511***	-0.538*	-0.064
Acquired*opacity (1-4 emp.)	-2.685**	-1.406	0.149	-0.104
Acquired*opacity (4-9 emp.)	-0.642***	0.440***	-1.065***	-0.172
Acquired*opacity (more than 9 emp.)	-0.307**	0.377***	-0.582**	-1.212
Greenfield*opacity (no employees)	1.389***	2.151***	-0.707	1.374
Greenfield*opacity (1-4 emp.)	9.622**	8.550**	-5.588	11.44
Greenfield*opacity (4-9 emp.)	0.613	1.481***	-0.676	-3.685**
Greenfield*opacity ( more than 9 emp.)	1.656***	2.366***	-0.581	-1.939
Observations	4399	4063	3999	2368
R-squared	0.544	0.603	0.147	0.368





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- Trade-off between gains from reduced connected lending and losses from less credit to opaque sectors.

## Thank you!



