

Discussion of "Leaning against the Credit Cycle" b\ Gelain, Lansing and Natvik Norges Bank Research Paper 4, 2015

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## About the paper

- Very interesting paper on a very topical issue, at the centre of monetary policy debate (particularly in Sweden, Norway and Canada)
- Analysis of prospects for leaning against the wind with monetary policy
  - Also important implications for macroprudential policy
- Basis in Iacoviello (2005) model, with the addition of long-term mortgage contracts
- Most important conclusions
  - Little scope for MP to lean against D/Y due to sticky D; responses in Y similar to standard short-contract model
  - Better to lean against ΔD (which is determined by new loans), but this has costs in terms of higher inflation volatility



## Important mechanism in the model

#### Debt stock dynamics (simplified):

•  $D_t = (1 - \alpha) * D_{t-1} + L_t$ 

where  $\alpha$  = amortisation rate

 $L_t = LTV * IH_t$ , i.e. subject to changes in collateral value (housing investment) and LTV constraint

• In standard Iacoviello (2005) model,  $\alpha = 1$ :

 $D_t = L_t = LTV * H_t,$ 

where  $H_t$  is value of house

 Changes in housing prices (and LTV) have large effects on the stock of debt



 If, realistically, α is set to be less than 1, e.g. 10 per cent per year:

 $D_t = 0.90 * D_{t-1} + L_t$ 

Intuitive interpretation: Debt stock is

- to 90 per cent dependent on previous periods' debt and
- to 10 per cent dependent on new loans, subject to changes in collateral value and LTV contraint"\*



## **Questions and comments**

#### **General comments**

- Very interesting paper on a highly topical issue
- Clearly written and focus on a particular policy question
- Important contribution to the rapidly growing research on monetary policy, MaP and financial stability by experts in the field (a series of papers in recent years)
- I also have some specific comments/questions...



## Questions and comments, cont.

1. Common view: "MaP first line of defence"

But if debt contracts are long-term, can macroprudential policy have meaningful effects on the credit cycle?

- Example: If mortgage contracts are long term, a change in LTV for new loans has very little effect on debt stock in the short-to-medium term
  - Though better "trade-off" with effects on GDP since more targeted tool than monetary policy
- Similar for other MaP tools (e.g. LTI) affecting only new loans



## Questions and comments, cont.

# 2. What is the intuition for the small difference in effects on GDP with short vs long-term debt contracts?

My intuition is that the impatient households' Euler equation would be much affected =>more sticky consumption with long-term debt



Impulse responses to a 25 basis point increase in the quarterly interest rate



## Questions and comments, cont.

- 3. How exogenous is the amortisation rate?
- Within this framework, the difference between tools affecting only new borrowers vs all borrowers not so important
- Apart from MaP on new loans, interest rate changes have the potential to affect also the stock of debt
  - This is ruled out with exogenous rate of amortisation
- But if the interest rate increases and collateral value decreases, there may be incentives to lower debt stock
- Banks may not be able to force households to increase amortisation, but households may voluntarily restore balance sheets through increased amortisation (savings)\*

Also has to do with  $L_t \leq 0$ , further explored in NB WP 16, 2014