#### "ESTIMATING POLICY FUNCTIONS IN PAYMENTS SYSTEMS USING REINFORCEMENT LEARNING"

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**ECONOMICS OF PAYMENTS X** 

# This Paper

- New methodology to estimate banks' policies in a large value payment system.
- R einforcement learning can successfully approximate analytical solutions for a simple two period model with two banks.
- Promising results for a more complex environment with two banks and multiple periods.
- An interesting case study for how AI can be used in large value payment systems. Showcases AI's ability to make financial decisions under uncertainty.

#### Illustrative Example

- 2 banks Bank A and Bank B
- Bank A needs to send \$10B to Bank B at 8:01AM
- Bank B needs to send to Bank A \$10B at 8:02AM
- Common knowledge about the payment needs
- Q: How much collateral should Bank A pledge at 8:00AM?
- A: \$10B
- Q: How much collateral should bank B pledge at 8:00AM?
- A: Northing! Because Bank B uses the collateral from Bank A.
  Bank B free-rides on the liquidity provided by Bank A.

# Economic trade-offs in the model

- Collateral is costly so pledging less is better
- Delays in sending payments are even more costly so pledging more is better, unless there is a reasonable chance that there is an incoming payment that is backed by other bank's collateral ("free collateral")
- Banks want to reuse the free collateral from another bank rather than to pledge their own collateral
- The timing of the payments is not (fully) predictable, and the actions of other banks are not observable
- The paper shows that reinforcement learning allows AI to account for the above trade-offs

# Comments

# Large Value Transfer System (LVTS)

- Canadian LVTS has two tranches to send payments
  - Tranche 1 (RTGS): high stability, low efficiency (collateral overuse)
  - Tranche 2 (DNS): high efficiency, low stability (credit limits instead of collateral)
    - Banks mainly use Tranche 2. The paper models Tranche 1 only.
    - The true risk is that banks cut credit limits, collateral constraints become binding and critical payments cannot be made, causing a high-frequency systemic risk (Chapman, Gofman, Jafri 2019)
    - Stress measures: rejected payments, delayed payments, credit limit reductions, delays of credit limits extension.
- Can reinforcement learning be applied in a hybrid system like LTVS? Can it help to predict jumps in systemic risk? Can it help regulators to decide when to inject liquidity by accepting broader collateral?

### Should AI learn from Humans?

- The key question for training an AI model is what is the objective function. Do we try to replicate/ approximate human behavior? Do we try to create a superhuman AI system? How do we measure success? Do we want to have an autonomous AI-based large value payments system? Is it better than a hybrid system where both humans and AI make decisions?
- Do human operators of LVTS play an optimal equilibrium strategy in a multi-bank game of liquidity hoarding? Should we train AI to approximate this strategy? What if it is suboptimal?
- There is a significant number of failed payments that should never happen in equilibrium. Does it suggest that humans are not perfect?
- If there is a good and a bad equilibrium of the liquidity injection game or a good and a bad equilibrium of the credit limits provision game, should be train AI to avoid bad equilibria? Can AI be better in coordination?

# Cooperation or Competition?

- Do Banks play a non-cooperative game in LVTS?
- Evidence that large Canadian banks in LVTS injected extra liquidity at times of systemic stress (Chapman, Gofman, Jafri 2019).
- Inconsistent with the goal to hoard liquidity at the beginning of the day.
- Banks want clients to receive payments as much as they want clients to send payments.
- Banks do not want counterparties to fail to repay them their loans because they lack the collateral.
- Banks are not interested in the system's failure to process payments.
- Can AI help with collateral management at the system level?

# Model Misspecification

- 2 banks vs. many banks (Fedwire or Target2 have thousands)
- Banks can pledge more collateral during the day
- Payments come continuously. Some are urgent. We observe only sent payments, do not observe delays.
- Interbank market for liquidity.
- Borrowing from the Bank of Canada at the end of the day requires collateral.
- Will AI be able to deal with the real-life setting? Can we learn from AI's solution to a simplified environment? What if we feed AI with less data than what human operators have?

## Conclusion

- R einforced Learning has been very successful in different domains (Chess, Go).
- It is great to see the technique is used for estimating policy functions for initial collateral pledging to LVTS. Very promising research agenda with a lot of potential.
- I hope to see more AI work on estimating size and timing of payment needs, predicting rejected payments, delays in payments and collateral shortages