

Market Liquidity and Systemic Risk of Government Bond Markets: Network Analysis and Agency Based Model Approach


by Toshiyuki Sakiyama and Tetsuya Yamada (e-mail : tetsuya.yamada@boj.or.jp)




Bank of Japan

The networks of JGB markets have *core-periphery structures*.

Network Structure of JGB Markets




How QE affected the network structures?




Event Studies of Fire Sales shows that *Cores needed to search new peripheries* to sell their bonds, and peripheries bought them *because price was discounted*.


Fire Sale Events in JGB market




Number of links in 2013



Number of links (detail) in 2013



Transaction volume per Player in 2013




→ The same results are obtained in the case of VaR shock.

Systemic Risk Simulation Model show that not only the capital adequacy of market participants but also *the network structure are important for financial market stability*.


Systemic risk simulation model

i) Hit VaR-constrain




ii) Firstly, players who are directly connected purchase to a certain level.

iii) in the case that selling pressure of player in VaR-constrain is not satisfied, go to step iv)



iv) Then, players who are not connected purchase. In this situation, the price declines additionally because of bargaining power.


v) Due to this drop in price, hit VaR-constrain




vi) FIRE SALES!

The results


Simple example (N = 6, model 1 v.s. model 2)



Peripheries connected to red core have enough capacities



Peripheries connected to red core have little capacities



• When peripheries connected to red cores have little capacities to absorb shock, the price declines with small external shock.

→ The same results are obtained if number of player =100