Stagflation and Topsy-Turvy Capital Flows

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Motivation: Surge in inflation and aggressive policy tightening

(a) Inflation rates



(b) Policy rates



- Surge in inflation is forcing central banks to engage in their most aggressive tightening cycle in decades.
- Raises spectre of new “taper tantrum,” large capital outflows from EMEs.
- Reasons to believe such capital outflows could be *excessive*? Are rising odds of stagflation critical for this assessment?

Context and contribution

- **Large literature in macro theory** points to imperfections in financial, goods and labor markets as possible causes of excessive capital flows (e.g., Bianchi, 2011, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2016). But it has largely ignored roles of output-inflation trade-off and stagflation.

- **Our contribution**: Document excessive capital flows in baseline open-economy New-Keynesian model with output-inflation trade-off. Flows may even be *topsy-turvy*.

  - Novel macroeconomic externality associated with external borrowing and operating through economy's supply side.
  - Capital inflows raise domestic marginal costs and worsens policy trade-off in most depressed countries.



Literature

Sketch of model

Baseline open-economy New-Keynesian model

- Two countries
- Preferences $u_t = \ln C_t - \frac{N_t^{1+\phi}}{1+\phi}$, with $C \equiv \left[(1-\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_H)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + \alpha^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_F)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}}\right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}$ (for presentation: focus on $\alpha = 1/2$, i.e., no home bias)
- Monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities (Calvo pricing)
- Flexible exchange rate, cooperative monetary policy under commitment
- Producer currency pricing and law of one price
- Complete financial markets
- Cost-push shocks generating output-inflation trade-off

Details on households | Details on firms

Equilibrium

- Output determination

$$y_t = \frac{1}{2}\left(c_t + c_t^* + \eta s_t\right). \tag{1}$$

- International risk-sharing

$$c_t = c_t^* + \theta_t. \tag{2}$$

- Inflation and marginal costs

$$\rho \pi_{H,t} = \dot{\pi}_{H,t} + \kappa mc_t, \tag{3}$$

$$mc_t = (1+\phi)y_t - \frac{\eta - 1}{2}s_t + \frac{1}{2}\theta_t + u_t. \tag{4}$$

World and difference formulation | Loss function

Optimal monetary and capital flow management (CFM) policy

- Optimal policy solves

$$\min_{\{y_t^D, \pi_t^D, \theta_t\}} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left[\left(\frac{1}{\eta} + \phi \right) (y_t^D)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{\kappa} (\pi_t^D)^2 + \frac{1}{4} (\theta_t)^2 \right] dt$$

subject to

$$\rho \pi_t^D = \dot{\pi}_t^D + \kappa \left[\left(\frac{1}{\eta} + \phi \right) y_t^D + \frac{1}{2} \theta_t \right] + \kappa u_t^D. \qquad \text{(NKPC D)}$$

- Optimal policy characterized by targeting rules

$$\dot{y}_t^D + \varepsilon \pi_t^D = 0 \qquad \text{and} \qquad \theta_t = 2 y_t^D.$$

- Remarks:
  - With output-inflation trade-off, generally $y_t^D \neq 0$, so free capital mobility regime is constrained inefficient ($\theta_t \neq 0$).
  - Optimal to redirect spending *away* from country with most depressed output.

Externality via firms' marginal costs

- Consider marginal reallocation of spending towards Home at t, starting from free capital mobility regime.

- Applying envelope theorem, change in loss function induced by perturbation is

$$\frac{d\mathbb{L}_t}{d\theta_t} = \underbrace{\varphi_t^D}_{\text{multiplier on (NKPC D)}} \times \underbrace{\frac{\partial mc^D(y_t^D, \theta_t)}{\partial \theta_t}}_{+}$$

- If (NKPC D) binds ($\varphi_t^D \neq 0$), perturbation has first-order welfare effect.

Topsy-turvy capital flows

- How do capital flows behave under free capital mobility vs. optimal CFM?
- Under free capital mobility, two neoclassical motives of inter-temporal trade compete (Cole-Obstfeld, 1991)
  - Low output $\rightarrow$ incentive to borrow,
  - ToT appreciation $\rightarrow$ incentive to save.

$$nx_t = \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} y_t^D.$$

- Under optimal CFM, additional *Keynesian* motive of inter-temporal trade
  - Relax output-inflation trade-off where it is the most stringent $\rightarrow$ incentive to save.

$$nx_t = -\frac{1}{\eta} y_t^D.$$

- When $\eta > 1$, capital flows are *topsy-turvy* under free capital mobility.

Relaxing no home bias assumption ($\alpha < 1/2$)

$$\frac{\partial mc^D(y_t^D, \theta_t)}{\partial \theta_t} = \frac{\alpha\chi}{\eta - (\eta - 1)(1 - 2\alpha)^2}\left[\underbrace{1}_{\text{real wage effect}} - \underbrace{(1-2\alpha)/\chi}_{\text{purchasing power effect}}\right]$$

- χ is trade elasticity
- Shifting demand toward Home appreciates ToT, exercising counteracting force on marginal costs.
- For plausible calibrations, real wage effect dominates.



Cost-push shock scenario

- Now consider (unanticipated, temporary) inflationary cost-push shock in Home, starting from symmetric steady-state of model
  - Home: $u_t = 2\bar{u} > 0$ for some $\bar{u} > 0$ for $t \in [0, T)$ and $u_t = 0$ for $t \geq T$
  - Foreign: $u_t^* = 0$ for $t \geq 0$

- In terms of "world" and "differences":

$$u_t^W = u_t^D = \begin{cases} \bar{u} > 0 & \text{for} \quad t \in [0, T) \\ 0 & \text{for} \quad t \geq T. \end{cases}$$

- How does world economy adjust under free capital mobility vs. optimal CFM regime?

- Targeting rules + NKPC D form a dynamical system amenable for phase diagram analysis.

Adjustment under free capital mobility



Adjustment under optimal CFM



Impulse responses to cost-push shock in calibrated example

Set $\rho = 0.04$, $\eta = 2$, $\alpha = 0.25$, $\phi = 0$, $\varepsilon = 7.66$, $\rho_\delta = 1 - 0.75^4$, with mean reverting Home cost-push shock matching annual autocorrelation of 0.65 (Groll and Monacelli, 2020).



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

Conclusion

- Point to a macroeconomic externality operating via firms' marginal costs in standard open-economy model with nominal rigidities.
- When policy faces output-inflation trade-off, externality causes
  - Excessive capital flows toward countries with most depressed output.
  - Capital may even flow the wrong way (topsy-turvy)!
- Casts further doubts on classical view that free capital mobility promotes macroeconomic adjustment, esp. in stagflationary context.
- Wider applicability: externality likely matters in other contexts with output-inflation tradeoffs and household heterogeneity (e.g., multi-sector closed economies).

Relationship to literature

Macroeconomic externality resembles those stressed by two branches of recent literature in monetary and international macro:

1. AD externalities in economies with nominal rigidities
   - Farhi and Werning (2012, 2014, 2016, 2017), Korinek and Simsek (2016), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016), etc.
   - Constraints on price adjustments and monetary policy prevent goods-specific labor wedges to be closed.
   - General prescription: incentivize agents to shift wealth toward states of nature where their spending is high on goods whose provision is most depressed.
2. Pecuniary externalities under incomplete financial markets
   - Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Korinek (2007, 2018), Bianchi (2011), Jeanne and Korinek (2010, 2019, 2020), Benigno et al. (2013, 2016), etc.
   - Incomplete markets or borrowing constraints prevent equalization of MRS across agents.
   - General prescription: distort financial choices to generate price movements that reduce incomplete markets wedges.

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Households

- Preferences over consumption and labor supply $u_t = \ln C_t - \frac{N_t^{1+\phi}}{1+\phi}$

- CES consumption $C \equiv \left[(1-\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_H)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + \alpha^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C_F)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}$ where
  - α captures trade openness, for presentation focus on $\alpha = 1/2$ (no home bias)
  - C_H, C_F Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates of goods produced in Home and Foreign with ES between varieties of ε.

- Can trade two types of nominal bonds, domestic D_t and international B_t

$$\dot{D}_t + \dot{B}_t = i_t D_t + (\underline{i_t} + \tau_t) B_t + W_t N_t - \int_0^1 P_{H,t}(l) C_{H,t}(l) dl - \int_0^1 P_{F,t}(l) C_{F,t}(l) dl + T_t .$$

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Firms + International relative prices

Firms

- Produce differentiated goods with technology $Y_t(l) = N_t(l)$.
- $N_t(l)$ is composite of individual household labor, CES aggregator with ES among varieties ε_t^w, to generate cost-push shocks.
- Calvo (1983) price setting with producer currency pricing. ▸ details

International relative price

- Terms of trade $S_t \equiv P_{F,t}/P_{H,t} = P^*_{F,t}/P^*_{H,t}$.

▸ back

Details on firms' pricing

- Calvo (1983) price setting, opportunity to reset price $P^r_{H,t}(j)$ when receives price-change signal (Poisson process w. intensity $\rho_\delta \geq 0$). Firm maximizes

$$\int_t^\infty \rho_\delta e^{-\rho_\delta(k-t)} \frac{\lambda_k}{\lambda_t} \left[P^r_{H,t}(j) - P_{H,k} MC_k\right] Y_{k|t} dk,$$

subject to demand $Y_{k|t} = \left(P^r_{H,t}/P_{H,k}\right)^{-\varepsilon} Y_k$, with real marginal cost $MC_k \equiv (1-\tau^N)W_k/P_{H,k}$.

▸ back

Equilibrium (cont.)

- (1) + (2) give equilibrium terms of trade

$$y_t - y_t^* = \eta s_t.$$

- (3) + (4) give New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC)

$$\rho \pi_{H,t} = \dot{\pi}_{H,t} + \kappa \underbrace{\left[(1+\phi) y_t - \frac{\eta - 1}{2} s_t + \frac{1}{2} \theta_t + u_t \right]}_{mc_t}.$$

back

World and difference formulation

- Define
  - "world" variables $y_t^W \equiv (y_t + y_t^*)/2$, $\pi_t^W \equiv (\pi_{H,t} + \pi_{F,t}^*)/2$,
  - "difference" variables $y_t^D \equiv (y_t - y_t^*)/2$, $\pi_t^D \equiv (\pi_{H,t} - \pi_{F,t}^*)/2$.
- Terms of trade satisfies

$$2y_t^D = \eta s_t . \tag{ToT}$$

- NKPCs

$$\dot{\pi}_t^W = \rho \pi_t^W - \kappa(1+\phi) y_t^W - \kappa u_t^W , \tag{NKPC W}$$

$$\dot{\pi}_t^D = \rho \pi_t^D - \kappa \left[\left(\frac{1}{\eta} + \phi \right) y_t^D + \frac{1}{2} \theta_t \right] - \kappa u_t^D . \tag{NKPC D}$$

▸ back

Welfare criterion

- Assume long-run distortions from monopolistic competition eliminated by labor subsidy.

- 2nd order approximation of (equally weighted) sum of households' utility around efficient allocation:

$$\mathbb{L}_t = \left[(1+\phi)(y_t^W)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{\kappa}(\pi_t^W)^2\right] + \left[\left(\frac{1}{\eta}+\phi\right)(y_t^D)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{\kappa}(\pi_t^D)^2\right] + \frac{1}{4}(\theta_t)^2.$$

- Remark: "world" variables separated from "difference" variables in both objective function and constraints, can study determination of both blocks separately

Loss function with home bias

back

Loss function with home bias

- Loss function with $\alpha < 1/2$

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{L}_t &= \left[(1+\phi)(y_t^W)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{\kappa}(\pi_t^W)^2\right] + \left[(1+\phi)(y_t^D)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{\kappa}(\pi_t^D)^2\right] \\ &\quad + \alpha(1-\alpha)\left[(1-\eta)\eta(s_t)^2 + (\theta_t - (\eta-1)(1-2\alpha)s_t)^2\right].\end{aligned}$$

▸ back

Optimal monetary policy

- Optimal monetary policy solves

$$\min_{\{y_t^D,\pi_t^D\}} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t}\left[\left(\frac{1}{\eta}+\phi\right)(y_t^D)^2+\frac{\varepsilon}{\kappa}(\pi_t^D)^2+\frac{1}{4}(\theta_t)^2\right]dt$$

subject to

$$\rho\pi_t^D=\dot{\pi}_t^D+\kappa\left[\left(\frac{1}{\eta}+\phi\right)y_t^D+\frac{1}{2}\theta_t\right]+\kappa u_t^D. \qquad \text{(NKPC D)}$$

- Optimal plan characterized by targeting rule

$$\dot{y}_t^D+\varepsilon\pi_t^D = 0.$$

- Remark:
  - Monetary policy is "inward looking" regardless of assumption on $\{\theta_t\}$.

Details on optimal monetary policy

- Optimal monetary policy solves

$$\min_{\{y_t^W,\pi_t^W,y_t^D,\pi_t^D,s_t\}} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t}\Big\{\Big[(1+\phi)(y_t^W)^2+\frac{\varepsilon}{\kappa}(\pi_t^W)^2\Big]+\Big[(1+\phi)(y_t^D)^2+\frac{\varepsilon}{\kappa}(\pi_t^D)^2\Big]$$
$$+\alpha(1-\alpha)\Big[(1-\eta)\eta(s_t)^2+(\theta_t-(\eta-1)(1-2\alpha)s_t)^2\Big]\Big\}dt.$$

subject to

$$\dot{\pi}_t^W=\rho\pi_t^W-\kappa(1+\phi)y_t^W-\kappa u_t^W, \qquad \text{(NKPC W)}$$
$$\dot{\pi}_t^D=\rho\pi_t^D-\kappa\left[(1+\phi)y_t^D-\frac{\omega-1}{2}s_t+\alpha\theta_t\right]-\kappa u_t^D, \qquad \text{(NKPC D)}$$
$$2y_t^D=\omega s_t+(1-2\alpha)\theta_t. \qquad \text{(ToT)}$$

- Optimal plan characterized by targeting rules

$$\dot{y}_t^W+\varepsilon\pi_t^W = 0,$$
$$\dot{y}_t^D+\varepsilon\pi_t^D = 0.$$

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