Who Talks During Monetary Policy Quiet Periods, and Why? Evidence from the European Central Bank's Governing Council

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Bank of Finland & SUERF Conference

Lunch and Poster Session

19 October 2021

*This presentation does not necessarily reflect the views of the OeNB, the ECB or the Eurosystem.

The (not so) quiet period in the run-up to monetary policy meetings



Michael Brown @MrMBrown · 16. März

...

Andrew Bailey breaking the BoE's **quiet period** for the second day running...what are they doing on Threadneedle St!?



Paul Gordon @pgordon66 · 29. Nov. 2014 ··· Not so quiet in ECB's quiet period. #ECB's Lautenschlaeger Rebuffs QE as Germans Step Up Opposition bloom.bg/1yo1zs9 @BloombergNews

...



Becky Quick 🤡 @BeckyQuick · 4. Nov. 2010 Shocker -- Chairman Bernanke talks about yesterday's Fed action in quiet period in Wash Post OpEd http://wapo.st/9v6W7O

This paper

Monetary policy quiet period (QP):

- Self-imposed discipline during days preceding policy meetings
- Statements on future monetary policy stance & economic developments ruled out
- <u>Rationale</u>: avoid strategic policy lock-ins and volatility
- QP represents a double-edged sword

Research question: Why and when do central bankers breach the quiet period?

Lack of empirical evidence on drivers of non-compliance:

 \rightarrow No systematic data, classification difficulties, selection bias

Proprietary ECB summary reports on statements in QP (2008-2020)

SEC/GovC/

breach

nonbreach





BY MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE ECB

SECTION I: STATEMENTS MADE DURING THE QUIET PERIOD

- Statements made during the quiet period (16 January 2020 23 January 2020) referring explicitly to the future monetary policy stance and economic developments including statements on inflation, wage developments, economic growth, structural reforms, fiscal reforms, exchange rates, labour markets, etc.
- Statements made during the quiet period (16 January 2020 23 January 2020) explicitly declining to comment on the future monetary policy stance and economic developments.
- Statements made during the quiet period (16 January 2020 23 January 2020) c) not referring explicitly to the future monetary policy stance and economic developments.

21 January 2020

Contributions: a primer on quiet period communication in the Eurosystem

1. Provide descriptive statistics on quiet period compliance

2. Identify systematic patterns in breaching behavior

3. Understand the ECB's classification of statements

4. Test for strategic motives in quiet period communication

Background and data

The ECB's quiet period

- First introduced in <u>2001</u>, covers 7 days before meetings
- Systematic monitoring since Trichet presidency
- ECB summary <u>circulated</u> prior to meeting, but <u>no formal sanctions</u>


We match statement-level data from ECB summaries with:

- 1. Public information on GovC members (e.g. age, education)
- 2. National macroeconomic data (e.g. inflation, unemployment)


We conduct a statement-by-statement review of the ECB series:

Main outcome: our <u>own series</u> of breaches

QP breaches in the euro area since 2008 (116 meetings, 64 distinct members, 112/347 breaches)



Heterogeneity in QP breaches in the euro area since 2008



Main results (I): cross-sectional variation in GovC members' QP breaches



 $C_{m,t}$: wide range of member characteristics & macroeconomic controls $S_{i,t}$: international audience, prepared text, days to meeting

- 1. Main finding: "zero results" no evidence for home bias, nor career concerns
- 2. Experience & expertise robustly correlated with breaching behavior
- 3. Results consistent across ECB and our own re-classified series



Main results (I	I): differences in QP breach	series			
Classifi	$\underbrace{D_{i,m,t}}_{\text{cation difference}} = \underbrace{\alpha}_{\text{Constant}} + \underbrace{\alpha}_{\text{Constant}}$	Statement co	$+\underbrace{\mathbf{\Gamma'C}_{n}}_{Member of}$		$\underbrace{u_{i,m,t}}_{Error}$
		(1)	(2)	(3)	
		Full period	Pre-June 2014	Post-June 2014	
	ECB board member	0.1305**	0.1524***	0.0074	
		(0.0498)	(0.0555)	(0.0767)	
	Decline to comment	0.2244**	0.1670*	0.4814***	
		(0.0893)	(0.0901)	(0.0977)	
	Days to meeting	0.0137*	0.0160*	-0.0034	
		(0.0072)	(0.0082)	(0.0151)	
	Observations	903	670	233	
	Other controls in ${\boldsymbol{S}}$ and ${\boldsymbol{C}}$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
	Quiet period fixed effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
	R-squared	0.2149	0.1895	0.3295	
	Robust (clustered at m	ember-level) s	standard errors in	parentheses.	

Do non-voting members breach QP to "lock in" colleagues?

New test of the narrative of ECB GovC as collegial decision-making body

Identification strategy:

- Rotational schedule enters into force in Jan 2015 Rotational schedule
- First schedule set in 2014 pre-determined voting rights ever since
- Voting rights orthogonal to economic developments and policy debates

$$B_{i,m,t} = \underbrace{\beta T_{m,t}}_{Treatment} + \underbrace{\mathbf{\Lambda}' \mathbf{S}_{i,t}}_{Statement \ controls} + \underbrace{\mathbf{\Gamma}' \mathbf{C}_{m,t}}_{Time-varying \ controls} + \underbrace{M_m}_{Member \ FE} + \underbrace{QP_t}_{QP \ FE} + u_{i,m,t}$$

We find no evidence that strategic communication substitutes for voting rights.

I. Correlational regressions: selection into speaking • Results

▶ Focus on "involuntary" statements only (e.g. Parliamentary hearings)

II. Quasi-experiment: separating media demand and supply **Results**

We find <u>no effect</u> of bearing voting rights on media demand

III. Additional results

- Different model specifications
- Analysis of total communication during QP
- Ex post meeting outcome not associated with strategic communication Plat

Take-aways and future research

"Zero results" with policy implications:

- \rightarrow Home bias does not seem to play a role for QP behaviour
- \rightarrow No rotational voting effect on QP behaviour
- \rightarrow Relative <u>absence of classic career concerns</u>: only small transparency lever?

QP definition and clarity:


- \rightarrow Frequent breaches & classification hard to reproduce
- \rightarrow Clarification of QP rules might be helpful

Work in progress:


- <u>"Market-driven" classification</u> into breaches and non-breaches
- What explains anonymous leaks (so-called "sources stories")?

APPENDIX

Exploring cross-sectional variation in GovC members' QP breaches: results • Table • B1 • B2



Exploring cross-sectional variation in GovC members' QP breaches: results (contd.) **Table PB1 PB2**



		Part	1.		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Classification	ECB class.	ECB class.	own class.	own class.	total comm.
Sample	full	robust	full	robust	full (member-level)
Age	0.0116	0.0078	-0.0223	0.0375	-0.1139*
	(0.0234)	(0.0885)	(0.0364)	(0.1509)	(0.0624)
Age (squared)	-0.0001	-0.0000	0.0002	-0.0002	0.0010*
	(0.0002)	(0.0008)	(0.0003)	(0.0013)	(0.0006)
$Reappointment \leq 1Y$	0.0403	-0.0683	0.0260	0.3316	0.0257
	(0.0718)	(0.0871)	(0.0968)	(0.5150)	(0.0510)
Service end ≤ 1 Y	0.0152	-0.0251	0.0052	0.0955	0.0012
	(0.0333)	(0.0698)	(0.0508)	(0.1665)	(0.0640)
NCB voting group 1	-0.0392	0.0827	-0.0182	0.0614	0.1904*
	(0.0330)	(0.0787)	(0.0556)	(0.1762)	(0.1059)
ECB board member	-0.0397	0.0394	0.1199*	0.3731	0.1210
	(0.0365)	(0.1098)	(0.0604)	(0.2290)	(0.0968)
Female	-0.0947*	-0.1325	-0.0586	-0.5145	-0.0893
	(0.0562)	(0.2095)	(0.1613)	(0.3130)	(0.1015)

Conditional correlations: cross-sectional variation in GovC members' QP breaches Visual VB1 B2

Base categories: economics/bus. admin./finance; no doctoral degree; NCB voting group 2 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Cond. correlations: cross-sectional variation in GovC members' QP breaches (contd.) Visual VB1 VB2

Part 2.									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)				
Classification	ECB class.	ECB class.	own class.	own class.	total comm.				
Sample	full	robust	full	robust	full (member-level)				
Law	-0.0496	-0.1983	-0.1102*	-0.1964	-0.1406*				
	(0.0318)	(0.1562)	(0.0558)	(0.2232)	(0.0835)				
Political sciences	-0.0761		-0.0778		-0.0386				
	(0.0547)		(0.0880)		(0.0802)				
Doctorate	0.0127	0.1384*	0.0841	0.2324	-0.0617				
	(0.0348)	(0.0782)	(0.0519)	(0.1532)	(0.0802)				
Study abroad	-0.0741*	-0.1047*	-0.1105**	-0.1109	-0.0613				
	(0.0374)	(0.0556)	(0.0542)	(0.1542)	(0.0883)				
Service length	-0.0366***	-0.0724*	-0.0567***	-0.1782**	-0.0093				
	(0.0133)	(0.0398)	(0.0190)	(0.0776)	(0.0193)				
Serv. length (squared)	0.0035***	0.0088**	0.0054***	0.0153**	-0.0001				
	(0.0011)	(0.0038)	(0.0019)	(0.0057)	(0.0012)				

Base categories: economics/bus. admin./finance; no doctoral degree; NCB voting group 2 Robust (clustered at member-level) standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1

		Part 3	3.		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Classification	ECB class.	ECB class.	own class.	own class.	total comm.
Sample	full	robust	full	robust	full (member-level)
Inflation (yoy)	0.0152	-0.0400	0.0022	-0.0323	-0.0118
	(0.0161)	(0.0326)	(0.0223)	(0.0415)	(0.0206)
Unemp. (rel. Δ yoy)	0.0379	-0.1307	-0.0227	-0.0277	-0.2063
	(0.0615)	(0.1618)	(0.1487)	(0.3555)	(0.1911)
10Y sov. yield (Δ)	-0.0245	0.0518	0.0065	0.0797	-0.0239
	(0.0260)	(0.0450)	(0.0489)	(0.0737)	(0.0317)
Stock market (returns)	0.0855	-0.2101	0.3660	-0.2224	-0.4962**
	(0.1701)	(0.2182)	(0.3295)	(0.5635)	(0.1878)

Base categories: economics/bus. admin./finance; no doctoral degree; NCB voting group 2 Robust (clustered at member-level) standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

Part 4.								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
Classification	ECB class.	ECB class.	own class.	own class.	total comm.			
Sample	full	robust	full	robust	full (member-level)			
International audience	-0.0012	-0.1119	0.0670*	-0.1115				
	(0.0202)	(0.0988)	(0.0396)	(0.1944)				
Prepared text	-0.0401**		0.0015					
	(0.0195)		(0.0430)					
Days to meeting	0.0063	-0.0028	0.0197**	-0.0061				
	(0.0058)	(0.0205)	(0.0089)	(0.0308)				
Observations	903	69	903	69	2,635			
Clustered SE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark			
Quiet period fixed effects	\checkmark	×	\checkmark	\times	\checkmark			
R-squared	0.2785	0.3078	0.2431	0.2382	0.1825			
Base categories: economics/bus. admin./finance; no doctoral degree; NCB voting group 2								
Robust (cl	ustered at me	ember-level) s	standard erro	rs in parenth	eses.			

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Impact of rotational voting on QP breaches: statement-level regressions **Pack**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Classification	ECB class.	ECB class.	own class.	own class.			
Treatment	0.0354	-0.0069	0.0917	0.0398			
	(0.1190)	(0.1213)	(0.1356)	(0.1559)			
Treatment $ imes$ NCB voting group 2		0.1632		0.2005			
		(0.2350)		(0.2439)			
Observations	157	157	157	157			
Clustered SE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark			
Control vectors $C_{m,t}$ and $S_{i,t}$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark			
Member fixed effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark			
Quiet period fixed effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark			
R-squared	0.5699	0.5722	0.5589	0.5616			
Base category for treatment interaction: NCB voting group 1 (ES, FR, GER, IT, NL).							
Robust (clustered at member-level) standard errors in parentheses.							
*** p<0.	.01, ** p<0.0	05, * p<0.1					

Impact of rotational voting on QP breaches: member-level regressions Pack

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)				
Dependent variable	Total comm.	Total comm.	Total comm.	Total comm.				
Туре	(binary)	(binary)	(count)	(count)				
Treatment	-0.0369	0.0023	-0.0614**	-0.0407				
	(0.0230)	(0.0319)	(0.0259)	(0.0366)				
Treatment $ imes$ NCB voting group 2		-0.0539		-0.0285				
		(0.0410)		(0.0473)				
Observations	737	737	737	737				
Clustered SE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark				
Control vector $\mathbf{C}_{m,t}$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark				
Member fixed effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark				
Quiet period fixed effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark				
R-squared	0.1471	0.1479	0.1446	0.1448				
Base category for treatment interaction: NCB voting group 1 (ES, FR, GER, IT, NL).								
Robust (clustered at member-level) standard errors in parentheses.								
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1								

	(1)	(2)							
Dependent variable	Strictly relevant meetings	Total number of calendar entries							
Treatment	-0.0930	0.5501							
	(0.2300)	(0.5710)							
Observations	136	136							
Clustered SE	\checkmark	\checkmark							
Control vector $C_{m,t}$	\checkmark	\checkmark							
Member fixed effects	\checkmark	\checkmark							
Quiet period fixed effects	\checkmark	\checkmark							
R-squared	0.2474	0.4007							
Robust (clustered at member-level) standard errors in parentheses.									
	***	n < 0.1							

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

First rotational voting schedule of ECB GovC (2015) • Back

Governing Council Members - Group 1		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
President, Deutsche Bundesbank	Jens Weidmann	Ø	Ø		\checkmark	*	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	*	Ø	Ø
Governor, Banco de España	Luis María Linde	*	\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark	*	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	۲	Ø
Governor, Banque de France	Christian Noyer	\checkmark	۲		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	*	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	*
Governor, Banca d'Italia	Ignazio Visco	\checkmark	\checkmark	۲	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	*	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	Ø
President, De Nederlandsche Bank	Klaas Knot	\checkmark	\checkmark		*	\checkmark	\checkmark	Ø	\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark	Ø
Governing Council Members - Group 2		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Governor, Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique	Jan Smets	Ø	\bigotimes	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	*
Governor, Eesti Pank	Ardo Hansson	*	\checkmark	Ø									
Governor, Central Bank of Ireland	Patrick Honohan	*			\checkmark	Ø							
Governor, Bank of Greece	Yannis Stournaras	*				\checkmark			\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	Ø
Governor, Central Bank of Cyprus	Chrystalla Georghadji	Ø	*		*	\checkmark	Ø						
Chairman of the Board, Lietuvos bankas	Vitas Vasiliauskas	\checkmark	\checkmark	*	*	*		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	Ø
Governor, Latvijas Banka	Ilmārs Rimšēvičs	Ø	\checkmark	\checkmark	*	*	*	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	Ø
Governor, Banque centrale du Luxembourg	Gaston Reinesch	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		*	*	*	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	Ø
Governor, Central Bank of Malta	Josef Bonnici	Ø	\checkmark				*	*	*	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	Ø
Governor, Oesterreichische Nationalbank	Ewald Nowotny	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark			*	*	*	\checkmark	\checkmark	Ø
Governor, Banco de Portugal	Carlos Costa	\checkmark	\checkmark					\checkmark	*	*	*	\checkmark	Ø
Governor, Banka Slovenije	Boštjan Jazbec	Ø	\checkmark						\checkmark	*	*	*	Ø
Governor, Národná banka Slovenska	Jozef Makúch		\checkmark	\checkmark					\checkmark	\checkmark	*	*	*
Governor, Suomen Pankki - Finlands Bank	Erkki Liikanen											()	(*

Example: CBI Governor meeting calendars • Back



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Administrative Information

Appointment Diaries

Appointments diaries contain details of appointments and meetings. Some information is withheld for confidentiality or data protection reasons.

Governor's Appointment Diaries

2020 Governor Makhlouf's Appointment Diary (Jan-Mar) | pdf 288 KB

2019 Governor Makhlouf's Appointment Diary | pdf 816 KB

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QP communication and policy action Pack

