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DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Andrey Tkachenko (Higher School of Economics and Bocconi University) - State-business relations and access to external financing: evidence from Russia =0D=0A Abstract Contractual relations of firms with a state may give lenders a positive signal and facilitate access to debt. This paper studies the impact of public procurement contract on firms access to debt using an extensive survey of Russian manufacturing firms combined with accounting and procurement data. It shows that earnings from state-to-business contracts increase the short-term debt twice larger than revenue from private contracts. The long-term debt is not affected by public contracts differently compared to private contracts. The debt sensitivity to public contracts is four times larger for politically connected firms, though it is still positive and significant for non-connected firms. The paper concludes that political connection does not entirely suppress the beneficial access to debt the public contracts create. =0D=0A Online BOFIT seminars are open to all researchers interested in the subjects covered. Those wishing to attend a seminar are kindly asked to register in advance, by filling in the  Online Registration Form =0D=0A The registration for each seminar is open until 9:00 am the day of the seminar. You will receive a link to join the seminar by email at the latest one hour before the seminar is scheduled to begin. =0D=0A
DTEND:20210302T093000Z
DTSTAMP:20210202T105111Z
DTSTART:20210302T083000Z
LOCATION:Teams meeting
SUMMARY:BOFIT Seminar - Andrey Tkachenko (Higher School of Economics and Bocconi University) - State-business relations and access to external financing: evidence from Russia
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