RssSources nyheter https://www.suomenpankki.fi sv BOFITs prognos om den ekonomiska utvecklingen i Ryssland 2024–2026: Rysslands ekonomi saktar in https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2024/bofits-prognos-om-den-ekonomiska-utvecklingen-i-ryssland-20242026-rysslands-ekonomi-saktar-in/ Finlands Banks forskningsinstitut för tillväxtmarknader BOFIT förutspår en avmattning i den ekonomiska tillväxten i Ryssland. I år väntas tillväxten ligga kring 2 % men sjunka till 1 % under de följande åren. Den kortsiktiga ekonomiska politiken och anfallskrigets förlopp kan påverka utvecklingen i betydande grad.

Den ekonomiska tillväxten i Ryssland var 2023 snabbare än vad som tidigare förutspåtts. Kapitalstocken och den privata konsumtionen ökade kraftigare än väntat. Det stora språnget i kapitalstocken förklaras av försvarsindustrins ökade investeringar och beredskapen för osäkrare tider. Dessutom har lagren byggts på till följd av den allt större komponentbristen.

Den privata konsumtionen i Ryssland steg snabbt i fjol efter nedgången 2022 tack vare stora löneförhöjningar. I år väntas den årliga tillväxten bromsa in framför allt på grund av begränsningar i kapaciteten.

”Under åren framöver växer Rysslands ekonomi i långsammare takt, och tillväxten drivs allt mer av staten. Tillväxten bromsar in och närmar sig landets långsiktiga tillväxtpotential, som har försvagats av anfallskriget”, säger senior ekonom Sinikka Parviainen från BOFIT.

Krigsutgifterna får Rysslands ekonomi att växa

Den ekonomiska tillväxten i Ryssland saktar in i år. Även om kvartalstillväxten stannar upp helt 2024, blir tillväxten på årsnivå i år ca 2 % tack vare den kraftiga tillväxten under andra halvåret 2023. Om inget överraskande händer, kommer den ryska ekonomin att växa med ca 1 % under 2025–2026, vilket ligger nära landet långsiktiga tillväxtpotential.

De offentliga utgifterna bidrar mest till den ekonomiska tillväxten i Ryssland under prognosperioden. Statens betydligt ökade krigsutgifter kanaliseras också till investeringar.

”Dessa investeringar kan dock inte antas höja landets produktionskapital eller produktivitet, då en stor del av investeringsvarorna förstörs redan på kort sikt”, konstaterar Parviainen.

En annan viktig drivkraft för tillväxten är den privata konsumtionen, som upprätthålls av full sysselsättning. Arbetskraftsbristen inom många sektorer förutsätter stora löneförhöjningar. Sannolikheten för en utvidgning av Rysslands exportmarknad är liten, medan importen begränsas bland annat av sanktionerna.

Osäkerheten kring prognosen är fortfarande stor. Avsaknaden av statistik försvårar också analysen av nuläget. Anfallskrigets förlopp och den kortsiktiga ekonomiska politiken i dagens Ryssland kan därför betydligt påverka den ekonomiska utvecklingen i Ryssland.

Hela prognosen på finska kan läsas på adressen https://www.bofit.fi/fi/ennusteet/viimeisin-venaja-ennuste/

Upplysningar:

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2024/bofits-prognos-om-den-ekonomiska-utvecklingen-i-ryssland-20242026-rysslands-ekonomi-saktar-in/ Pressmeddelande Mon, 25 Mar 2024 11:00:00 GMT
Stigande räntor ledde till betydligt svagare verksamhetsresultat för Finlands Bank 2023 https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2024/stigande-rantor-ledde-till-betydligt-svagare-verksamhetsresultat-for-finlands-bank-2023/ Bankfullmäktige har i dag fastställt Finlands Banks bokslut på framställning av Finlands Banks direktion.

Finlands Banks reviderade resultat för räkenskapsåret 2023 är noll euro efter upplösning av den generella avsättningen med 1 112 miljoner euro för att täcka det negativa verksamhetsresultatet. Finlands Banks finansiella resultat och balansräkningens struktur är en följd av de penningpolitiska åtgärderna som banken vidtar för att upprätthålla prisstabilitet i enlighet med sitt mandat.

”De stigande räntorna har försvagat Finlands Banks verksamhetsresultat betydligt. Finlands Bank har förberett sig väl för uppgången i räntorna, och riskavsättningarna har stärkts under perioden av låga räntor. Nu upplöses avsättningarna på motsvarande sätt. Resultatutsikterna är svaga också de närmaste åren”, säger vice ordföranden i Finlands Banks direktion Marja Nykänen.

Europeiska centralbanken inledde 2022 höjningar av styrräntorna för att dämpa den alltför höga inflationen och fortsatte höjningarna 2023, varvid ECB:s inlåningsränta steg från 2,0 % till 4,0 %.

Finlands Bank har inom ramen för de penningpolitiska programmen köpt obligationer, av vilka en stor del har emitterats av den offentliga sektorn i Finland. Det handlar om långfristiga obligationer som löper med fast ränta. Obligationsköpen skapade likviditet, vilket ökade affärsbankernas inlåning i centralbanken. På centralbanksinlåningen betalades 2023 en genomsnittlig ränta på 3,3 %. Den varierande räntebindningen för tillgångar och skulder har gett upphov till en strukturell ränterisk i centralbankens balansräkning som realiserats när räntorna gått upp.

Till följd av ränteuppgången betalades 4 472 miljoner euro i ränta på affärsbankernas inlåning under räkenskapsåret 2023, vilket överstiger avkastningen på tillgångarna. Räntenettot för 2023 på −1 044 miljoner euro var 1 503 miljoner euro mindre än året innan.

Resultatet av centralbanksverksamheten, som inkluderar både ränteintäkterna på Finlands Banks finansiella tillgångar och bankens andel av Eurosystemets penningpolitiska räntenetto, utgjorde −1 027 miljoner euro (2022: 35 miljoner euro). Finlands Banks och Finansinspektionens verksamhetskostnader och verksamhetsintäkter, exklusive kostnaderna för anskaffning av sedlar och avgiften till pensionsfonden, var −70 miljoner euro (2022: −66 miljoner euro).

Finlands Banks bokslut, som också innehåller Finansinspektionens intäkter och kostnader, har i dag den 22 mars 2024 publicerats på finska på Finlands Banks webbplats. På svenska och engelska publiceras bokslutet i april.

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av direktionens vice ordförande Marja Nykänen, telefon 09 183 20 07.

Finlands Banks årsberättelse 2023 (på finska)

Riskhanteringschef Antti Nurminen skriver om konsekvenserna av stigande räntor för Finlands Banks resultat i sin blogg (på finska).

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2024/stigande-rantor-ledde-till-betydligt-svagare-verksamhetsresultat-for-finlands-bank-2023/ Pressmeddelande Fri, 22 Mar 2024 09:01:00 GMT
Finlands Banks interimsprognos: Från seg recession mot tillväxt https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2024/finlands-banks-interimsprognos-fran-seg-recession-mot-tillvaxt/ Enligt Finlands Banks interimsprognos, som ges ut i dag, befinner sig den finländska ekonomin fortfarande i recession. Den högre pris- och räntenivån dämpar den privata konsumtionen och investeringarna. Särskilt svår är situationen inom bostadsbyggandet. Också exporten har krympt. Sysselsättningen är dock fortsatt god i förhållande till konjunkturläget och inflationen har också sjunkit snabbt.

Enligt interimsprognosen krymper Finlands BNP med 0,5 % under 2024. Ekonomin börjar återhämta sig först mot slutet av året och då rent av i något snabbare takt än vad Finlands Bank förutsåg i sin prognos i december 2023. BNP-tillväxten väntas bli 1,7 % under 2025 och sakta in något till 1,5 % under 2026.

”Fastän den faktiska ekonomiska utvecklingen har varit svagare än förutsett, är framtidsutsikterna oförändrade. Konjunkturnedgången har redan nått botten, och tillväxten väntas komma i gång i år i takt med att hushållens köpkraft stärks och det allmänna förtroendet för ekonomin börjar återhämta sig", säger Finlands Banks prognoschef Meri Obstbaum.

Inflationen saktar in betydligt – sysselsättningsgraden faller

Sysselsättningsläget är alltjämt gott i förhållande till konjunkturläget, då företagen ofta har tillgripit permitteringar i stället för uppsägningar. Lågkonjunkturen slår igenom med viss fördröjning på arbetsmarknaden och sysselsättningsgraden för personer i åldern 20–64 kommer att sjunka till 77,2 % i år. Antalet anställda vänder upp 2025, då konjunkturläget förbättras, men sysselsättningsgraden kommer ännu inte 2026 att överskrida den nivå som rådde före recessionen.

Den sjunkande inflationen har stärkt konsumenternas köpkraft och löntagarnas reala inkomster ökade redan 2023 från året förut. Inflationen avtar ytterligare under 2024 till under 1 %, men stiger något under 2025. Inflationen drivs huvudsakligen av prisökningen på tjänster.

Riskerna för prognosen ligger på nedåtsidan

Riskerna för prognosen ligger på nedåtsidan. De geopolitiska spänningarna har inte lättat och kan fortsätta att påverka den ekonomiska tillväxten negativt. Inflationen i euroområdet kan visa sig vara ihärdigare än väntat och en fördröjning av räntesänkningarna skulle förlänga recessionen. De största inhemska riskerna hänger samman med utsikterna för bostadsmarknaden. Om bostadsbyggnadsbranschens trångmål blir långvarigt, kan återverkningarna på sysselsättningen bli kraftigare än väntat. En utdragen arbetskonflikt innebär större osäkerhet i prognosen, eftersom det är svårt att bedöma konfliktens slutliga utbredning och dess konsekvenser.

Finlands Banks interimsprognos, mars 2024 (på finska)

Upplysningar:

prognoschef Meri Obstbaum

fornamn.efternamn@bof.fi, +35891832363

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2024/finlands-banks-interimsprognos-fran-seg-recession-mot-tillvaxt/ Pressmeddelande Fri, 15 Mar 2024 06:01:00 GMT
Mika Pösö blir chef för avdelningen för marknadsoperationer https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2024/mika-poso-blir-chef-for-avdelningen-for-marknadsoperationer/ Ekonomie magister, M.A. (Econ.) Mika Pösö har utnämnts till avdelningschef för Finlands Banks avdelning för marknadsoperationer. Utnämningen har gjorts för en femårsperiod.  

Mika Pösö har varit rådgivare till Finlands Banks direktion och avdelningschef för ledningssekretariatet samt haft andra expert- och chefsuppdrag på bankens avdelningar sedan 1995. Under 2020–2023 var han direktionsmedlem i Internationella valutafonden IMF:s direktion i Washington D.C.

Avdelningen för marknadsoperationer har till uppgift att genomföra ECB:s penningpolitik, investera Finlands Banks finansiella tillgångar och ta fram marknadsanalyser som underlag för besluten. Avdelningen svarar för avveckling, säkerhetshantering och betalningsrörelse på dessa områden och producerar TARGET-betalsystemtjänster.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2024/mika-poso-blir-chef-for-avdelningen-for-marknadsoperationer/ Pressmeddelande Tue, 12 Mar 2024 13:45:00 GMT
Internationella valutafonden publicerar utvärdering av Finlands ekonomi https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/internationella-valutafonden-publicerar-utvardering-av-finlands-ekonomi/ Internationella valutafonden (IMF) har slutfört sin årliga utvärdering av Finlands ekonomi och de ekonomiska utsikterna för Finland. Utvärderingen bygger på diskussioner som den delegation från IMF som besökte Finland i januari 2024 förde med myndigheter, forskningsinstitut, privata finansinstitut, arbetsmarknadsparter och andra instanser. Valutafondens direktion behandlade den slutliga utvärderingsrapporten den 7 mars 2024. Rapporten finns tillgänglig på valutafondens webbplats www.imf.org.

IMF:s landrapport (PDF)

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Senior ekonom Anni Norring, telefon 09 183 2120, anni.norring@bof.fi.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/internationella-valutafonden-publicerar-utvardering-av-finlands-ekonomi/ Nyhet Mon, 11 Mar 2024 08:00:00 GMT
Penningpolitiskt utlåtande https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/ECB-ordforandens-inledningsanforanden/2024/penningpolitiskt-utlatande2/ ECB:s presskonferens 25 januari 2024

Christine Lagarde, ECB:s ordförande,
Luis de Guindos, ECB:s vice ordförande
Frankfurt am Main den 7 mars 2024

God eftermiddag, vice ordföranden och jag önskar er hjärtligt välkomna till vår presskonferens.

ECB-rådet beslutade idag att hålla de tre styrräntorna oförändrade. Sedan vårt senaste sammanträde i januari har inflationen minskat ytterligare. I de senaste prognoserna från ECB:s experter har inflationen reviderats ner, särskilt för 2024, främst som resultat av ett lägre bidrag från energipriser. I prognoserna förutspås att inflationen i genomsnitt kommer att ligga på 2,3 procent 2024, 2,0 procent 2025 och 1,9 procent 2026. Prognoserna för inflation exklusive energi och livsmedel har också reviderats ner till ett genomsnitt på 2,6 procent för 2024, 2,1 procent för 2025 och 2,0 procent för 2026. Även om de flesta mått på underliggande inflation har lättat ytterligare är inhemskt pristryck fortsatt högt, delvis beroende på stark lönetillväxt. Finansieringsförhållandena är restriktiva och våra tidigare räntehöjningar fortsätter att tynga efterfrågan, vilket bidrar till att få ner inflationen. Våra experter har reviderat ner sin tillväxtprognos för 2024 till 0,6 procent med förväntat dämpad ekonomisk aktivitet under den närmaste tiden. Därefter räknas med att ekonomin tar fart och växer i en takt om 1,5 procent under 2025 och 1,6 procent 2026, inledningsvis med stöd av konsumtion och därefter även av investeringar.

Vi är fast beslutna att se till att inflationen inom rimlig tid återgår till vårt medelfristiga tvåprocentsmål. Baserat på vår aktuella bedömning anser vi att ECB:s styrräntor är på nivåer som, om de upprätthålls under tillräckligt långt tid, kommer att göra ett substantiellt bidrag till detta mål. Våra framtida räntebeslut kommer att säkerställa att våra styrräntor sätts på tillräckligt restriktiva nivåer så länge som är nödvändigt.

Vi kommer att fortsätta att följa ett databeroende tillvägagångssätt för att fastställa vilken nivå som är lämplig och hur länge restriktionen ska bestå. Framför allt kommer våra räntebeslut att baseras på vår bedömning av inflationsutsikterna med beaktande av inkommande ekonomiska och finansiella data, dynamiken i underliggande inflation och styrkan i den penningpolitiska transmissionen.

Mer om dagens beslut finns i ett pressmeddelande på vår webbplats.

Jag kommer nu mer i detalj att beskriva hur vi tror att ekonomin och inflationen kommer att utvecklas och därefter förklara vår bedömning av de monetära och finansiella förutsättningarna.

Ekonomisk aktivitet

Ekonomin är fortsatt svag. Konsumenterna fortsatte att hålla tillbaka på konsumtion, investeringar dämpades och företag exporterade mindre vilket återspeglar sjunkande extern efterfrågan och ett visst tapp i konkurrenskraft. Dock tyder enkäter på en gradvis återhämtning under det här året.. När inflationen går ner och lönerna fortsätter att stiga kommer realinkomsterna att gå upp och stödja tillväxten. Dessutom kommer de dämpande effekterna av tidigare räntehöjningar gradvis att avta och efterfrågan på export från euroområdet torde ta fart.

Arbetslösheten är den lägsta nivån sedan euron infördes. Sysselsättningen ökade med 0,3 procent under det sista kvartalet 2023, vilket återigen översteg den ekonomiska aktiviteten. Som resultat minskade produktion per anställd ytterligare. Under tiden annonserar arbetsgivare ut färre lediga jobb samtidigt som färre företag rapporterar att deras produktion begränsas av brist på arbetskraft.

En fortsatt avveckling av offentliga energirelaterade stödåtgärder bör möjliggöra ett beständigt fortskridande av disinflationsprocessen. Finans- och strukturpolitik bör utformas så att vår ekonomi blir mer produktiv och konkurrenskraftig, ökar utbudskapaciteten och gradvis får ner höga offentliga skuldkvoter. En snabbare implementering av NGEU-programmet (Next Generation EU programme) och mer målmedvetna ansträngningar att avveckla nationella hinder i syfte att fördjupa och bättre integrera bank- och kapitalmarknader kan hjälpa till att öka investeringar i gröna och digitala övergångar och reducera pristryck på medellång sikt. EU:s reviderade ramverk för ekonomisk styrning bör implementeras utan fördröjning.

Inflation

Inflationen tickade ner till 2,8 procent i januari och den gick, enligt Eurostats snabbstatistik, ner ytterligare till 2,6 procent i februari. Livsmedelsinflationen sjönk åter, till 5,6 procent i januari och 4,0 procent i februari, medan energipriserna under dessa båda månader fortsatta att sjunka jämfört med ett år tidigare men i lägre takt än i december. Även varuinflationen sjönk ytterligare till 2,0 procent och 1,6 procent i februari. Efter att ha legat på 4,0 procent under tre månader i rad tickade tjänsteinflationen ner till 3,9 procent i februari.

De flesta mått på underliggande inflation minskade ytterligare i januari allt eftersom effekten av tidigare utbudschocker fortsatte att avta och stramare penningpolitik tyngde efterfrågan. Inhemskt pristryck är dock fortfarande högt, delvis beroende på robust lönetillväxt och fallande arbetsproduktivitet. Samtidigt finns tecken på att löneökningarna är på väg att dämpas. Vidare absorberar vinster en del av de stigande arbetskraftskostnader, vilket minskar inflationseffekterna.

Inflationen väntas fortsätta på denna nedåttrend under de närmaste månaderna. På lite längre sikt väntas den sjunka ytterligare till vårt mål när arbetskraftskostnaderna dämpas och effekterna av tidigare energichocker, flaskhalsar på utbudssidan och återöppningen av ekonomin efter pandemin avtar. Mått på långfristiga inflationsförväntningar är i stort sett fortsatt stabila och de flesta ligger på runt 2 procent.

Riskbedömning

Riskerna för den ekonomiska tillväxten ligger på nedåtsidan. Tillväxten skulle kunna bli lägre om effekterna av penningpolitiken blir starkare än väntat. En svagare världsekonomi eller en ytterligare avmattning i världshandeln skulle också hämma euroområdets tillväxt. Rysslands oberättigade krig mot Ukraina och den tragiska konflikten i Mellanöstern är de huvudsakliga källorna till geopolitiska risker. Detta kan leda till att företag och hushåll ser mindre positivt på framtiden och till att global handel störs. Tillväxten kan bli högre om inflationen går ner snabbare än väntat och om stigande realinkomster innebär högre konsumtion än emotsett eller om världsekonomin växer starkare.

Uppåtriskerna för inflationen inbegriper de ökade geopolitiska spänningarna, särskilt i Mellanöstern, vilka skulle kunna driva upp energi- och fraktkostnader på kort sikt och störa den globala handeln. Inflationen skulle också kunna bli högre än emotsett om lönerna ökar mer än väntat eller om vinstmarginalerna skulle visa mer motståndskraft. Inflationen kan däremot överraska på nedåtsidan om penningpolitiken dämpar efterfrågan mer än väntat eller om det ekonomiska klimatet i övriga världen försämras oväntat.

Finansiella och monetära förhållanden

Marknadsräntorna har ökat sedan vårt sammanträde i januari och vår penningpolitik har hållit bredare finansieringsförhållanden mer restriktiva. Utlåningsräntor på företagslån har i stort sett stabiliserats medan räntor på bolån sjönk i december och januari. Utlåningsräntorna är dock fortfarande höga, med 5,2 procent på företagslån och 3,9 procent på bolån.

Bankutlåning till företag blev positiv i december, med en årlig tillväxttakt på 0,5 procent. Men i januari tickade den ner till 0,2 procent beroende på ett negativt flöde under månaden. Tillväxttakten på lån till hushåll fortsatte att försvagas och föll till 0,3 procent på årsbasis i januari. Det breda penningmängdsmåttet, mätt genom M3, växte i en dämpad takt på 0,1 procent.

Slutsats

ECB-rådet beslutade idag att hålla de tre styrräntorna oförändrade. Vi är fast beslutna att se till att inflationen inom rimlig tid återgår till vårt medelfristiga tvåprocentsmål. Baserat på vår aktuella bedömning anser vi att ECB:s styrräntor är på nivåer som, om de upprätthålls under tillräckligt långt tid, kommer att göra ett substantiellt bidrag till detta mål. Våra framtida räntebeslut kommer att säkerställa att våra styrräntor sätts på tillräckligt restriktiva nivåer så länge som är nödvändigt. Vi kommer att fortsätta att följa ett databeroende tillvägagångssätt för att fastställa vilken nivå som är lämplig och hur länge restriktionen ska bestå.

Under alla omständigheter står vi redo att inom ramen för vårt mandat vid behov justera alla våra instrument så att inflationen återgår till vårt medelfristiga mål och bevara en smidig transmission av penningpolitiken.

Vi är nu beredda att svara på era frågor.

Se den engelska versionen för den exakta formulering som ECB-rådet har enats om.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/ECB-ordforandens-inledningsanforanden/2024/penningpolitiskt-utlatande2/ ECB-tal Thu, 07 Mar 2024 16:00:00 GMT
Eurosystemets penningpolitiska beslut https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/eurosystemets-penningpolitiska-beslut2/ ECB:s pressmeddelande 7 mars 2024

ECB-rådet beslutade idag att hålla styrräntorna oförändrade. Sedan det senaste sammanträdet i januari har inflationen minskat ytterligare. I de senaste prognoserna från ECB:s experter har inflationen reviderats ner, särskilt för 2024, främst som resultat av ett lägre bidrag från energipriser. ECB:s experter förutspår nu att inflationen i genomsnitt kommer ligga på 2,3 procent 2024, 2,0 procent 2025 och 1,9 procent 2026. Prognoserna för inflation exklusive energi och livsmedel har också reviderats ner till ett genomsnitt på 2,6 procent för 2024, 2,1 procent för 2025 och 2,0 procent för 2026. Även om de flesta mått på underliggande inflation har lättat ytterligare är inhemskt pristryck fortsatt högt, delvis beroende på stark lönetillväxt. Finansieringsförhållandena är restriktiva och de tidigare räntehöjningarna fortsätter att tynga efterfrågan, vilket bidrar till att få ner inflationen. ECB:s experter har reviderat ner sina tillväxtprognoser för 2024 till 0,6 procent med dämpad ekonomisk aktivitet under den närmaste tiden. Därefter räknar de med att ekonomin tar fart och växer i en takt på 1,5 procent under 2025 och 1,6 procent 2026, inledningsvis med stöd av konsumtion och därefter även av investeringar.

ECB-rådet är fast beslutet att se till att inflationen inom rimlig tid återgår till det medelfristiga 2-procentsmålet. Baserat på sin aktuella bedömning anser ECB-rådet att styrräntorna är på nivåer som, om de upprätthålls under tillräckligt långt tid, kommer att göra ett substantiellt bidrag till detta mål. ECB-rådets framtida räntebeslut kommer att säkerställa att styrräntorna sätts på tillräckligt restriktiva nivåer så länge som är nödvändigt.

ECB-rådet kommer att fortsätta att följa ett databeroende tillvägagångssätt för att fastställa vilken nivå som är lämplig och hur länge restriktionen ska bestå. Framför allt kommer ECB-rådets räntebeslut att baseras på bedömningen av inflationsutsikterna i ljuset av inkommande ekonomiska och finansiella data, dynamiken i underliggande inflation och styrkan i den penningpolitiska transmissionen.

ECB:s styrräntor

Räntan på de huvudsakliga refinansieringstransaktionerna och räntorna på marginalutlåningsfaciliteten och inlåningsfaciliteten förblir oförändrade på 4,50 %, 4,75 % respektive 4,00 %.

Programmet för köp av tillgångar (APP) och stödköpsprogrammet föranlett av pandemin (PEPP)

APP-portföljen minskar i en måttlig och förutsägbar takt eftersom Eurosystemet inte längre återinvesterar värdepapper som förfaller.

ECB-rådet avser fortsätta att fullt ut återinvestera förfall av värdepapper förvärvade inom PEPP-portföljen under det första halvåret av 2024. Under det andra halvåret ämnas PEPP-portföljen reduceras med i genomsnitt 7,5 miljarder euro i månaden. ECB-rådet avser upphöra med återinvesteringar inom ramen för PEPP i slutet av 2024.

ECB-rådet kommer att fortsätta tillämpa flexibilitet vid återinvestering av kommande förfall i PEPP-portföljen i syfte att motverka risker mot transmissionsmekanismen relaterat till pandemin.

Refinansieringstransaktioner

Allt eftersom bankerna återbetalar belopp som upplånats under de riktade långfristiga refinansieringstransaktionerna kommer ECB-rådet regelbundet att granska hur riktade utlåningstransaktioner och relaterad pågående återbetalning bidrar till den penningpolitiska inriktningen.

***

ECB-rådet står redo att, inom ramen för sitt mandat, vid behov justera alla sina instrument så att inflationen återgår till 2-procentsmålet på medellång sikt och bevara en smidig välfungerande transmission av penningpolitiken. Instrumentet för transmissionsskydd finns också tillgängligt för att motverka oönskade, störande marknadskrafter som utgör ett allvarligt hot mot den penningpolitiska transmissionen i samtliga länder i euroområde och möjliggör för ECB-rådet att mer effektivt uppfylla sitt prisstabilitetsmandat.

ECB:s ordförande kommer att redogöra för de överväganden som ligger bakom dessa beslut vid en presskonferens som börjar kl. 14:45 (centraleuropeisk tid) idag.

Se den engelska versionen för den exakta formulering som ECB-rådet har enats om.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/eurosystemets-penningpolitiska-beslut2/ Nyhet Thu, 07 Mar 2024 13:22:00 GMT
Det utestående beloppet av konsumentkrediter beviljade av övriga finansinstitut minskade under 2023 https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/ovriga-finansinstitut/2023/det-utestaende-beloppet-av-konsumentkrediter-beviljade-av-ovriga-finansinstitut-minskade-under-2023/ Vid utgången av 2023 uppgick det utestående beloppet av konsumentkrediter som övriga finansinstitut beviljat finländska hushåll till 4,7 miljarder euro, vilket är 3 % mindre än vid motsvarande tidpunkt ett år tidigare. Av konsumentkrediterna var nästan 90 % fordonslån.

Det totala beloppet av hushållens utestående konsumentkrediter (26 miljarder euro) ökade emellertid under 2023. Konsumentkrediterna beviljade av övriga finansinstitut utgör 18 % av hushållens utestående konsumentkrediter. Största delen (66 %) av hushållens konsumentkrediter har beviljats av banker (kreditinstitut) med verksamhet i Finland. Av de aktörer som beviljar konsumentkrediter har under den senaste tiden kreditinstituten med gränsöverskridande utlåning ökat sin andel (15 %) mest.

 

Det utestående beloppet av snabblåneföretagens konsumentkrediter redan under 100 miljoner euro

Det utestående beloppet av konsumentkrediter beviljade av konsumentkredit- och smålåneföretag, dvs. så kallade snabblåneföretag, fortsatte att minska och också genomsnittsräntan (29,3 %) sjönk under 2023[1]. Vid utgången av 2023 hade det utestående beloppet av konsumentkrediter till finländska hushåll beviljade av konsumentkredit- och smålåneföretag redan sjunkit under 100 miljoner euro. Snabblåneföretagens utestående konsumentkrediter har minskat betydligt efter 2018, då snabblåneföretagens lånefordringar på hushållen uppgick till uppskattningsvis 700 miljoner euro. I september 2019 infördes ett räntetak på 20 % för konsumentkrediter[2]. Efter det har en del av de företag som beviljar snabblån upphört med att bevilja nya lån eller helt lagt ner sin verksamhet. Till minskningen av det utestående beloppet bidrar även de lån som sålts till andra aktörer och tagits bort från balansräkningen. En del av aktörerna har också fortsatt sin verksamhet som kreditinstitut.  

 

Den effektiva räntan på fordonslån beviljade av övriga finansinstitut 7,6 %

De finländska hushållen lyfte under det sista kvartalet 2023 från övriga finansinstitut nya fordonslån till ett värde av 743 miljoner euro, vilket är 8 % mindre än vid motsvarande tidpunkt för ett år sedan. Under samma tid betalade kreditinstituten ut fordonslån för 488 miljoner euro. Fordonslån utbetalades för sammanlagt 1,2 miljarder euro det sista kvartalet 2023, vilket är 4 % mer än vid motsvarande tidpunkt ett år tidigare.

Under årets sista kvartal 2023 var den överenskomna årliga räntan på nya utbetalningar av fordonslån från övriga finansinstitut (5,1 %) lägre än räntan på fordonslån från kreditinstitut (5,8 %). Också den effektiva räntan[3] som beaktar övriga kostnader var lägre (7,6 %) i fordonslån beviljade av övriga finansinstitut än i fordonslån beviljade av banker (8,1 %).

Fordonslånens (8,0 miljarder euro) andel av hushållens samtliga konsumentkrediter var över 30 % vid utgången av 2023. De övriga finansinstitutens andel av dessa krediter var 53 % och andelen för kreditinstitut med verksamhet i Finland 47 %.

Hushållens utestående konsumentkrediter över 26 miljarder euro

 

Lån till finländska företag och hushåll beviljade av övriga finansinstitut, 2023Q4:

 

Företagslån (mn euro)

Hushållslån (mn euro)

Lån med säkerhet

1 802

4 251

Lån utan säkerhet och lån med säkerhetsunderskott

4 141

589

Sammanlagt

5 943

4 840

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Markus Aaltonen, telefon 09 183 2395, e-post: markus.aaltonen(at)bof.fi,

Pauli Korhonen, telefon 09 183 2280, e-post: pauli.korhonen(at)bof.fi.

 

Nästa publiceringstillfälle 5.9.2024.

 

Name & Shame-förfarandet:

Företag som med avsikt lämnat sig utanför statistiken över övriga finansinstitut för perioden 2023Q4:

Creditstar Finland Oy (2023Q3)

Lahden Pantti Oy (2023Q4)

 

 

[1] Vid utgången av 2022 var det utestående beloppet 140 miljoner euro och genomsnittsräntan 33,6 %.

[2] Räntetaket skärptes i oktober 2023. Från och med oktober är räntetaket 15 % + referensräntan enligt räntelagen. Räntan får ändå inte överstiga 20 %. Referensräntan enligt räntelagen för tiden 1.1–30.6.2024 är 4,50 %.

[3] Vid insamlingen av statistik om övriga finansinstitut är den effektiva räntan räntesatsen för nya utbetalningar och vid insamlingen av bankstatistik räntesatsen för nya avtal.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/ovriga-finansinstitut/2023/det-utestaende-beloppet-av-konsumentkrediter-beviljade-av-ovriga-finansinstitut-minskade-under-2023/ Statistik Thu, 07 Mar 2024 08:00:00 GMT
Under sista kvartalet 2023 gjordes fler kortbetalningar än året innan https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/betalnings_new/2023/under-sista-kvartalet-2023-gjordes-fler-kortbetalningar-an-aret-innan/ Det totala värdet av betalningstransaktioner med finländska betalkort

 

Under sista kvartalet 2023 gjordes med finländska betalkort sammanlagt 585 miljoner kortbetalningar, vilket var 32 miljoner (6 %) fler än vid motsvarande tidpunkt 2022. Det totala värdet av kortbetalningarna utgjorde sista kvartalet 2023 sammanlagt 17,7 miljarder euro, vilket var 6 % mer än ett år tidigare.

 

Antalet betalningstransaktioner med finländska betalkort

 

Det totala värdet av kontaktlösa betalningar sjönk med 443 miljoner euro (7 %) från tredje kvartalet 2023 och var 5,8 miljarder euro det sista kvartalet. Under sista kvartalet 2023 gjordes 358 miljoner kortbetalningar med kontaktlös betalning, vilket var 10 % mindre än under tredje kvartalet.

 

Distansbetalningarnas värde och antal fortsätter att öka

Med dator eller mobil enhet initierades 98 miljoner kortbetalningar under sista kvartalet 2023, vilket var 21 % mer än under samma period 2022. Det totala värdet av kortbetalningar på distans (3,8 md euro) steg med 24 % jämfört med motsvarande tidpunkt för ett år sedan.

Antalet kortbetalningar med chip eller magnetremsa minskade med 7 % från tredje kvartalet 2023 och utgjorde 128 miljoner transaktioner sista kvartalet 2023. Det totala värdet av kortbetalningar med chip eller magnetremsa sjönk med 0,2 miljarder euro (3 %) från tredje kvartalet 2023 och var 8,0 miljarder euro.

Det sammanlagda värdet av korttransaktioner som gjorts med finländska betalkort i övriga euroländer uppgick till 1,4 miljarder euro under sista kvartalet 2023, vilket var 14 % mer än vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan. Det sammanlagda värdet av korttransaktioner som gjorts med finländska betalkort utanför EU var 0,4 miljarder euro sista kvartalet 2023, vilket var 2 % mindre än under tredje kvartalet.

Med kort utgivna i ett annat euroland än Finland gjordes i Finland mätt i värde 9 % mindre kortbetalningar under sista kvartalet 2023 än under tredje kvartalet, och det totala värdet av betalningarna var 196 miljoner euro. Med kort utgivna utanför EU gjordes i Finland under sista kvartalet 2023 kortbetalningar till ett värde av sammanlagt 182 miljoner euro, vilket var 7 % mindre än vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan.

Under sista kvartalet 2023 gjordes 311 miljoner betalningsöverföringar, vilket var 4 % mer än vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan. Värdet av betalningsöverföringarna (1 031 md euro) sjönk med 4 % från sista kvartalet 2022. Det totala värdet av betalningsöverföringar till finländska motparter sjönk med 1 % från sista kvartalet 2022 och utgjorde 828 miljarder euro sista kvartalet 2023.

 

De siffror som behandlas i detta meddelande har publicerats i den nya dashboarden för betalningsstatistik. Dashboardens innehåll utökas senare.

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Tia Kurtti, telefon 09 183 2043, e-post: tia.kurtti(at)bof.fi,

Tuomas Nummelin, telefon 09 183 2373, e-post: tuomas.nummelin(at)bof.fi.

 

Nästa publiceringstillfälle juni 2024.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/betalnings_new/2023/under-sista-kvartalet-2023-gjordes-fler-kortbetalningar-an-aret-innan/ Statistik Tue, 05 Mar 2024 08:00:00 GMT
I januari utbetalades mindre studielån än för ett år sedan https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/monetara-finansinstituts-balansrakning_new/2024/i-januari-utbetalades-mindre-studielan-an-for-ett-ar-sedan/ I januari 2024[1] utbetalades studielån för 279 miljoner euro, vilket är 17 % mindre än vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan. Utbetalningarna av studielån i januari har senast varit mindre än så 2018. Genomsnittsräntan på utbetalda studielån var 4,46 %, vilket var 2,22 procentenheter högre än i januari 2023. Genomsnittsräntan på nya utbetalningar av studielån har senast varit högre i november 2008.

De Euriborbundna lånens andel var 86 % av samtliga utbetalda studielån och genomsnittsräntan på dem var 4,52 %. Användningen av bankernas egna referensräntor vid nya utbetalningar av studielån har blivit allmännare. I januari 2024 var 14 % av de nya utbetalningarna av studielån bundna till primräntor, dvs. bankernas egna referensräntor, då deras andel ännu i januari 2022 var 5 %. Genomsnittsräntan på nya utbetalningar som bundits till bankernas egna referensräntor var något lägre än på utbetalningar av studielån som bundits till Euribor (4,04 %).

Den kraftiga ökningen av det utestående beloppet av studielån har planat ut. Vid utgången av januari 2024 uppgick det utestående beloppet av studielån till 6,2 miljarder euro och årsökningen var 4,0 %. Årsökningen har senast varit långsammare i september 2011. Det utestående beloppet av studielån har ökat snabbt under de senaste åren, men årsökningen har stadigt mattats av i takt med att utbetalningarna minskat och i och med Folkpensionsanstaltens studielånskompensationer[2]. Det utestående beloppet av studielån har mer än fördubblats efter studiestödsreformen som trädde i kraft 2017. Utöver de större låneposterna som följde på studiestödsreformen beror ökningen i beloppet av utestående studielån också på att låntagarna har ökat i antal[3].

 

Högre räntor minskade efterfrågan på studielån

 

Utlåning

De finländska hushållen lyfte i januari 2024 nya bostadslån för 0,8 miljarder euro, vilket är 40 miljoner euro mindre än vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan. Av de nya utbetalda bostadslånen stod investeringsbostadslånen för 90 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på nya bostadslån sjönk från december och var 4,36 % i januari. Det utestående beloppet av bostadslån uppgick vid slutet av januari 2024 till 106,4 miljarder euro och årsökningen var –1,5 %. Investeringsbostadslånens andel av de utestående bostadslånen var 8,6 miljarder euro. Av utlåningen till de finländska hushållen bestod 17,8 miljarder euro av konsumtionskrediter och 17,7 miljarder euro av övriga lån vid utgången av januari.

De finländska företagen lyfte i januari nya lån[4] för 1,8 miljarder euro, varav bostadsbolagslånen utgjorde 490 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på nya utbetalda företagslån steg från december och var 5,58 %. Det utestående beloppet av lån till finländska företag uppgick vid slutet av januari till 107,1 miljarder euro, varav andelen lån till bostadsbolag utgjorde 44,0 miljarder euro.

 

Inlåning

Inlåningen från hushållen i Finland uppgick totalt till 108,2 miljarder euro vid slutet av januari 2024 och genomsnittsräntan var 1,25 %. I beloppet ingick inlåning över natten för 68,8 miljarder euro och tidsbunden inlåning för 11,6 miljarder euro. De finländska hushållen tecknade i januari nya tidsbundna inlåningsavtal för 1 470 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på ny tidsbunden inlåning var i januari 3,40 %.

 

Utlåning och inlåning till Finland, preliminär uppgift*
  November, mn euro December, mn euro Januari, mn euro Januari, 12 mån förändring1, % Genomsnitts-ränta, %
Utlåning till hushåll, utestående belopp 141 151 141 418 141 807 -1,2 4,63
    - varav bostadslån 106 524 106 698 106 351 -1,5 4,08
    - varav investeringsbostadslån 8 638 8 621 8 627   4,28
Utlåning till icke-finansiella företag2, utestående belopp 106 306 105 794 107 126 1,8 4,77
Inlåning från hushåll, utestående belopp 107 987 108 673 108 211 -2,4 1,25
Nya utbetalda bostadslån till hushåll 1 237 1 337 810   4,36
    - varav investeringsbostadslån 95 85 89   4,53

* Omfattar utlåning och inlåning i alla valutor till Finland. I Finlands Banks statistikpublikationer till och med januari 2021 och i ECB:s statistikpublikationer presenteras utlåning och inlåning i euro för euroområdet och hushållen omfattar också hushållens icke-vinstsyftande organisationer, varför siffrorna i tabellen avviker från uppgifterna i dessa publikationer.
1 Den procentuella förändringen är beräknad på månatliga stockförändringar som är justerade för omklassificeringar och omvärderingar.  
2 Till de icke-finansiella företagen räknas bostadssammanslutningar.

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Usva Topo, telefon 09 183 2056, e-post: usva.topo(at)bof.fi,

Tuomas Nummelin, telefon 09 183 2373, e-post: tuomas.nummelin(at)bof.fi.

 

Nästa månadspublicering 2.4.2024 kl. 10.

 

Statistiksiffror och grafik som utgör underlag för meddelandet kan läsas på https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/.

 

[1] Den andel av studielånet som är avsedd för vårterminen kunde lyftas i januari.

[2] År 2022 betalades studielånskompensationer redan för 87,8 miljoner euro och åren 2015–2021 för sammanlagt ca 226,5 miljoner euro.

[3] Enligt Folkpensionsanstaltens statistik var antalet personer med studielån 525 000 läsåret 2022–2023, när antalet studielåntagare tre år tidigare var 63 000 färre.

[4] Exkl. konto- och kortkrediter.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/monetara-finansinstituts-balansrakning_new/2024/i-januari-utbetalades-mindre-studielan-an-for-ett-ar-sedan/ Statistik Wed, 28 Feb 2024 08:00:00 GMT
ECB-rådets beslut (utöver räntebeslut) https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/ecb-radets-beslut-utover-rantebeslut2/ ECB-rådets beslut (utöver räntebeslut) februari 2024

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/ecb-radets-beslut-utover-rantebeslut2/ Nyhet Fri, 23 Feb 2024 14:00:00 GMT
Account of the monetary policy meeting, 24-25 January 2024 https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/account-of-the-monetary-policy-meeting-24-25-january-2024/ Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on Wednesday and Thursday, 24-25 January 2024

22 February 2024

1. Review of financial, economic and monetary developments and policy options

Financial market developments

Ms Schnabel noted that, since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting on 13-14 December 2023, the rapid easing of financial conditions observed after the 25-26 October meeting had levelled off and been pared back slightly.

Financial conditions had eased sharply in November and December, as the narrative in financial markets had shifted from “high for longer” to swift disinflation and imminent monetary policy easing. After the Governing Council’s 13-14 December meeting, financial conditions had continued to ease until late December but had tightened slightly thereafter. This followed ECB communication that had countered the aggressive market pricing of a rate-cutting cycle starting as early as March 2024.

While the probability of a 25 basis point cut in April still stood at around 60%, a first cut was now fully priced in only for June. Expected cumulative rate cuts by the end of the year had declined slightly since the December meeting, to around 130 basis points. Policy rate expectations in US forward markets had also been scaled back, although to a slightly lesser extent. US interest rate markets were positioned for an initial 25 basis point cut in May, with a 40% probability of a March cut. Moreover, investors expected almost the same magnitude of cumulative cuts as in the euro area in the course of 2024, anticipating a globally synchronised normalisation cycle.

However, the uncertainty around this policy path was high, as reflected in the persistent volatility in bond markets. The easing of global financial conditions in November and December 2023 had gone hand-in-hand with lower volatility in risk asset markets. Implied volatility in euro area equity markets had dropped to its lowest level since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic in February 2020, despite significant geopolitical tensions and risks of protracted economic weakness. Yet, lower implied volatility in risk asset markets was not accompanied by meaningfully lower implied volatility in bond markets, which had decoupled from equity market volatility.

There were two potential sources of heightened monetary policy uncertainty. The first was the timing and pace of the policy adjustment, while the second was the extent of the required policy adjustment. Respondents to the January 2024 ECB Survey of Monetary Analysts (SMA) had raised their expectations for the pace of rate cuts over the year but remained more cautious than financial market pricing. While markets foresaw a cumulative easing of around 130 basis points, SMA respondents expected total cuts of 100 basis points by the end of the year. Differences in the outlook for inflation could explain the discrepancy between market pricing and analysts’ expectations for the future path of monetary policy. Investors trading in financial markets were discernibly more optimistic about the inflation outlook than the median SMA respondent. Another explanation could be different speeds in adjusting to new information. During the interest rate tightening cycle in 2022 and 2023, rate markets had consistently led survey expectations, often by several months.

The second source of uncertainty about the medium-term policy rate path concerned the extent of adjustment required to return to a neutral policy rate and the uncertainty surrounding estimates of such a rate. SMA participants had raised, noticeably, their median longer-run expectations for policy rates compared with levels during the period before the start of the ECB’s hiking path.

The expected reversal of the 2023 tightening was also visible in longer tenors of the yield curve. The euro area ten-year real overnight index swap (OIS) rate remained close to early 2023 levels and slightly below its September 2023 level, when the ECB had last hiked interest rates. The corresponding nominal OIS interest rate had even fallen below early 2023 levels. In the United States, the ten-year real OIS interest rate had fallen to a similar degree since late October but remained above early 2023 levels. The reappraisal of the monetary policy outlook had been the dominant driver of the decline in bond yields since the Governing Council’s October monetary policy meeting, along with news on the growth outlook and fiscal developments.

The rescaling of the earlier aggressive market pricing had also affected risk asset markets. Yet, euro area equity markets remained broadly unchanged since the December meeting. A longer perspective, since the start of 2023, revealed that developments in equity markets, as in other risk asset markets, had been robust, providing an easing impulse to financial conditions. The somewhat stronger repricing of monetary policy expectations in the euro area than in the United States had been reflected in a slight appreciation of the euro, with the US dollar moving lower against a broad set of currencies.

Intra-euro area sovereign bond spreads had declined further, as the announcement regarding the phasing-out of reinvestment under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) had been well absorbed by the market and some government bonds had seen record demand. The announcement on the PEPP and the ongoing gradual and predictable unwinding of the Eurosystem’s bond portfolios under the asset purchase programme (APP) had not amplified the sensitivity of spreads to changes in risk-free rates, suggesting that fragmentation risks remained muted.

Absorption in euro area government bond markets had been supported by benign liquidity conditions, underpinned by the return of foreign investors and investment funds. The prospects for smooth and healthy market absorption remained largely in place for 2024. Benign market conditions had also been evident in 2023 year-end trading and repo market functioning. Repo rate declines in general collateral and non-general collateral markets had been substantially more contained than at the 2021 and 2022 year-ends.

The global environment and economic and monetary developments in the euro area

Reviewing the global environment, Mr Lane noted that global economic activity had moderated in the fourth quarter of 2023. At the same time, global trade growth was improving as post-pandemic patterns normalised. However, the recent tensions in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden were a downside risk to trade, since these could adversely affect delivery times and maritime shipping costs, especially on routes between China and Europe. Since the end of December, there had been a big drop in transit volumes, with some shipping re-routing around Africa. So far, the rental price for container vessels was relatively unaffected, likely owing to spare capacity, while shipping prices had already increased.

Oil production was not expected to be affected by the developments in the Red Sea area. The latest projections from the International Energy Agency estimated that oil supply and demand would remain broadly in balance in the first quarter of 2024 and that the market would move into surplus in the remainder of the year. However, there had been notable movements in energy prices. Oil futures prices were significantly above levels at the time of the Governing Council’s December meeting but gas futures prices were significantly lower. Mr Lane noted that, when analysing energy prices, it was also important to look at the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) market. Emissions allowance prices had fallen 22% within the first three weeks of January, reflecting weak demand from the industry and power sectors. In the case of the power sector, this was due to the increased use of renewables.

Concerning global commodities, there had been little movement in food and metal prices since the last Governing Council meeting. Also since then, there had been limited change in the euro’s exchange rates, both against the US dollar and in nominal effective terms.

Turning to the euro area, Mr Lane recalled that inflation had risen to 2.9% in December, from 2.4% in November, owing to energy-related base effects. However, the increase was less than expected. While services inflation had remained steady at 4.0%, food and non-energy industrial goods inflation had continued to decline. Looking ahead, headline inflation and core inflation – as measured, respectively, by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and the HICP excluding energy and food – were expected to continue their downward trajectory.

Domestic inflation remained high at 4.5%, owing to the elevated pace of wage increases and falling labour productivity, but it too had started to ease. Indicators of momentum in headline inflation and all of its components had eased further. The annualised three-month-on-three-month growth rate of seasonally adjusted core inflation had fallen below 1.5%, with momentum in goods inflation at zero and momentum in services and food inflation close to 2%. A broad range of underlying inflation measures had also fallen in December. This reflected the fading impact of past shocks, as well as weaker demand that was, in part, the result of the ongoing strong transmission of tighter monetary policy. Among the different measures, the Persistent and Common Component of Inflation, which was the best predictor of inflation one and two years ahead, had eased to 2% in December.

Overall, the December inflation data provided further evidence that the disinflationary process was well on track and in fact might be running faster than previously expected. However, several headwinds were expected to increase inflation momentum again, as embedded in the December Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections. This was largely due to the increasing role of wage pressures in explaining the dynamics of core inflation and also to the fading out of some of the energy price falls and the disinflationary pressures coming from the removal of supply bottlenecks.

Historically, the Purchasing Managers’ Indices (PMIs) for prices had not been able to capture developments in goods and services inflation very well. Since 2020, however, the correlation had improved, with the PMIs showing a six-month leading property for goods and a nine-month leading property for services. On this basis, the PMIs suggested that downward pressures on goods and services inflation were likely to continue in the near term. However, the latest readings showed a small reversal, suggesting that these pressures were set to weaken.

Looking ahead, the expected slowdown in the disinflationary process was also evident from a decomposition of services inflation into “wage-intensive” and “not wage-intensive” components. So far, the declines in services inflation observed earlier had been driven by the not wage-intensive component, while the contribution from the wage-intensive component had declined only very gradually.

The pace of wage growth remained elevated but there were some initial signs of a deceleration. Unit labour costs had grown by 6.7% and compensation per employee by 5.3% in the third quarter of 2023. Negotiated wage growth had decreased from 4.8% in September to 4.6% in October. The forward-looking wage trackers signalled wage dynamics that were broadly in line with the December staff projections. Mr Lane also recalled that the wage tracker contained both old and new contracts, renegotiated at different points in time. New agreements signed at the end of 2023, if one-off payments were included, showed increases still above 5%. Moreover, many negotiations taking place in the first quarter of 2024 were expected to be concluded in February or March.

Survey-based measures of wage expectations showed that firms and professional forecasters expected a decline in wage growth in 2024. According to the January Corporate Telephone Survey, wage growth was expected to fall from 5.3% in 2023 to 4.4% in 2024. These expectations were a bit lower than in previous rounds. Similarly, in the latest Survey of Professional Forecasters, expectations for the annual growth in compensation per employee pointed to easing wage growth from 2024 onwards and had been revised down for the longer-term horizon. In particular, as of 2026, expected wage growth was below 3%, which was generally seen as the trend increase consistent with the ECB’s 2% medium-term inflation target.

The contribution of unit profits to domestic price pressures had continued to decrease in the third quarter of 2023, suggesting that – as expected – profit margins were absorbing some of the price pressures coming from wage increases. The January Corporate Telephone Survey suggested that firms had adjusted their profit margins during 2023. Although reported profit margins had edged up somewhat at the end of the year, they remained below the long-term average after being above it from early 2021 to mid-2023. This further confirmed that profits had started to mitigate the inflationary effects of wage increases.

Looking ahead, inflation was expected to ease further over the course of 2024, as the effects of past energy shocks, supply bottlenecks and the post-pandemic reopening of the economy faded and tighter monetary policy constrained demand.

Measures of shorter-term inflation expectations had come down markedly, while longer-term inflation expectations mostly stood around 2%. Market-based measures of inflation compensation implied by fixings contracts – measures extracted from swap contracts linked to very near-term euro area inflation releases – indicated that investors were expecting inflation to fall to 2% as early as April and to stay at or below 2% for most of the remainder of 2024. The Consumer Expectations Survey showed that perceptions about inflation had finally declined in recent months. Households’ expectations one year ahead had declined considerably between October and December, whereas three-year ahead expectations had moved sideways since October. As regards professional forecasters, their inflation expectations had shifted down over the entire horizon, with longer-term expectations now standing at 2%.

Upside risks to inflation included the heightened geopolitical tensions, especially in the Middle East, which could push energy prices and freight costs higher in the near term and hamper global trade. Inflation could also turn out higher than anticipated if wages increased by more than expected or profit margins remained resilient. By contrast, inflation might surprise on the downside if monetary policy dampened demand by more than expected or the economic environment in the rest of the world worsened unexpectedly. Moreover, inflation could decline more quickly in the near term if energy prices evolved in line with the recent downward shift in market expectations for the future path of oil and gas prices.

The euro area economy had likely stagnated in the final quarter of 2023, following a mild contraction in real GDP in the third quarter. The latest statistical releases for services and industrial production indicated a drop relative to the third quarter, and survey indicators including the PMIs remained at levels consistent with falling activity. However, in January, forward-looking indicators signalled some pick-up in growth further ahead.

Turning to the components of demand, private consumption was estimated to have remained subdued at the end of 2023. Mr Lane recalled that the December staff projections entailed a significant recovery in private consumption during 2024. Indicators were not yet available for the first quarter. However, firms’ expectations had remained contained for retail trade, while they continued to be above historical averages for contact-intensive services.

Moving on to housing investment, this was the GDP demand component most visibly affected by monetary policy transmission. Housing investment had been contracting over the past two years and was estimated to have also declined in the final quarter of 2023. The December projections entailed a slower rate of decline. At the same time, the PMI for housing output remained in deeply negative territory but with some signs of bottoming out.

Regarding business investment, the picture was mixed. Business investment had still been growing in 2023, but the expectation in the December projections was that it would decline in the fourth quarter. There had been an accumulation of stocks of finished capital goods that might have cushioned the decline in investment in the recent past. Additionally, the existing order books for capital goods were helping to keep investment growth in positive territory. However, new orders were still falling sharply, which suggested a period of weak investment ahead.

On the trade side, in spite of the recovery in global trade, euro area exports had remained subdued as 2023 drew to a close. Imports also continued to be weak, owing to an unfavourable composition of demand and to the inventory destocking cycle, both at the global level and in the euro area.

The labour market continued to be robust. The unemployment rate had fallen back to 6.4% in November, even as more workers entered the labour force. Labour market conditions had benefited from the 2022 surge in profit margins, which enabled firms to hoard labour despite demand tailing off. At the same time, momentum in demand for labour was decelerating, with fewer vacancies being advertised.

Turning to fiscal policies, news on fiscal measures had been limited. The few measures taken were cancelling each other out at the euro area aggregate level, as some countries had implemented new measures and others were rolling back their previous plans.

The risks to economic growth remained tilted to the downside. Growth could be lower if the effects of monetary policy turned out to be stronger than expected. A weaker world economy or a further slowdown in global trade would also weigh on euro area growth. Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East were key sources of geopolitical risk. This might result in firms and households becoming less confident about the future and global trade being disrupted. Growth could be higher if rising real incomes led to a greater increase in spending than anticipated, or the world economy grew more strongly than expected.

Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, market interest rates had moved broadly sideways since the previous Governing Council meeting. Similarly, at the longer end of the yield curve, risk-free rates and sovereign bond yields were little changed overall, despite some fluctuations in the intervening period.

Monetary aggregates had continued to decline in annual terms and remained close to historical lows. M3 – the broad monetary aggregate – had declined by 0.9%, year on year, in November 2023. This decline was consistent with the lack of aggregate growth in bank lending and, if measured in real terms, the decline was much larger. M1 – the narrow monetary aggregate of currency in circulation and overnight deposits – had continued to fall very sharply in November, against a background of portfolio shifts.

The transmission of the restrictive monetary policy stance to broader financing conditions remained exceptionally strong. Lending rates on business loans had declined slightly to 5.2% in November but remained close to their historical highs. Mortgage rates had increased further to 4.0%. The January bank lending survey suggested that higher borrowing rates, with the associated cutbacks in investment plans and house purchases, had led to a further drop in credit demand in the fourth quarter. Against this background, credit dynamics had improved somewhat but, overall, remained weak in November, despite an increase in short-term loans to firms likely associated with their greater working capital needs. At the same time, the further tightening in credit standards for loans to companies reported in January was quite moderate, in a sign that the trend towards ever more restrictive credit conditions observed over the last two years might be flattening out.

Monetary policy considerations and policy options

Overall, the incoming information had broadly confirmed the Governing Council’s previous assessment of the medium-term inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. Inflation was heading towards the 2% target, possibly at a faster pace than previously expected. The current levels of the policy interest rates would make a substantial contribution to reaching that goal if maintained for a sufficiently long duration. In terms of an overall evaluation of the policy rate trajectory, the disinflationary process needed to be further along for the Governing Council to be sufficiently confident that inflation would hit the target in a timely manner and settle sustainably at that level. Therefore, Mr Lane proposed keeping the three key ECB interest rates unchanged.

The three elements of the Governing Council’s reaction function gave a robust framework for assessing the data and guiding decisions over the upcoming policy meetings. The Governing Council should continue to follow a data-dependent approach to determining the appropriate level and duration of restriction. In particular, the Governing Council’s interest rate decisions should remain based on its assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

Finally, Mr Lane proposed preserving the option to apply flexibility in reinvesting redemptions coming due in the PEPP portfolio, with a view to countering risks to the monetary policy transmission mechanism still related to the pandemic.

2. Governing Council’s discussion and monetary policy decisions

Economic, monetary and financial analyses

As regards the external environment, members took note of the assessment provided by Mr Lane that, while global GDP growth was seen to have decelerated in the fourth quarter of 2023, incoming trade data suggested that goods trade momentum was turning positive again. This was in line with the assessment that a normalisation of the inventory cycle and consumption patterns between goods and services should support trade. Moreover, the impact on global trade from recent developments in the Red Sea area was seen as contained so far. Looking at key global economies, the United States was on course for a soft landing, while in China GDP growth had slowed in the last quarter of 2023. In the context of weaker Chinese domestic demand, it was argued that Chinese exports would put additional negative pressure on international prices. The weakness in China had also been negatively affecting euro area exports, increasing uncertainty around the economic outlook.

Turning to energy commodities, oil prices had increased since the December Governing Council meeting, while European gas prices had declined further as demand remained subdued and gas storage facilities were relatively full. The euro area economy was seen as particularly exposed to geopolitical risk, which was likely to remain elevated for years to come. First, the war in Ukraine remained an important risk factor. Second, the conflict in the Middle East had resulted in rising freight costs and a lengthening of delivery times owing to the recent attacks on freight ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. So far there had been no major disruption of trade and the main impact had come from ships taking longer routes around Africa, resulting in higher shipping rates and longer delivery times. However, this had, anecdotally, already led to some euro area companies halting production because of a lack of components. In this context of heightened global uncertainty, it was seen as puzzling that international energy price developments had remained overall very benign.

With regard to economic activity, members concurred with Mr Lane that the euro area economy was likely to have stagnated in the final quarter of 2023. The incoming data continued to signal weakness in the near term. However, some forward-looking survey indicators pointed to a pick-up in growth further ahead. The labour market had remained robust. The unemployment rate, at 6.4% in November, had fallen back to its lowest level since the start of the euro and more workers had entered the labour force. At the same time, demand for labour was slowing, with fewer job vacancies being advertised. Governments should continue to roll back energy-related support measures to avoid driving up medium-term inflationary pressures. Fiscal and structural policies should be designed to make the euro area economy more productive and competitive, as well as to gradually bring down high public debt ratios. Structural reforms and investments to enhance the euro area’s supply capacity – which would be supported by the full implementation of the Next Generation EU programme – could help reduce price pressures in the medium term, while supporting the green and digital transitions. Following the recent ECOFIN Council agreement on the reform of the EU’s economic governance framework, the legislative process should be concluded swiftly so that the new rules could be implemented without delay. Moreover, it was imperative that progress towards capital markets union and the completion of banking union be accelerated.

Members widely acknowledged that growth would likely be weaker than expected in the short term. So far, however, the decline in inflation was coming at a relatively mild cost in terms of economic activity. On the one hand, survey indicators suggested that the economy might have bottomed out. PMI indicators had plateaued and were even showing an uptick, feeding into the view that there would be a soft landing. Looking at the flash PMIs for January, manufacturing activity, although still firmly in negative territory, was on an upward path. The forward-looking PMIs for services had increased notably and employment expectations had also edged up moderately. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the economy was now likely to have stagnated for the fifth quarter in a row and the next staff projections would most likely shift the start of the recovery by one or two quarters again. Consumer confidence remained low and the PMI indicator for services had come in below analysts’ expectations in January. The ECB’s contacts with non-financial corporations showed that the business environment was perceived as not worsening, but also not improving. The Governing Council therefore still needed to see clearer signs that the recovery was on track.

Looking ahead, the main factor behind the expected recovery – according to the December 2023 staff projections – was consumption, which was seen picking up as real household income gradually improved. Investment was seen as another potential driver. Housing investment had been quite weak for almost two years, but it might gradually recover with mortgage rates coming off their peak. Reference was made to the bank lending survey, which foresaw an increase in households’ demand for loans for house purchase in the first quarter of 2024. Business investment had held up better than anticipated, and it might continue to do so given the still high stock of orders for capital goods and profits remaining above pre-pandemic trends, especially if financial conditions loosened further. This was seen as posing an upward risk to the economic outlook, notably in the short term, in view of the weak investment trajectory that the December projections anticipated. At the same time, it was stressed that monetary transmission remained very strong, particularly in the housing sector, as reflected in weak developments for housing loans.

Turning to the labour market, conditions there were seen as persistently very tight. Unemployment was still at an all-time low, so it could be argued that the “sacrifice ratio” of bringing down inflation had been virtually zero. Given the very tight labour market, it was prudent for the Governing Council to exercise caution on wage prospects and to await evidence that wage growth was actually moderating as projected for 2024. It was argued that the Governing Council would need to see some hard data confirming that wages had turned the corner. At the same time, it was highlighted that the labour market was clearly showing signs of cooling, and that was likely to have a dampening effect on future wage growth. Given significant labour hoarding, either economic activity would have to recover soon or employment and wage growth had to fall. Some softening of labour market conditions was already visible in a decline in job vacancies, which was typically the first variable that started to adjust.

Against this background, members assessed that the risks to economic growth remained tilted to the downside. Growth could be lower if the effects of monetary policy turned out stronger than expected. A weaker world economy or a further slowdown in global trade would also weigh on euro area growth. Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East were key sources of geopolitical risk. This might result in firms and households becoming less confident about the future and global trade being disrupted. Growth could be higher if rising real incomes meant spending increased by more than anticipated, or if the world economy grew more strongly than expected.

In this context, the view was expressed that the risks surrounding growth and inflation in the December staff projections were, overall, increasingly on the downside. It was remarked that a lower figure for activity in the fourth quarter, with the economy stagnating or even contracting, would mechanically imply substantially lower growth for 2024 owing to a carry-over effect. Moreover, the growth rate in both 2023 and 2024 would remain far below potential, mainly as a result of tighter financial conditions, weak sentiment, the withdrawal of fiscal support and the lagged effect of monetary policy tightening.

As euro area growth remained disappointing, also from a medium-term perspective, it was regarded as important to stress the need for structural reforms to address low productivity and impediments on the supply side. Low potential growth in Europe highlighted the importance of making progress towards capital markets union, as well as improving the functioning of the Single Market and other factor and product markets. In this context, it was pointed out that national governments were faced with several structural challenges, including an ageing population and the green and digital transitions, all to be tackled against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical risks. Even if activity and sentiment in the manufacturing sector were slowly improving, firms continued to face structural headwinds that were unrelated to the ECB’s monetary policy and needed to be tackled first and foremost by governments via structural reforms.

On the reform of the EU’s fiscal governance framework, it was stressed that the European Commission and the European Council should implement the new rules as transparently and as efficiently as possible, and in a way that permitted further progress towards fiscal consolidation and could simultaneously create headroom for investment. It was also recalled that governments needed to bring down high public debt ratios while being ready to contribute to closing the investment gap for the green transition and adaptation to climate change. This implied that they also had to adjust not only the path of “headline” fiscal policies but also the composition of budgets, to be able to pursue truly sustainable levels of economic activity that were resilient to the increasingly plausible scenario that the world would fall short of the objectives of the Paris Agreement.

With regard to price developments, members concurred with the assessment presented by Mr Lane in his introduction. Inflation had risen to 2.9% in December as some of the past fiscal measures to cushion the impact of high energy prices dropped out of the annual inflation rate, although the rebound was weaker than expected. Aside from this base effect, the overall trend of declining inflation had continued. Food price inflation had eased to 6.1% in December. HICP inflation excluding energy and food had also declined again, to 3.4%, owing to goods inflation falling to 2.5%. Services inflation was stable at 4.0%. Inflation was expected to ease further over the course of 2024 as the effects of past energy shocks, supply bottlenecks and the post-pandemic reopening of the economy faded, and tighter monetary policy continued to weigh on demand. Almost all measures of underlying inflation had declined further in December. The elevated rate of wage increases and falling labour productivity were keeping domestic price pressures high, although these too had started to ease. At the same time, lower unit profits had started to moderate the inflationary effect of rising unit labour costs. Measures of shorter-term inflation expectations had come down markedly, while measures of longer-term inflation expectations mostly stood around 2%.

Members stressed that the recent decline in inflation was good news. Headline and underlying inflation figures had recently been continuously below the predicted levels, suggesting a faster than anticipated disinflationary process. It was therefore likely that in March, with the new projections, there would be a downward revision to inflation for 2024. In this context, it was highlighted that the staff projections tended to underestimate changes in inflation momentum in both directions. Moreover, downside inflation surprises were currently occurring in parallel with downside growth surprises and repeated signs of a stronger than expected transmission of monetary policy. Additionally, market participants were expecting a lower inflation profile, notably for 2024. The view was expressed that this suggested the risks to the inflation projections might be moving to the downside, especially for the short term.

However, it was emphasised that the outlook for inflation remained particularly clouded over the short term. Seasonality could play a disproportionate role, with many firms posting new prices at the start of the year. This was likely to complicate the interpretation of incoming inflation numbers. Moreover, it was underlined that extracting a signal from the month-by-month data on how inflation would evolve over the medium term was subject to considerable uncertainty. In this regard, the medium-term component of wage dynamics and the evolution of inflation expectations remained crucial. It also remained an open issue as to how the pandemic-related changes in the prices of services would unwind relative to goods prices. There could be either more protracted deflation in goods prices or an extended period of services inflation above normal levels, with services prices typically stickier and more heavily determined by wages.

While headline inflation was generally seen as being on track towards the ECB’s 2% inflation target, this path remained surrounded by considerable uncertainty, especially with respect to the medium term. The prospect of inflation returning to target in a timely and sustained manner therefore remained fragile and depended on a number of benign assumptions materialising. In particular, emphasis was placed on the projected decline of record high unit labour cost growth, which was predicated on a rebound in productivity alongside a moderation in wage growth in 2024. Moreover, it was assumed that higher labour costs would continue to be absorbed by profits, as indicated by a projected smaller contribution from unit profits to domestic inflation. Reference was again made to the “last mile” difficulties, with the final stretch to the inflation target seen as more challenging than earlier phases. This was seen as a risk because the swift disinflation following the reversal of supply shocks and the forceful monetary tightening would soon start to wane, and the domestic components of inflation might prove more persistent or new shocks might derail progress. For example, although the momentum of services inflation had slowed, the annual growth rate had remained high, at 4% in December. Similarly, domestic inflation had come down but remained above other measures of underlying inflation. Moreover, the absorption of higher input costs by lower profit margins was not assured, as was suggested by the increase in selling price expectations over three successive months.

Turning to wage developments in more detail, members recalled that wage pressures were key to the medium-term inflation outlook. So far, wage growth had remained strong and, together with negative productivity growth, had led to a historically large increase of 6.7% in unit labour costs in the third quarter of 2023. The distance between current wage growth of around 5% and a trend increase of 3% or 2½% that was compatible with the 2% inflation target, assuming 1% or ½% trend productivity growth, was regarded as quite significant and likely to diminish only gradually over time. It remained to be seen whether unit labour cost growth would decline sharply in 2024 as assumed in the December staff projections, which relied partly on a rather strong recovery in productivity growth combined with a moderation in wage growth.

Despite stagnation, it was underlined that the economy continued to add jobs. The unemployment rate was clearly below all available estimates of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) for the euro area. Hence trade unions would probably still see themselves as being in quite a powerful negotiating position. It should also be kept in mind that the backloading of wage increases in some countries implied more persistent pressure on wage growth, stretching well into 2025. At the same time, the reason why unit labour costs were expected to improve significantly this year was because the economy was expected to recover strongly according to the December projections. So, under the baseline scenario, firms could increase output this year without necessarily adding to employment, and an improvement in productivity ensured that unit labour costs would decline more quickly than wages. If the economy were to grow by less, unit labour costs might not retrench and inflation pressure might persist. However, it was also argued that this was unlikely to happen, as firms would face weaker demand and pricing power and would thus eventually respond with layoffs, which would pre-empt a further decline in labour productivity.

Moreover, it was pointed out that nominal wage growth of around 5% – according to the latest available data for compensation per employee (for the third quarter of 2023) – was not necessarily an excessive number during a “catching-up” phase, taking into account that real wages had declined by about 7% since the beginning of the inflation surge. A recovery in real wages, as also embodied in the December projections, could be regarded as necessary for the euro area economy to recover from its current period of stagnation. In a context of weak demand, this should not be expected to put upward pressure on inflation. Conversely, if employment and wages were to weaken too much, there was a risk that the economy could quickly find itself back in a situation of low growth and low inflation. Moreover, in a context of rapid disinflation, it also seemed likely that trade unions would accept lower nominal wage increases to achieve the same real wage increases. Finally, caution was expressed against overinterpreting the signal from current wage growth, as the labour market typically lagged output dynamics and the impact of monetary policy tightening should therefore also become visible in wage growth with a lag.

Against this background, it was widely felt that the signal from wage growth in the first quarter of this year would be important, as many wage contracts were scheduled to be settled in the coming months. At the moment it was an open question as to how workers would react to the new environment of falling inflation, with the level of prices still high compared with wage levels. The incoming information from the wage trackers was broadly in line with the baseline in the December staff projections. Hence the question was raised as to whether new wage agreements would corroborate recent first signs of moderation in line with the projections, and whether firms would continue to compress margins. These were two elements which would be consistent with inflation returning to target in the medium term. Finally, it was also recalled that, while negotiated wages were typically a lagging indicator of economic growth, the wage drift – the other component of total wage growth – was more immediately responsive to the overall business cycle. In the context of an economy that had been stagnating for nearly one and a half years, it was thus likely that this component of wage growth would turn out to be weaker than suggested by the information in the wage tracker for negotiated wages.

Attention was drawn to another reason why inflation could be falling in spite of increasing wages. Since wages amounted to only around 40% of firms’ total costs and most indicators of intermediate costs were currently falling, when wages and intermediate costs were taken together, pressure on inflation from total costs was declining. As changes in producer prices typically led changes in consumer prices by a few quarters, this decline in cost pressure could be expected to be transmitted to consumer prices in the next couple of quarters. Now that intermediate costs were moving in the opposite direction to wages, wage growth was not a sufficient indicator to capture overall cost pressures in the economy, given that prices were typically set as a mark-up over total costs, not just wage costs.

The question was also raised as to whether, in the near future, profit margins would have enough scope to continue absorbing the rise in unit labour costs. If not, businesses might increasingly pass high unit labour costs through to prices. Firms’ profits were far from the exceptional levels of 2022, a time when firms purportedly took advantage of high inflation to increase profit margins. In fact, profit margins had already come down to the point where anecdotal evidence suggested that some firms were now starting to cut back on investment because they felt constrained by a lack of profitability. The performance of the manufacturing sector was weaker and the sector was also exposed to global competition, so profits might continue to buffer unit labour costs. By contrast, the services sector was largely shielded from global competition and demand was still robust. Therefore, the high unit labour costs in this sector were likely to be passed through to prices more easily. In this context, it was also noted that stock returns suggested that corporate profitability was, overall, still high. Moreover, there was significant uncertainty surrounding the link between wages and price-setting, and it was underlined that the Governing Council needed to monitor a broad set of variables to understand how the current state of the labour market would ultimately affect inflation, rather than relying on only a few indicators.

As regards longer-term inflation expectations, market-based measures had come down notably and remained broadly anchored at 2%, reflecting the market’s view that inflation would fall rapidly and stabilise around 2%. In this context, reference was made to risks of a downward unanchoring of inflation expectations, as a result of the weakness in economic activity and of a faster and broader disinflation than anticipated. At the same time, the view was expressed that there were no indications that expectations would become unanchored to the downside, with the inflation expectations of households and firms instead being skewed to the upside. Overall, developments were widely seen as going in the right direction.

Against this background, upside risks to inflation included the heightened geopolitical tensions, especially in the Middle East, which could push energy prices and freight costs higher in the near term and hamper global trade. Inflation could also turn out higher than anticipated if wages increased by more than expected or profit margins proved more resilient. By contrast, inflation could surprise on the downside if monetary policy dampened demand by more than expected, or if the economic environment in the rest of the world worsened unexpectedly. Moreover, inflation could decline more quickly in the near term if energy prices evolved in line with the recent downward shift in market expectations for the future path of oil and gas prices.

Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, market interest rates were broadly unchanged compared with the levels at the time of the Governing Council’s previous meeting but had shown substantial volatility. The rapid fall in market interest rates until around the turn of the year had subsequently reversed on the back of communication by Governing Council members that had curbed expectations of imminent policy rate cuts. This had led markets to price in a lower probability of policy rate cuts at the upcoming meetings of the Governing Council. Nevertheless, expected cumulative rate cuts for 2024 were currently nearly double the 75 basis points that had been embedded in the December staff projections. In addition, it was argued that the markets were expecting lower interest rates because they were expecting lower growth and inflation than projected, especially in 2024.

In this respect, it was widely felt that the current market pricing of future interest rates was not a sign that markets did not understand the ECB’s reaction function. Instead, it appeared that markets simply expected inflation to be lower than foreseen in the December staff projections, notably for 2024. Given that market expectations for inflation and for the future path of nominal interest rates had moved lower in tandem, the profile of expected real interest rates had remained broadly unchanged. It was important not to dismiss the markets’ assessment, and it was advisable to exercise humility when judging market expectations for inflation and rates. However, this did not mean that the Governing Council had to follow or validate these expectations. Market pricing would likely respond both to incoming data and to the Governing Council’s communication of its own assessment.

Euro area equity markets were assessed to have been quite buoyant in 2023 and also to have remained robust into 2024, despite the weaker outlook for economic growth. It was argued that this could, in part, reflect the repricing of the outlook for interest rates by financial markets, which might be underpricing the risk of a shallower monetary policy easing cycle. An alternative interpretation of the strength in equity markets was that financial market participants might be expecting profits to remain resilient, which could justify current stock market valuations, notably of globally active firms.

Members also pointed out that euro area financial markets had continued to function well, with sovereign and corporate bond spreads generally contained and mostly narrowing. There was no evidence of market fragmentation amid the normalisation of the Eurosystem balance sheet, which was a welcome development. Overall, there had been a significant loosening of financial conditions since the October monetary policy meeting, when the Governing Council had first paused the hiking cycle after the series of interest rate increases implemented since July 2022. Financial conditions were broadly unchanged from the time of the December meeting and had tightened only slightly since the trough around the end of 2023.

Members agreed that the ECB’s restrictive monetary policy had been strongly transmitted to financing conditions for firms and households, while some evidence had recently emerged that borrowing costs might have reached a peak. Bank lending rates for firms had fallen in November 2023 for the first time in a long period and, although mortgage rates had increased further, the bank lending survey suggested some flattening-out in the tightening of credit standards and an easing in the terms and conditions for housing loans. However, it was recalled that, even if rates on new lending might be reaching a turning point, much of the repricing of the existing stock of loans at higher rates remained in the pipeline.

Credit dynamics had improved somewhat but remained weak overall. This weakness reflected the impact of past monetary policy tightening, which, as reported in the latest bank lending survey, had also contributed to a further drop in credit demand in the fourth quarter of 2023. On the credit supply side, it was argued that weak incentives for bank lending might also have played a role. Banks had attractive alternative ways of putting their liquidity to work, including by investing in bond markets and placing funds in the ECB’s deposit facility. Anecdotal evidence nevertheless suggested that loan supply was not seen as a major problem by firms, who cited other issues, such as regulation and the lack of qualified labour, as being more important. Overall, it was assessed that the monetary policy transmission to credit volumes had remained strong, especially for mortgages. At the same time, credit dynamics appeared to be in line with the narrative of a soft landing for the economy. Moreover, the fact that monthly lending flows to firms had reached their highest level in more than a year and loans to households had picked up could be an indication that credit dynamics might be close to a turning point, and that the peak of monetary transmission to bank lending volumes might have been reached.

Finally, it was remarked that, in response to changes in the monetary policy stance, banks’ funding strategies were gradually normalising in terms of both the configuration of bank interest rates and their recourse to the Eurosystem balance sheet. Banks had benefited from being able to draw on well-functioning funding markets with stable and sustainable spreads. While more diversified funding strategies might imply an increase in aggregate bank funding costs, they contributed to robust bank balance sheets and therefore increased the resilience of banks to shocks in the prevailing uncertain macro-financial environment. This would also support an orderly and smooth transmission of monetary policy if shocks were to materialise.

Monetary policy stance and policy considerations

Turning to the monetary policy stance, members assessed the incoming data since the last Governing Council meeting in accordance with the three main elements that the Governing Council had communicated in 2023 to be important in shaping its reaction function. These elements were (i) the implications of the incoming economic and financial data for the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation, and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission. Overall, members saw the latest developments in economic activity and inflation as being consistent with the current monetary policy stance. There had been further progress on all three elements of the reaction function, which gave grounds to be confident that monetary policy was working.

Starting with the inflation outlook, data releases issued since the previous meeting suggested that disinflation was broadly proceeding as envisaged, or even at a slightly faster pace than previously expected. It was argued that, on the basis of current information and updated assumptions, and in particular lower energy prices, the new staff projections due in March were likely to show a downward revision to inflation for 2024. However, it was underlined that the important question from a policy perspective was the extent to which the news on near-term inflation would be translated into changes in the medium-term inflation outlook. While the incoming information had broadly confirmed the previous assessment of the medium-term inflation outlook, it would be premature to draw any firm conclusions in this regard, as a more complete evaluation was needed when the March projections were available. While inflation had been decreasing faster than expected, this could partly be attributed to one-off factors and energy price developments that might easily reverse. For an assessment of the medium-term inflation outlook, a wide range of variables needed to be considered, in particular the extent to which disinflation would lead to lower wage claims.

For the new staff projections, the prevailing market expectations regarding interest rates were also important as conditioning assumptions. Market expectations were currently significantly lower than those underlying the December projections. Since the lower path for interest rates currently expected by markets was in part an endogenous reaction to lower inflation, the extent to which lower nominal rates would translate into higher growth and inflation in the future needed to be carefully assessed. This should include looking at how the expected path of real rates would change in the projections with new assumptions.

Members noted that measures of underlying inflation had passed their peak, having fallen since the summer, and HICP inflation excluding energy and food had been weaker than predicted in recent data releases. Momentum had also come down in those measures of underlying inflation that remained relatively high, including services inflation and domestic inflation. Yet, wage growth had remained strong, with only limited indications of a turnaround thus far. Moreover, unit labour costs had risen sharply, in part reflecting weak productivity growth, and it remained to be seen whether they would grow as slowly as foreseen in the projections, which were predicated on a recovery in productivity growth together with moderating wage growth. Further uncertainty pertained to how much the contribution of unit profits to domestic inflation would continue to decline as projected, with firms absorbing higher labour costs rather than passing them on to consumers.

Turning to the assessment of monetary policy transmission, members noted that there was solid evidence that monetary policy was being transmitted to financial markets, financing conditions and credit conditions, with the impact most likely having been stronger than expected. However, uncertainty remained about the timing of the peak impact, as well as the ultimate overall effect of monetary policy tightening on the real economy and inflation.

All in all, members signalled that continuity, caution and patience were still needed, since the disinflationary process remained fragile and letting up too early could undo some of the progress made. While the initial inflation shock had largely reversed, the task that lay ahead was the reversal of second-round effects, which might prove to be more stubborn. At the same time, members expressed increased confidence that inflation would be brought back towards the 2% inflation target in a timely manner. The point was made that, for the first time in many meetings, the risks to reaching the inflation target were seen as broadly balanced or at least becoming more even. At the same time, the view was also expressed that, after several years of significantly overshooting the inflation target, the costs of another overshooting were likely higher than the costs of undershooting.

In this context, members underlined the fact that the ECB’s inflation target was symmetric, implying the need to avoid both an undershooting and an overshooting, unless policy rates were close to the effective lower bound. At the same time, there was likely to be some volatility in inflation on the path to achieving the 2% target, and new shocks could materialise. Even if the projections foresaw a temporary period of inflation below 2%, as long as such a deviation was neither large nor persistent, the policy conclusion, in keeping with the ECB’s medium-term orientation, was that the Governing Council did not necessarily have to act. However, it was recalled that, since the ECB’s monetary policy strategy did not prescribe an average inflation target, the Governing Council should not aim at any such undershooting and all persistent deviations from the inflation target in either direction required a policy response.

Monetary policy decisions and communication

Against this background, all members agreed with the proposal by Mr Lane to maintain the three key ECB interest rates at their current levels. It was affirmed that further progress needed to be made in the disinflationary process before the Governing Council could be sufficiently confident that inflation was set to hit the ECB’s target in a timely manner and in a sustainable way. At the present juncture it was regarded as important for monetary policy to stay the course and for the Governing Council to proceed with a steady hand. At the same time, members underlined the fact that monetary policy remained data-dependent. It was reiterated that, based on its current assessment, the Governing Council considered the key ECB interest rates to be at levels that, if maintained for a sufficiently long duration, would make a substantial contribution to returning inflation to the medium-term target in a timely manner. Future decisions would ensure that policy rates would be set at sufficiently restrictive levels for as long as necessary.

There was broad consensus among members that it was premature to discuss rate cuts at the present meeting and members widely referred to risk management considerations to support this view. The risk of cutting policy rates too early was still seen as outweighing that of cutting rates too late. Having to reverse course, in the event that economic activity picked up more strongly than expected, wage growth accelerated or renewed inflationary pressures emerged, could entail high reputational costs. The point was also made that the risk of an inadvertent overtightening of monetary policy was mitigated by the fact that financial markets were already pricing in a number of rate cuts in 2024, contributing to a loosening of both financial and financing conditions. However, it was also argued that such a loosening might be premature and could possibly derail or delay a timely return of inflation to target. In any case, members agreed that following a data-dependent rather than a calendar-based approach was important, in line with the elements of the reaction function that the Governing Council had communicated in 2023.

Members also agreed with the Executive Board proposal to continue applying flexibility in reinvesting redemptions falling due in the PEPP portfolio.

Taking into account the foregoing discussion among the members, upon a proposal by the President, the Governing Council took the monetary policy decisions as set out in the monetary policy press release. The members of the Governing Council subsequently finalised the monetary policy statement, which the President and the Vice-President would, as usual, deliver at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting.

Monetary policy statement

Monetary policy statement for the press conference of 25 January 2024

Press release

Monetary policy decisions

Meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council, 24-25 January 2024

Members

  • Ms Lagarde, President
  • Mr de Guindos, Vice-President
  • Mr Centeno*
  • Mr Cipollone
  • Mr Elderson
  • Mr Hernández de Cos
  • Mr Herodotou
  • Mr Holzmann*
  • Mr Kazāks
  • Mr Kažimír
  • Mr Knot*
  • Mr Lane
  • Mr Makhlouf
  • Mr Müller
  • Mr Nagel
  • Mr Panetta
  • Mr Reinesch*
  • Ms Schnabel
  • Mr Scicluna*
  • Mr Šimkus
  • Mr Stournaras
  • Mr Välimäki, temporarily replacing Mr Rehn
  • Mr Vasle
  • Mr Villeroy de Galhau
  • Mr Vujčić
  • Mr Wunsch

* Members not holding a voting right in January 2024 under Article 10.2 of the ESCB Statute.

Other attendees

  • Mr Dombrovskis, Commission Executive Vice-President**
  • Ms Senkovic, Secretary, Director General Secretariat
  • Mr Rostagno, Secretary for monetary policy, Director General Monetary Policy
  • Mr Winkler, Deputy Secretary for monetary policy, Senior Adviser, DG Economics

** In accordance with Article 284 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Accompanying persons

  • Ms Bénassy-Quéré
  • Mr Dabušinskas
  • Mr Demarco
  • Mr Gavilán
  • Mr Haber
  • Mr Kaasik
  • Mr Koukoularides
  • Mr Lünnemann
  • Mr Madouros
  • Mr Martin
  • Ms Mauderer
  • Mr Nicoletti Altimari
  • Mr Novo
  • Mr Pösö
  • Mr Rutkaste
  • Mr Sleijpen
  • Mr Šošić
  • Mr Vanackere
  • Ms Žumer Šujica

Other ECB staff

  • Mr Proissl, Director General Communications
  • Mr Straub, Counsellor to the President
  • Ms Rahmouni-Rousseau, Director General Market Operations
  • Mr Arce, Director General Economics
  • Mr Sousa, Deputy Director General Economics

Release of the next monetary policy account foreseen on 4 April 2024.

]]>
https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/account-of-the-monetary-policy-meeting-24-25-january-2024/ Nyhet Thu, 22 Feb 2024 12:30:00 GMT
Ökat intresse för inlåning med högre ränta https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/sparande-och-investering/2023/okat-intresse-for-inlaning-med-hogre-ranta/ I och med att räntorna stigit har de finländska hushållen överfört[1] sina tillgångar till inlåningskonton med högre ränta. Under 2023 överförde hushållen tillgångar till ett värde av 7,3 miljarder euro till tidsbundna konton och drygt 2 miljarder euro till konton för placeringsdepositioner[2]. Som helhet minskade emellertid inlåningen från hushållen[3] (108,7 miljarder euro) med över 3 miljarder euro under 2023, eftersom tillgångarna på konton för inlåning över natten[4] samtidigt minskade med 12,4 miljarder euro.

Trots minskningen utgörs största delen (65 %) av inlåningen från hushållen fortfarande av insättningar på konton för inlåning över natten (inkl. transaktionskonton). Vid utgången av 2023 var 70,6 miljarder euro av inlåningen från hushållen inlåning över natten, 10,9 miljarder euro tidsbunden inlåning och 27,2 miljarder euro placeringsdepositioner.

I och med att räntorna gått upp har ränteskillnaderna mellan olika inlåningskonton ökat. Genomsnittsräntan på hushållens tidsbundna inlåning och placeringsdepositioner har stigit snabbt. Vid slutet av december var genomsnittsräntan på tidsbunden inlåning 2,70 % och på placeringsdepositioner 2,46 %. Genomsnittsräntan på inlåning över natten har också stigit och var 0,46 % vid slutet av december.

2023Q4_sv.png

 

Vid utgången av december 2023 var den genomsnittliga räntan på hushållens inlåning 1,18 %, då den vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan var 0,21 %. Genomsnittsräntan på inlåningen från hushållen har senast varit högre 2009.

Genomsnittsräntan på de finländska hushållens nya avtal om tidsbunden inlåning sjönk något från november 2023 och var i december 3,42 %. Före det hade genomsnittsräntan på ny tidsbunden inlåning stigit utan avbrott sedan juli 2022. I Finland var genomsnittsräntan på ny tidsbunden inlåning i december något högre än i euroområdet i medeltal. I december 2023 var genomsnittsräntan på nya avtal om tidsbunden inlåning i euroområdet 3,29 %. Också den sjönk något från november.

 

Finländarnas insättningar och investeringar (mn euro), 2023Q4
  Totalt** Hushåll Arbetspensions-anstalter
  stock (flöden) omvärder-ing stock (flöden) omvärder-ing stock (flöden) omvärder-ing
Finländarnas investeringar            
Noterade aktier 211 498 10 745 46 011 2 228 36 509 2 188
  (-3 265)   (147)   (475)  
- inhemska aktier 123 443 4 858 40 259 1 702 17 158 901
  (1 569)   (187)   (340)  
             
Räntebärande värdepapper 222 325 7 546 2 414 60 29 320 1050
  (953)   (38)   (-1 062)  
- inhemska räntebärande värdepapper 97 115 3 831 1 912 48 4 498 195
  (-892)   (5)   (-462)  
             
Fondandelar            
Inhemska investeringsfonder 118 577 5 392 34 062 1567 5 331 189
  (543)   (381)   (-14)  
             
Utländska fonder 176 391 2 005 6 484 378 129 512 -55
  (649)   (182)   (1 083)  
             
Finländarnas insättningar på bank            
Inlåning över natten (transaktionskonton) 142 484 -61 70 557 -4 5 760 -4
  (-390)   (-3 995)   (2 130)  
Andra insättningar 46 929 -9 38 116 -1 -* -*
  (2 493)   (2 563)   -*  
             
* Konfidentiell.            
** Försäkringsbolagens värdepapper- och fondinformation saknas.        

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Markus Aaltonen, telefon 09 183 2395, e-post: markus.aaltonen(at)bof.fi,

Antti Hirvonen, telefon 09 183 2121, e-post: antti.hirvonen(at)bof.fi.

 

Statistiksiffror och grafik som utgör underlag för meddelandet kan läsas på https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/.

Nästa publiceringstillfälle 8.5.2024 kl. 10.

 


[1] Netto.

[2] Placeringsdepositioner är inlåning med uppsägningstid. De har ingen överenskommen löptid (till skillnad från tidsbunden inlåning), men de kan tas ut i kontanter efter en viss uppsägningstid eller mot straffavgift (till skillnad från inlåning över natten). I denna kategori ingår också placeringskonton utan uppsägningstid eller överenskommen löptid men med restriktiva uttagsvillkor.

[3] I statistiken ändrades i många fall klassificeringen av inlåning som är förenad med restriktiva uttagsvillkor från inlåning över natten till placeringsdepositioner. Ändringen ökade mängden placeringsdepositioner och minskade inlåningen över natten. Historiska data har korrigerats från och med oktober 2022. Se närmare uppgifter om ändringen av klassificeringen som gäller inlåning (Länk).

[4] Omfattar transaktionskonton och övriga konton, från vilka tillgångar kan tas ut eller överföras fritt.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/sparande-och-investering/2023/okat-intresse-for-inlaning-med-hogre-ranta/ Statistik Thu, 08 Feb 2024 08:02:16 GMT
De oreglerade lånen inom byggbranschen har fortsatt att öka https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/monetara-finansinstituts-balansrakning_new/2023/de-oreglerade-lanen-inom-byggbranschen-har-fortsatt-att-oka/ Vid utgången av december 2023 var 5,6 % (160 miljoner euro) av de utestående banklånen som beviljats finländska företag inom byggbranschen oreglerade[1]. Det är den största[2] siffran i statistikhistorien. De oreglerade lånen inom byggbranschen började öka i augusti 2023 och de fortsatte att öka under hösten och början av vintern. Sedan juli 2023 har andelen oreglerade lån av utlåningen till företag inom byggbranschen ökat med 2,4 procentenheter (62,0 miljoner euro). Under 2023 redovisade bankerna 100 miljoner euro netto[3] i nedskrivningar och kreditförluster av företagslån inom byggbranschen (3,5 % av utlåningen i december 2023). Vid utgången av december utgjorde de utestående banklånen till företag inom byggbranschen totalt 2,9 miljarder euro.

I december 2023 var de oreglerade lånens andel av utlåningen inom samtliga branscher jämfört med byggbranschen högre endast inom sektorn för kultur, nöje och fritid (11,3 %) samt inom hotell- och restaurangbranschen (6,2 %). Dessa branscher är till sin lånestock klart mindre än byggbranschen. Vid utgången av december uppgick de utestående lånen inom sektorn för kultur, nöje och fritid till 471 miljoner euro och inom hotell- och restaurangbranschen till 775 miljoner euro. Under 2023 utgjorde de redovisade nedskrivningarna och kreditförlusterna av lån till sektorn för kultur, nöje och fritid 1,2 % netto av utlåningen och för hotell- och restaurangbranschen 0,9 %.

Andelen oreglerade lån av den totala utlåningen till företag är fortfarande liten. Vid slutet av december 2023 var de oreglerade lånens andel av bankernas utlåning till företag[4] (62,0 miljarder euro) 1,2 miljarder euro, dvs. 1,9 %. Som helhet har den låga andelen oreglerade företagslån sin förklaring i de branscher[5] med en stor lånestock för vilka andelen oreglerade lån av utlåningen har hållit sig under 2 %. Under 2023 redovisades 312 miljoner euro netto i nedskrivningar av den totala utlåningen till företag, dvs. 0,5 % av lånestocken.

 

De oreglerade lånen inom byggbranschen har fortsatt att öka

 

Utlåning

De finländska hushållen lyfte i december 2023 nya bostadslån för 1,3 miljarder euro, vilket är 270 miljoner euro mer än vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan. Av de nya utbetalda bostadslånen stod investeringsbostadslånen för 85 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på nya bostadslån sjönk från november och var 4,42 % i december. Det utestående beloppet av bostadslån uppgick vid slutet av december 2023 till 106,7 miljarder euro och årsökningen var –1,6 %. Investeringsbostadslånens andel av de utestående bostadslånen var 8,6 miljarder euro. Av utlåningen till de finländska hushållen utöver bostadslån bestod 17,3 miljarder euro av konsumtionskrediter och 17,5 miljarder euro av övriga lån vid utgången av december.

De finländska företagen lyfte i december nya lån för 2,7 miljarder euro, och av dem utgjorde bostadsbolagslånen 540 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på nya utbetalda företagslån sjönk från november och var 5,36 %. Det utestående beloppet av lån till finländska bostadsbolag uppgick vid slutet av december till 43,8 miljarder euro.

 

Inlåning

Inlåningen från hushållen i Finland uppgick totalt till 108,7 miljarder euro vid slutet av december 2023 och genomsnittsräntan var 1,18 %. I beloppet ingick inlåning över natten för 70,6 miljarder euro och tidsbunden inlåning för 10,9 miljarder euro. De finländska hushållen tecknade i december nya tidsbundna inlåningsavtal för 1,3 miljarder euro. Genomsnittsräntan på ny tidsbunden inlåning var i december 3,42 %.

 

Utlåning och inlåning till Finland, preliminär uppgift*
  Oktober, mn euro November, mn euro December, mn euro December, 12 mån förändring1, % Genomsnitts-ränta, %
Utlåning till hushåll, utestående belopp 141 257 141 151 141 418 -1,3 4,63
    - varav bostadslån 106 535 106 524 106 698 -1,6 4,08
    - varav investeringsbostadslån 8 641 8 638 8 621   4,28
Utlåning till icke-finansiella företag2, utestående belopp 105 873 106 306 105 794 1,2 4,77
Inlåning från hushåll, utestående belopp 108 351 107 987 108 673 -2,8 1,18
Nya utbetalda bostadslån till hushåll 1 128 1 237 1 337   4,42
    - varav investeringsbostadslån 100 95 85   4,62

* Omfattar utlåning och inlåning i alla valutor till Finland. I Finlands Banks statistikpublikationer till och med januari 2021 och i ECB:s statistikpublikationer presenteras utlåning och inlåning i euro för euroområdet och hushållen omfattar också hushållens icke-vinstsyftande organisationer, varför siffrorna i tabellen avviker från uppgifterna i dessa publikationer.
1 Den procentuella förändringen är beräknad på månatliga stockförändringar som är justerade för omklassificeringar och omvärderingar.  
2 Till de icke-finansiella företagen räknas bostadssammanslutningar.

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Antti Hirvonen, telefon 09 183 2121, e-post: antti.hirvonen(at)bof.fi,

Usva Topo, telefon 09 183 2056, e-post: usva.topo(at)bof.fi.

 

Nästa månadspublicering 28.2.2024 kl. 10.

 

Statistiksiffror och grafik som utgör underlag för meddelandet kan läsas på https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/.

 

[1] Ett lån betraktas som oreglerat när det har förfallit för mer än 90 dagar sedan eller det finns anledning att anta att gäldenären inte kommer att fullgöra sin betalning.

[2] Data har samlats in från och med juni 2010.

[3] Inkluderar också redovisade återföringar, som minskar beloppet av redovisade nedskrivningar och kreditförluster. Nedskrivningar av lån redovisas på basis av modeller för förväntade kreditförluster. Den förväntade kreditförlusten är bankens uppskattning av det lånebelopp som kunden inte betalar. Redovisade nedskrivningar och kreditförluster minskar andelen problemlån i lånestocken.

[4] Exkl. bostadsbolag.

[5] Fastighetsverksamhet, försörjning av el, gas, värme och kyla samt handel; reparation av motorfordon och motorcyklar.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/monetara-finansinstituts-balansrakning_new/2023/de-oreglerade-lanen-inom-byggbranschen-har-fortsatt-att-oka/ Statistik Wed, 31 Jan 2024 08:00:00 GMT
ECB ökar klimatarbetet med fokus på grön omställning, klimat och naturrelaterade risker https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/ecb-okar-klimatarbetet-med-fokus-pa-gron-omstallning-klimat-och-naturrelaterade-risker/ ECB:s pressmeddelande 30 januari 2024

  • Klimatkrisens ökande inverkan på ekonomin och det finansiella systemet driver på behovet av fler åtgärder
  • ECB bekräftar sitt engagemang för pågående klimatåtgärder och kommer att se över dem regelbundet
  • Tre fokusområden för arbetet under 2024 och 2025: konsekvenser av grön omställning, klimatförändringarnas fysiska effekter samt naturrelaterade risker för ekonomi och finanssystem

Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) har beslutat att utöka sitt arbete med klimatförändringar och har identifierat tre fokusområden som kommer att vägleda dess verksamhet 2024 och 2025:

  1. effekterna och riskerna med omställningen till en grön ekonomi, särskilt de därmed förbundna omställningskostnaderna och investeringsbehoven,
  2. klimatförändringarnas ökande fysiska inverkan och hur åtgärder för en anpassning till en varmare värld påverkar ekonomin,
  3. risker som härrör från naturförlust och naturförstöring, hur de samverkar med klimatrelaterade risker och hur de kan påverka ECB:s arbete genom inverkan på ekonomi och finanssystem.

”Ett varmare klimat och försämringen av naturkapital tvingar fram förändringar i vår ekonomi och vårt finanssystem. Vi måste förstå och hålla jämna steg med denna förändring för att fortsätta att fullgöra vårt mandat, sade ECB:s ordförande Christine Lagarde. ”Genom att bredda och intensifiera våra ansträngningar kan vi bättre förstå konsekvenserna av dessa förändringar och därigenom bidra till att stärka stabiliteten och stödja den gröna omställningen i ekonomi och finanssystem.”

I detta syfte har man enats om följande konkreta åtgärder.

  • När det gäller övergången till en grön ekonomi kommer ECB att intensifiera sitt arbete med effekterna av övergångsfinansiering, gröna investeringsbehov, omställningsplaner och hur den gröna omställningen påverkar aspekter av vår ekonomi såsom arbetskraft, produktivitet och tillväxt. Resultaten kommer också att ligga till grund för ECB:s ramverk för makromodellering. ECB kommer dessutom att inom ramen för sitt mandat undersöka ytterligare förändringar av sina penningpolitiska instrument och portföljer med anledning av denna övergång.
  • När det gäller klimatförändringarnas ökande fysiska inverkan, kommer ECB att fördjupa sin analys av extrema väderhändelsers påverkan på inflation och finanssystem samt hur detta kan integreras i klimatscenarier och makroekonomiska prognoser. Det kommer även att bedömas vilka potentiella effekter en anpassning, eller avsaknad av anpassning till klimatförändringarna får för ekonomi och finanssektorn, inbegripet relaterade investeringsbehov och bristande försäkringsskydd.
  • När det gäller naturförlust och naturförstöring kommer ECB att analysera den nära kopplingen till klimatförändringar och de därmed sammanhängande ekonomiska och finansiella konsekvenserna. Man kommer också att ytterligare undersöka ekosystemens roll för ekonomi och finanssystem.
  • När det gäller den egna verksamheten kommer ECB att lansera sitt åttonde miljöledningsprogram för att för att stödja målet att minska koldioxidutsläpp fram till 2030. Tillsammans med hela Eurosystemet kommer detta arbete att omfatta principer för ekodesign för framtida eurosedlar och miljöavtryck i utformningen av en digital euro som för närvarande är i förberedelsefasen.

Beslutet att intensifiera insatserna på dessa områden följer ECB:s genomgång av klimatåtgärder sedan lanseringen av klimatagendan 2022 och en anpassning av arbetsplanen mot bakgrund av den föränderliga miljön och förbättringar av tillgången till data och metoder.

Det arbete som planeras för dessa fokusområden kommer att komplettera ECB:s nuvarande klimatrelaterade åtgärder i dess pågående uppgifter, penningpolitik och banktillsyn inbegripet. ECB kommer att förbättra sina klimatrelaterade indikatorer, riskövervakning och information och fortsätta att bidra till utvecklingen av klimatrelaterad politik i europeiska och internationella forum. På längre sikt är ECB fast beslutet att regelbundet se över dessa åtgärder för att säkerställa att de är ändamålsenliga och bidrar till fullgörandet av ECB:s mandat.

En översikt över det planerade arbetsprogrammet för 2024 och 2025 finns i bilagan (engelska) och mer information finns på ECB:s webbplats.

För information

  • ECB måste ta hänsyn till klimatförändringarnas effekter i utförandet av sina uppgifter inom ramen för sitt mandat. Utan att det påverkar dess prisstabilitetsmål måste ECB dessutom stödja den allmänna ekonomiska politiken i Europeiska unionen, i syfte att bidra till en hög skyddsnivå och förbättring av miljön. Detta inkluderar målen i den europeiska klimatlagen. Enligt artikel 11 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt ska ECB också integrera miljöskyddskraven i utformningen och genomförandet av sin politik och verksamhet.
  • ECB infördeklimathänsyn i sitt penningpolitiska ramverk efter sin strategiöversyn 2021.
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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/ecb-okar-klimatarbetet-med-fokus-pa-gron-omstallning-klimat-och-naturrelaterade-risker/ Nyhet Tue, 30 Jan 2024 13:45:00 GMT
I fjol påträffades 653 förfalskade eurosedlar i Finland https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2024/i-fjol-patraffades-653-forfalskade-eurosedlar-i-finland/ Bland de utelöpande sedlarna i Finland påträffades 653 förfalskade eurosedlar under 2023. Antalet har ökat något från året innan, men är fortfarande mycket måttligt. År 2022 påträffades 469 förfalskade eurosedlar i omlopp.

Bland de förfalskningar som påträffades i omlopp under 2023 var valören 20 euro vanligast (totalt 364 st.), valören 50 euro näst vanligast (149 st.) och valören 10 euro tredje vanligast (80 st.).

”Antalet falska sedlar som påträffades i omlopp 2023 var något större än året innan, men trots det ungefär i samma storleksklass som normalt årligen påträffas i Finland. Det är viktigt att komma ihåg att alltid ge akt på sedlarnas säkerhetsdetaljer när man hanterar sedlar”, säger sedelexpert Olli Vehmas från Finlands Bank.

Period

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

Antal förfalskningar

979

1 496

523

469

653

Eurosedlarna är försedda med flera säkerhetsdetaljer för äkthetskontroll. Sedelns äkthet kan kontrolleras med några enkla test: känn på sedeln, titta på den mot ljuset och luta på sedeln. I tveksamma fall lönar det sig att jämföra en misstänkt sedel med en som man vet är äkta. Guider och handledningar för äkthetskontroll finns på Finlands Banks webbplats (www.suomenpankki.fi > Pengar och betalningar).

Finlands Bank har gett ut en webbaserad sedelkurs som är öppen för alla. Kursen ger en inblick i eurosedlarnas säkerhetsdetaljer samt information om hur man ska handla i olika situationer om man råkar ut för en falsk sedel. Kursen finns på adressen setelikurssi.suomenpankki.fi.

Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) har i dag gett ut ett pressmeddelande (www.ecb.europa.eu) om antalet falska eurosedlar som påträffats totalt i världen.

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

sedelexpert Olli Vehmas, Finlands Bank, telefon 09 183 3410

kriminalöverkonstapel Jussi Larvanto, centralkriminalpolisen, telefon 0295 486 954

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2024/i-fjol-patraffades-653-forfalskade-eurosedlar-i-finland/ Pressmeddelande Mon, 29 Jan 2024 09:00:00 GMT
ECB-rådets beslut (utöver räntebeslut) https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/ecb-radets-beslut-utover-rantebeslut/ ECB-rådets beslut (utöver räntebeslut) januari 2024

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/ecb-radets-beslut-utover-rantebeslut/ Nyhet Fri, 26 Jan 2024 14:00:00 GMT
Penningpolitiskt utlåtande https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/ECB-ordforandens-inledningsanforanden/2024/penningpolitiskt-utlatande/ ECB:s presskonferens 25 januari 2024

Christine Lagarde, ECB:s ordförande,
Luis de Guindos, ECB:s vice ordförande
Frankfurt am Main den 25 januari 2024

God eftermiddag, vice ordföranden och jag önskar er hjärtligt välkomna till vår presskonferens.

ECB-rådet beslutade idag att hålla ECB:s tre styrräntor oförändrade. Inkommande information har i stort sett bekräftat vår tidigare bedömning av de medelfristiga inflationsutsikterna. Bortsett från en uppåtriktad energirelaterad baseffekt på den totala inflationen har den nedåtgående trenden i underliggande inflation fortsatt och våra tidigare räntehöjningar fortsätter att med kraft slå igenom i finansieringsförhållandena. Strama finansieringsförhållanden dämpar efterfrågan och det bidrar till att pressa ner inflationen.

Vi är fast beslutna att se till att inflationen inom rimlig tid återgår till vårt medelfristiga tvåprocentsmål. Baserat på vår aktuella bedömning anser vi att ECB:s styrräntor är på nivåer som, om de upprätthålls under tillräckligt långt tid, kommer att göra ett substantiellt bidrag till detta mål. Våra framtida räntebeslut kommer att säkerställa att styrräntorna sätts på tillräckligt restriktiva nivåer så länge som är nödvändigt.

Vi kommer att fortsätta att följa ett databeroende tillvägagångssätt för att fastställa vilken nivå som är lämplig och hur länge restriktionen ska bestå. Framför allt kommer våra räntebeslut att baseras på vår bedömning av inflationsutsikterna med beaktande av inkommande ekonomiska och finansiella data, dynamiken i underliggande inflation och styrkan i den penningpolitiska transmissionen.

Mer om dagens beslut finns i ett pressmeddelande på vår webbplats.

Jag kommer nu att mer i detalj beskriva hur vi tror att ekonomin och inflationen kommer att utvecklas och därefter förklara vår bedömning av de monetära och finansiella förhållandena.

Ekonomisk aktivitet

Euroområdets ekonomi ser ut att ha stagnerat under det sista kvartalet 2023. Inkommande data fortsätter att signalera svaghet under den närmaste tiden. Dock pekar vissa framåtblickande enkätindikatorer på en tillväxtuppgång längre fram.

Arbetsmarknaden har förblivit robust. Arbetslösheten, som låg på 6,4 procent i november, har sjunkit tillbaka till sin lägsta nivå sedan euron infördes och fler arbetstagare har inträtt på arbetsmarknaden. Samtidigt har efterfrågan på arbetskraft tappat fart och färre lediga jobb utannonseras.

Regeringar bör fortsätta att avveckla energirelaterade stödåtgärder för att undvika att driva upp inflationstryck på medellång sikt. Finans- och strukturpolitiken bör utformas så att vår ekonomi blir mer produktiv och konkurrenskraftig och höga offentliga skuldkvoter gradvis minskar. Strukturreformer och investeringar för att stärka euroområdets utbudskapacitet – som skulle stödjas om NGEU-programmet (Next Generation EU programme) till fullo implementerades – kan bidra till minskat pristryck på medellång sikt och samtidigt främja grön och digital omställning. Efter Ekofinrådets överenskommelse nyligen om reform av ramverket för EU:s ekonomiska styrning bör lagstiftningsprocessen snabbt slutföras så att de nya reglerna kan implementeras utan fördröjning. Dessutom är det absolut nödvändigt att påskynda framstegen mot kapitalmarknadsunionen och fullbordandet av bankunionen.

Inflation

Inflationen steg till 2,9 procent i december i och med att vissa tidigare finanspolitiska stödåtgärder för att dämpa effekten av högre energipriser försvunnit ur den årliga inflationstakten även om vändningen var svagare än förväntat. Förutom denna baseffekt fortsatte den övergripande inflationstrenden i nedåtgående riktning. Livmedelsinflationen sjönk till 6,1 procent i december. Inflationen exklusive livsmedel och energi sjönk också igen, till 3,4 procent, beroende på att varuinflationen gick ner till 2,5 procent. Tjänsteinflationen var stabil på 4,0 procent.

Inflationen väntas lätta ytterligare under året med avtagande effekter av tidigare energichocker, flaskhalsar på utbudssidan och återöppningen av ekonomin efter pandemin samt att den stramare penningpolitiken fortsätter att tynga efterfrågan.

Nästan alla mått på underliggande inflation sjönk ytterligare i december. Den höga löneökningstakten och fallande arbetsproduktivitet håller upp inhemskt pristryck även om dessa också börjat lätta. Samtidigt har lägre vinst per enhet börjat dämpa inflationseffekten av stigande arbetskostnader per producerad enhet. Mått på kortsiktiga inflationsförväntningar har gått ner kraftigt medan de mer långsiktiga inflationsförväntningarna mestadels ligger runt 2 procent.

Riskbedömning

Riskerna för den ekonomiska tillväxten ligger på nedåtsidan. Tillväxten skulle kunna bli lägre om effekterna av penningpolitiken blir starkare än väntat. En svagare världsekonomi eller en ytterligare avmattning i världshandeln skulle också hämma euroområdets tillväxt. Rysslands oberättigade krig mot Ukraina och den tragiska konflikten i Mellanöstern är de huvudsakliga källorna till geopolitisk risk. Detta kan resultera i att företag och hushåll ser mindre positivt på framtiden och att den globala handeln störs. Tillväxten kan bli högre om stigande realinkomster innebär att konsumtionen ökar mer än förväntat eller om världsekonomin växer starkare än väntat.

Uppåtriskerna för inflationen inbegriper de ökade geopolitiska spänningarna, framför allt i mellanöstern, som skulle kunna driva upp energipriser och fraktkostnader på kort sikt och hindra världshandeln. Inflationen kan också visa sig bli högre än förutsett om lönerna stiger mer än väntat eller om vinstmarginaler skulle visa sig mer motståndskraftiga. Inflationen kan däremot överraska på nedåtsidan om penningpolitiken dämpar efterfrågan mer än väntat eller om det ekonomiska klimatet i övriga världen oväntat försämras. Inflationen skulle också kunna gå ner snabbare inom snar framtid om energipriserna utvecklades i linje med den senaste tidens nedskiftning i marknadsförväntningar om den framtida banan för olje- och gaspriser.

Finansiella och monetära förhållanden

Marknadsräntor har i stort sett rört sig i sidled sedan vårt förra sammanträde. Vår restriktiva penningpolitik fortsätter att slå igenom starkt i de bredare finansieringsförhållandena. Utlåningsräntor på företagslån gick ner något till 5,2 procent i november medan bolån steg ytterligare till 4,0 procent.

I vår senaste enkätundersökning om bankernas utlåning visas att höga lånekostnader och de därav följande nedskärningarna i investeringsplaner och bostadsköp har lett till ytterligare kraftigt minskad kreditefterfrågan under det fjärde kvartalet. Åtstramningen i kreditstandarder för lån till företag och hushåll dämpades men förblev fortsatt strama i och med att bankerna oroar sig för de risker deras kunder står inför.

Mot denna bakgrund har kreditutvecklingen förbättrats något men är överlag fortsatt svag. Lån till företag stagnerade i november jämfört med föregående år – efter att ha sjunkit i oktober – när månadsflödet av korta lån vände. Lån till hushåll växte i en dämpad årstakt om 0,5 procent.

Slutsats

ECB-rådet beslutade idag att hålla ECB:s tre styrräntor oförändrade. Vi är fast beslutna att se till att inflationen inom rimlig tid återgår till vårt medelfristiga tvåprocentsmål. Baserat på vår aktuella bedömning anser vi att ECB:s styrräntor är på nivåer som, om de upprätthålls under tillräckligt långt tid, kommer att göra ett substantiellt bidrag till detta mål. Våra framtida räntebeslut kommer att säkerställa att styrräntorna sätts på tillräckligt restriktiva nivåer så länge som är nödvändigt. Vi kommer att fortsätta att följa ett databeroende tillvägagångssätt för att fastställa vilken nivå som är lämplig och hur länge restriktionen ska bestå.

Under alla omständigheter står vi redo att inom ramen för vårt mandat vid behov justera alla våra instrument så att inflationen återgår till vårt medelfristiga mål och bevara en smidig transmission av penningpolitiken.

Vi är nu beredda att svara på era frågor.

Se den engelska versionen för den exakta formulering som ECB-rådet har enats om.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/ECB-ordforandens-inledningsanforanden/2024/penningpolitiskt-utlatande/ ECB-tal Thu, 25 Jan 2024 16:25:53 GMT
Eurosystemets penningpolitiska beslut https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/eurosystemets-penningpolitiska-beslut/ ECB:s pressmeddelande 25 januari 2024

ECB-rådet beslutade idag att hålla de tre styrräntorna oförändrade. Inkommande information har i stort sett bekräftat dess tidigare bedömning av de medelfristiga inflationsutsikterna. Bortsett från en uppåtriktad energirelaterad baseffekt på den totala inflationen har den nedåtgående trenden i underliggande inflation fortsatt och de tidigare räntehöjningarna fortsätter att med kraft slå igenom i finansieringsförhållandena. Strama finansieringsförhållanden dämpar efterfrågan och det bidrar till att pressa ner inflationen.

ECB-rådet är fast beslutet att se till att inflationen inom rimlig tid återgår till det medelfristiga 2-procentsmålet. Baserat på sin aktuella bedömning anser ECB-rådet att ECB:s styrräntor är på nivåer som, om de upprätthålls under tillräckligt långt tid, kommer att göra ett substantiellt bidrag till detta mål. ECB-rådets framtida räntebeslut kommer att säkerställa att styrräntorna sätts på tillräckligt restriktiva nivåer så länge som är nödvändigt.

ECB-rådet kommer att fortsätta att följa ett databeroende tillvägagångssätt för att fastställa vilken nivå som är lämplig och hur länge restriktionen ska bestå. Framför allt kommer ECB-rådets räntebeslut att baseras på bedömningen av inflationsutsikterna med beaktande av inkommande ekonomiska och finansiella data, dynamiken i underliggande inflation och styrkan i den penningpolitiska transmissionen.

ECB:s styrräntor

Räntan på de huvudsakliga refinansieringstransaktionerna och räntorna på marginalutlåningsfaciliteten och inlåningsfaciliteten förblir oförändrade på 4,50 procent, 4,75 procent respektive 4,00 procent.

Programmet för köp av tillgångar (APP) och stödköpsprogrammet föranlett av pandemin (PEPP)

APP-portföljen minskar i en måttlig och förutsägbar takt eftersom Eurosystemet inte längre återinvesterar värdepapper som förfaller.

ECB-rådet avser fortsätta att fullt ut återinvestera förfall av värdepapper förvärvade inom PEPP under det första halvåret av 2024. Under det andra halvåret ämnas PEPP-portföljen reduceras med i genomsnitt 7,5 miljarder euro i månaden. ECB-rådet avser upphöra med återinvesteringar inom ramen för PEPP i slutet av 2024.

ECB-rådet kommer att fortsätta tillämpa flexibilitet vid återinvestering av kommande förfall i PEPP-portföljen i syfte att motverka risker mot den penningpolitisk transmissionsmekanismen relaterad till pandemin.

Refinansieringstransaktioner

Allt eftersom bankerna återbetalar belopp som upplånats under de riktade långfristiga refinansieringstransaktionerna kommer ECB-rådet regelbundet att granska hur riktade utlåningstransaktioner och relaterad pågående återbetalningar bidrar till den penningpolitiska inriktningen.

***

ECB-rådet står redo att, inom ramen för sitt mandat, vid behov justera alla sina instrument så att inflationen återgår till 2-procentsmålet på medellång sikt och bevara en smidig välfungerande transmission av penningpolitiken. Instrumentet för transmissionsskydd finns också tillgängligt för att motverka oönskade, störande marknadskrafter som utgör ett allvarligt hot mot den penningpolitiska transmissionen i samtliga länder i euroområde och möjliggör för ECB-rådet att mer effektivt uppfylla sitt prisstabilitetsmandat.

ECB:s ordförande kommer att redogöra för de överväganden som ligger bakom dessa beslut vid en presskonferens som börjar kl. 14:45 (centraleuropeisk tid) idag.

Se den engelska versionen för den exakta formulering som ECB-rådet har enats om.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/eurosystemets-penningpolitiska-beslut/ Nyhet Thu, 25 Jan 2024 13:21:00 GMT
IMF:s kommentarer om Finlands ekonomi https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2024/imfs-kommentarer-om-finlands-ekonomi/ En delegation från Internationella valutafonden (IMF) på besök i Finland har överlämnat sina kommentarer om det ekonomiska läget och den finansiella stabiliteten i Finland till myndigheterna.

Uttalandet grundar sig på diskussioner som delegationen fört med finska myndigheter, arbetsmarknadspartner, privata finansinstitut, forskningsinstitut och andra instanser. Vi bifogar kommentarerna i sammandrag på svenska.

Kommentarerna på engelska har i sin helhet lagts ut både på IMF:s webbplats (www.imf.org) och på Finlands Banks webbplats (www.suomenpankki.fi).

Sammandrag på svenska (inofficiell översättning) (pdf)

Kommentarer på engelska (pdf)

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2024/imfs-kommentarer-om-finlands-ekonomi/ Pressmeddelande Tue, 23 Jan 2024 08:00:00 GMT
Account of the monetary policy meeting, 13-14 December 2023 https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/account-of-the-monetary-policy-meeting-13-14-december-2023/ Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on Wednesday and Thursday, 13-14 December 2023

18 January 2024

1. Review of financial, economic and monetary developments and policy options

Financial market developments

Ms Schnabel noted that since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting on 25-26 October 2023 the narrative in financial markets had entirely turned around, proving once again its high sensitivity to incoming data and central bank communication. Markets had turned bullish, driven by expectations of quick and “immaculate” disinflation and an early and sharp monetary policy reversal. This repricing had supported risk asset prices, with equity markets soaring and sovereign and corporate credit spreads narrowing amid continued smooth market absorption. Buoyant risk asset markets and a stronger euro exchange rate were consistent with investors pricing in a bottoming-out rather than a deterioration in the euro area’s economic growth momentum.

Looking at the key drivers of financial market developments and monetary policy expectations, the first and dominant factor had been the downward surprise in inflation worldwide. Second, other macroeconomic data, excluding inflation, had also come in better than expected in the euro area, alleviating fears of a “hard landing” of the economy. The third factor supporting investor risk appetite had been diminishing impact of geopolitical tensions, accompanied by lower oil prices.

The pronounced swing in market pricing over recent months had resulted in strong movements in financial conditions indices. The tightening in euro area financial conditions seen in September and October on the back of expectations that interest rates would be high for longer, as well as a decompression of term premia, had more than reversed in November and early December when investors had positioned for rapid disinflation. Almost all components of the standard financial conditions indices pointed towards a substantial loosening of financial conditions to levels last seen at the start of the year.

Investors had substantially revised their assessment of both the near-term and longer-term inflation outlook since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting. They now expected inflation to come down much more quickly and to stand close to the ECB’s 2% inflation target thereafter. The inflation-linked swap (ILS) forward curve pointed to three features of markets’ pricing of annual inflation in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) beyond 2024. First, market-based measures of compensation for headline inflation in the euro area had moved lower over the entire maturity spectrum. Second, investors did not foresee a scenario in which inflation would return to below-target levels. Third, compared with the period before the global financial crisis, the ILS forward curve was currently more upward-sloping, driven by inflation risk premia that were gradually increasing over the horizon. In other words, in the new global economic and geopolitical landscape, upside risks to longer-term inflation were seen as more prominent than before the global financial crisis.

The disinflation narrative, which had first emerged in the United States, had found fertile ground in the euro area, spilling over into euro area short-term rate markets, especially after the flash estimate of euro area inflation in November had come in lower than expected. Markets were currently pricing in an earlier first rate cut by the ECB and a swifter rate-cutting cycle than they had at the time of the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting. A 25 basis point cut in April 2024 had been fully priced in by markets as of 13 December, even prior to the release of the policy rate decision by the US Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Expected cumulative rate cuts in the euro area by the end of 2024 had increased to nearly 140 basis points, from around 60 basis points at the time of the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting.

One important factor behind the sharp downward adjustment in forward rates had been the pricing-out of further rate hikes. At the time of the October Governing Council meeting, option prices had pointed, under the assumption of risk neutrality, to a 25% probability of a further 25 basis point rate hike. As of 13 December, markets attached only an 8% probability to a further rate hike. By contrast, the most likely outcomes reported by survey respondents were less affected by changes in the tails of the distribution of responses. This could partly explain the substantial divergence between survey-based and market-based expectations, with analysts expecting later and fewer rate cuts than market participants. Participants in the Survey of Monetary Analysts expected a cumulative cut of 75 basis points, starting only in July 2024. Another factor that could explain this divergence was that analysts tended to be more sluggish in revising their expectations, waiting for firmer central bank guidance. Similar developments had been seen at the start of the tightening cycle, when survey results had lagged the forward curves in the euro area and the United States for several months.

As a result of the inflation and monetary policy repricing, real rates at the very short end of the curve had risen measurably as investors reappraised the near-term inflation outlook, while nominal short-term rates had been more “sticky”, reflecting the ECB’s communication. Looking beyond the short term, however, real forward rates had dropped markedly over the entire maturity spectrum as the decline in nominal interest rates had been greater than the downward revision to the inflation outlook over the medium and longer term. In other words, the previous tightening had been partly reversed.

A decomposition of euro area equity price movements showed that the strong rise in share prices since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting had been driven by the accommodative monetary policy repricing, with a small countervailing effect from earnings expectations. Developments in fixed income markets were consistent with market participants positioning for a bottoming-out rather than a further deterioration in the growth momentum of the euro area economy. The reappraisal of the policy rate outlook, in combination with somewhat better macroeconomic news for the euro area, had reversed the widening of spreads for corporate and sovereign bonds that had been observed in September and October.

Regarding possible adjustments to reinvestments in the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) portfolio, the December results of the Survey of Monetary Analysts suggested that markets were already expecting a partial run-down of PEPP reinvestments from the middle of 2024 and a full run-off after December 2024. Moreover, the sustained demand for bonds in primary and secondary markets amid the ongoing run-down of the asset purchase programme (APP) portfolio was likely to support the smooth market absorption of an earlier end to full PEPP reinvestments. Private investors had stepped in as the Eurosystem had reduced its footprint in sovereign and corporate bond markets. The smooth absorption had also been supported by debt managers tapping into retail demand and reducing somewhat the maturity of newly issued debt.

Banks’ funding conditions had also benefited from the monetary policy repricing and improved risk sentiment. Euro area bank bond spreads had narrowed, most notably for riskier bonds. Investor appetite for bank bonds had led to healthy primary market issuance activity, even in the Additional Tier 1 (AT1) bond segment. The increased recourse to market-based funding by banks amid more favourable funding conditions suggested that banks were able to smoothly absorb repayments of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs), as also suggested by notable voluntary repayments. Year-end dynamics in funding markets were expected to be calm. The generally smaller Eurosystem footprint in bond markets and lower excess liquidity should help to reduce distortions in the repo markets on reporting dates.

Turning to exchange rate developments, the euro had initially appreciated markedly against the US dollar after the Governing Council’s October monetary policy meeting. This appreciation had been stronger than suggested by movements in interest rate differentials and had been partly the result of improved investor sentiment on the back of the global repricing of monetary policy, which had weighed on the US dollar. Since late November the euro had partly reversed its gains. However, speculative positions pointed to a future appreciation of the euro against the dollar, consistent with expectations of a “soft landing” of the euro area economy.

The global environment and economic and monetary developments in the euro area

Reviewing the global economy, Mr Lane noted that in 2023 world real GDP had been stronger, while global trade had turned out weaker, than had been projected in December 2022. One reason for the drop in the elasticity of trade to global growth was related to the post-pandemic normalisation of the composition of demand from more trade-intensive goods to less trade-intensive services. The most recent data showed that consumption of goods and services was approaching the respective pre-pandemic trends, suggesting that the process of change in the composition of demand was coming to an end. The global inventory cycle was also returning to more normal fluctuations. During the pandemic, trade had been pushed higher by a strong build-up of inventories, much of which were imported inventories, because of global supply chain problems. As the supply chain disruptions unwound and new orders declined, the historically high stock of inventories had been run down. The normalisation of the inventory cycle was expected to contribute to a strengthening in trade growth and a normalisation of trade elasticities in the period ahead.

Turning to the euro area, Mr Lane recalled that the November flash estimate for inflation had been substantially lower than expected, with headline inflation falling to 2.4%, from 2.9% in October. All of the main components of the HICP had contributed to the decline. Core inflation (i.e. excluding the energy and food components) had decreased to 3.6% in November, from 4.2% in October. The decline in non-energy industrial goods inflation to 2.9%, from 3.5%, reflected easing supply chain bottlenecks and slowing demand growth. Services inflation had declined to 4.0% in November, from 4.6% in October. All measures of underlying inflation had fallen in October. While the annual rate of domestic inflation had remained elevated at 5%, the momentum in this indicator had declined markedly over the last three months.

Compared with one year ago, there had been very strong disinflation. Headline inflation had fallen by around 8 percentage points over the last year owing, in particular, to the massive declines in the energy component. When looking back at the inflation projections of December 2022, staff had been correct in foreseeing the major disinflation process a year ahead. This disinflationary process over the course of 2023 was due not only to base effects from the large energy price increases in 2022 but also to lower energy inflation in 2023. Food prices had also contributed to this disinflation – as had core inflation more recently.

Looking ahead, the current assessment was that inflation had reached the end of the strongest phase of the disinflationary cycle. While core inflation and food inflation were expected to continue their gradual decline, upward energy-related base effects and the expiry of the fiscal measures introduced to compensate for the effects of inflation were pushing up headline inflation. In terms of inflation momentum, as measured by the annualised three-month-on-three-month percentage changes in inflation, goods inflation had fallen to below 1% in November. However, momentum in services inflation, while declining, remained strong.

Focusing on the measures of underlying inflation, Mr Lane recalled that these measures were supposed to capture the persistent component of inflation, which was the component of inflation that was expected to persist one or two years ahead. During the past two years all measures of underlying inflation had first increased and then fallen significantly, giving only a blurred signal on the underlying inflationary forces.

Measures that were adjusted for energy and supply bottleneck shocks had seen a less steep increase and decrease. So, while the decline in underlying inflation was also evident in these adjusted measures, they pointed to a smaller improvement from a lower peak level. The decline in the adjusted measures of underlying inflation could be partly attributed to the effects of monetary policy. In other words, without the action of monetary policy, underlying inflation would have stayed higher.

An analysis of price dynamics for individual items in the core inflation basket showed that items accounting for almost half of core inflation were sensitive to monetary policy, and that these were the items that had lately declined more. This helped to explain the decline in underlying inflation and demonstrated that monetary policy was working its way through the economy as envisaged.

Short-term selling price expectations of firms, as reported in the European Commission’s latest business survey, pointed to a normalisation in manufacturing, as the share of firms expecting to charge higher prices three months ahead was close to its long-term average.

The latest Eurostat release showed that the rate of increase in compensation per employee had declined by 0.3 percentage points to stand at 5.2% in the third quarter, with the contribution of unit profits to the GDP deflator also falling substantially. This suggested that, as expected, moderating growth in profits was beginning to absorb some of the inflationary effects of wage increases. However, wage growth remained strong. Negotiated wage growth including one-off payments had increased to 4.7% in the third quarter, from 4.4% in the second quarter. Forward-looking wage trackers continued to signal high pressures, although there had been some deceleration in the Indeed wage tracker.

As regards inflation expectations, the October round of the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey showed that consumers had still not adjusted their perception of past inflation downwards, which was a risk factor for upcoming wage negotiations. On the side of professional forecasters, by contrast, the latest Survey of Monetary Analysts showed a sizeable drop in inflation expectations for 2024. Longer-term inflation expectations reported in the survey remained stable at 2%.

In the near term, headline inflation was set to pick up again, owing to energy-related base effects and the expiry of fiscal measures aimed at limiting the repercussions of the energy price shock. For 2024, the staff projections saw inflation declining only gradually – as a result of upward base effects and the phasing-out of past compensatory fiscal measures – before approaching the Governing Council’s target in 2025. Nonetheless, the strength of the ongoing disinflation process was reflected in the December projections: staff had revised down their projections for headline inflation by 0.2 percentage points to 5.4% for 2023 and by 0.5 percentage points to 2.7% for 2024. The 2025 projection was unchanged at 2.1%, while for 2026 inflation was projected to be 1.9%. Core inflation was projected to be 5.0% in 2023, 2.7% in 2024, 2.3% in 2025 and 2.1% in 2026.

Mr Lane focused on the fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rates, as these were free from carry-over effects. Starting with HICP inflation, the December projections showed a growth rate of 2.8% in the fourth quarter of 2023 over the fourth quarter of 2022, which was expected to slow very gradually to 2.6% in the fourth quarter of 2024. Thus the evolution of inflation during 2024 would be fairly flat. However, the slowdown in core inflation, which was less affected by base effects, was projected to be faster – with the rate falling from 3.8% in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 2.7% in the fourth quarter of 2024.

Upside risks to inflation included the heightened geopolitical tensions, which could raise energy prices in the near term, and extreme weather events, which could drive up food prices. Inflation could also turn out higher than anticipated if inflation expectations were to move above the target, or if wages or profit margins increased by more than expected. By contrast, inflation could surprise on the downside if monetary policy dampened demand by more than expected or the economic environment in the rest of the world worsened unexpectedly, potentially owing in part to the recent rise in geopolitical risks.

Turning to economic activity in the euro area, in the third quarter real GDP had fallen marginally, as rising domestic demand had been offset by the further run-down of inventories. Survey indicators suggested that activity was set to weaken in the services sector and construction would contract again in the fourth quarter, while there were tentative signs that activity in the manufacturing sector was bottoming out.

Moving to demand components, private consumption had increased by 0.3% in the third quarter, driven by consumption of services and durable goods. While the consumption of services was still being supported by the remaining effects from the post-pandemic reopening of the economy, durable goods consumption was being boosted by the delivery of previously ordered motor vehicles, as supply bottlenecks were being resolved. Thus the upward movement in durable goods consumption observed in the third quarter was a lagging indicator of overall consumption.

As regards near-term expectations, demand for goods that were more sensitive to interest rate changes – chiefly durable goods – was declining, while the consumption of services was still being supported by the remaining reopening effects. The recovery in private consumption embedded in the December Eurosystem staff projections was predicated on falling inflation and rising wages, which were expected to boost real disposable income.

Housing and business investment were set to remain weak in view of tight lending conditions. Business investment had been stronger than housing investment during 2023, largely owing to the reduction in the outstanding stock of orders. However, this factor would not support business investment in 2024, which would be increasingly affected by the monetary tightening.

Euro area goods export growth had remained negative in September and the growth of import volumes had declined further. Export prospects remained subdued amid increasing competitiveness challenges. According to the European Commission’s business survey, European firms perceived themselves to have become less competitive in the global market, owing to both price factors and, increasingly, non-price factors.

Employment had so far been resilient. The unemployment rate had stood at 6.5% in October and employment had increased by 0.2% in the third quarter. However, short-term indicators pointed to a cooling of the labour market and weaker economic activity was dampening the demand for workers, with firms advertising fewer vacancies in recent months. Moreover, the total number of hours worked had edged down by 0.1% in the third quarter.

The sequence of subdued growth followed by the expected recovery based on rising real incomes and improving foreign demand was reflected in the new staff projections. Staff expected annual real GDP growth to be 0.6% in 2023, rising to 0.8% in 2024 and 1.5% in both 2025 and 2026. Compared with the September staff projections, real GDP growth had been revised down by 0.1 percentage points for 2023 and 0.2 percentage points for 2024, while it was unchanged for 2025.

The risks to economic growth remained tilted to the downside. Growth could be lower if the effects of monetary policy turned out stronger than expected. A weaker world economy or a further slowdown in global trade would also weigh on euro area growth. Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East were key sources of geopolitical risk. This could result in firms and households becoming less confident about the future. Conversely, growth could be higher if rising real incomes led to spending increasing by more than anticipated or the world economy grew more strongly than expected.

As regards fiscal policies, the December staff projections entailed relatively small revisions to the main fiscal balances compared with the September projections. For 2024, the budget deficit was expected to decline to 2.8% of GDP and the fiscal stance was expected to tighten. It was important to continue monitoring whether governments would stick to their budgetary plans.

Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, market interest rates had fallen markedly since the October Governing Council meeting, more than reversing the significant increases observed earlier in the autumn. Initially, the declines had mainly affected medium to longer maturities, amid spillovers from other major economies. More recently, shorter-term market rates had also declined measurably, mostly in response to inflation falling faster than expected in November. This had resulted in a market forward curve that embedded an earlier and stronger easing of the monetary policy stance than incorporated in the staff projections.

Monetary policy transmission remained exceptionally strong. Bank lending to firms and households continued to be weak. The decline in the annual growth rate of bank lending to firms reflected both weaker credit demand and tighter credit standards. The softening of loan demand was mostly due to higher interest rates and slowing nominal fixed investment. For its part, the slowing pace of lending to households was driven by mortgage loans, consistent with the weakness in the housing market and tighter credit conditions.

Bank composite funding costs had risen further. The deposit base available to banks continued to contract, with the annual growth rates of M3 (the broad monetary aggregate) and M1 (currency in circulation and overnight deposits) in October standing at -1.0% and -10.0% respectively, close to their recent historical lows.

An important question was to what extent pressures from the transmission of monetary policy were still in the pipeline. ECB staff analysis showed that a sizeable increase in policy rates over a short period of time tended to lead to a stronger and faster transmission to credit volumes, and the impact of the tightening cycle on credit growth tended to peak earlier than implied by standard relationships. Such non-linearities seemed to be relevant in the current setting, with a substantial part of the extra interest rate effect attributable to a greater strength of the policy rate adjustments relative to historical regularities. Mr Lane also showed that, from a historical perspective, financing conditions had tightened very strongly over the current hiking cycle.

Monetary policy considerations and policy options

On the basis of the assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission, Mr Lane proposed keeping the three key ECB interest rates unchanged.

Notwithstanding the recent downside surprises in inflation and the substantial downward revision of projected inflation for 2024, headline inflation was set to return to target only by the second half of 2025. The remaining distance of inflation from the ECB’s target, the waning of disinflationary supply-side tailwinds and, overall, still-high levels of domestic inflation continued to call for maintaining a sufficiently restrictive stance.

The Governing Council should therefore maintain its current strategic orientation, namely that its future decisions should ensure that the key ECB interest rates would be set at sufficiently restrictive levels for as long as necessary, and that it would continue to follow a data-dependent approach to determining the appropriate level and duration of restriction. In particular, the Governing Council’s interest rate decisions should continue to be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook in light of incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

It was an appropriate time to review the schedule of PEPP reinvestments. With the fading impact of the pandemic and the reduction in fragmentation risks, Mr Lane proposed advancing the normalisation of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet at a measured and predictable pace. In particular, while full reinvestments should be maintained in the first half of 2024, the PEPP portfolio should be allowed to run off by €7.5 billion per month on average in the second half, with reinvestments fully discontinued at the end of the year. This proposal was broadly in line with market expectations, as reflected in the Survey of Monetary Analysts, and would be in line with the Governing Council's guidance that any “future roll-off of the PEPP portfolio will be managed to avoid interference with the appropriate monetary policy stance”. For the partial reinvestments until the end of 2024, operational modalities similar to those used during the partial reinvestments of the APP could be applied.

Furthermore, preserving the option to apply flexibility in reinvesting redemptions coming due in the PEPP portfolio, with a view to countering risks to the monetary policy transmission mechanism related to the pandemic, continued to be warranted.

Finally, in line with the ECB’s monetary policy strategy, it was again time for the Governing Council to thoroughly assess the links between monetary policy and financial stability. Euro area banks had demonstrated their resilience. They had high capital ratios and had become significantly more profitable over the past year. However, the outlook for financial stability remained fragile in the current environment of tightening financing conditions, weak growth and geopolitical tensions. In particular, the situation could worsen if banks’ funding costs were to increase by more than expected and if more borrowers were to struggle to repay loans. At the same time, the overall impact on the economy of such a scenario should be contained if financial markets reacted in an orderly fashion. Macroprudential policy remained the first line of defence against the build-up of financial vulnerabilities, and the measures in place contributed to preserving the resilience of the financial system.

2. Governing Council’s discussion and monetary policy decisions

Economic, monetary and financial analyses

As regards the external environment, members took note of the assessment provided by Mr Lane that euro area foreign demand had generally remained weak in 2023, despite an upward revision in the December staff projections compared with September. One important reason for this was the post-pandemic normalisation of demand away from more trade-intensive goods and towards less trade-intensive services. The fallout from the heightened geopolitical risks had so far remained contained and energy prices had come down from their recent elevated levels. The prices of both oil and gas had declined significantly since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting.

With regard to economic activity in the euro area, members concurred with Mr Lane that tighter financing conditions and subdued foreign demand were likely to continue weighing on economic activity in the near term. Members widely acknowledged the weaker than expected growth in the short term. Survey indicators suggested, however, that the economy might have hit its trough, both globally and in the euro area. The Purchasing Managers’ Indices (PMIs) were bottoming out and even showing a small uptick, supporting the prospect of a soft landing. At the same time, it was argued that it would be premature to think that the weakness in activity had run its course. There were several drivers of growth that were unlikely to sustain the euro area economy in the near term. First, there were no clear signals of an upcoming improvement in global trade, while geopolitical risks might be adding to the global weakness, at least in manufacturing. Second, the cash buffers of firms and households had so far delayed the impact of monetary policy on aggregate demand, but as these buffers declined, in tandem with the contraction of the balance sheet of the Eurosystem, the impact of tighter financing conditions was likely to become stronger. As corporate profitability was an important driver of business investment, declining corporate profitability was also seen as a downward risk for investment. Third, a generalised tightening of the fiscal stance was to be expected, possibly in part related to the EU economic governance review, which would put further downward pressure on the economy. Finally, the exceptionally strong monetary policy transmission to lending to firms and households risked having a stronger negative impact on growth and inflation than had been incorporated in the December baseline projection by Eurosystem staff.

On this basis, it was argued that the December staff projections for growth in the near term might be too optimistic overall, also considering that mechanical nowcasting tools continued to point to slower economic activity and the possibility of a technical recession. While it was also recalled that there had recently been a disconnect between hard and soft data – such as PMIs – the Consensus Economics forecast for GDP growth was also significantly lower for 2024 than the equivalent staff projection. Most of the expected growth in 2024 hinged on an increase in consumption, which in turn was dependent on the dynamics of labour income. While productivity growth was currently weak, the strong growth in labour income in the staff projections was seen to be simultaneously driven by continued strength in employment and the catching-up of real wages. Moreover, the removal of fiscal measures implemented to support households in response to increases in energy prices would have a distributional effect and be borne more by low-income households, which had the highest propensity to consume. This would further weigh on consumption. Finally, the recent increase in real interest rates for maturities shorter than one year should also have a negative impact on private consumption.

At the same time, it was underlined that the evidence that monetary policy transmission was working was to be welcomed and remained consistent with a soft landing. The impact of monetary policy tightening was increasingly visible and was broadly proceeding as intended: financing and credit conditions had tightened, lending had been slowing, aggregate demand had been weakening and underlying inflation had been easing. Since inflation was coming down, the euro area economy was set to recover gradually in 2024 owing to rising real incomes, stronger consumption and higher foreign demand. Investment had remained resilient thus far in 2023 and was now projected to stagnate in 2024. However, it could perform better than projected if financial conditions loosened and business confidence improved. Especially in jurisdictions with a high prevalence of adjustable interest rates, mortgage interest rates had already started to decline, which could soon support housing investment again, as this was one of the demand components that had also been the first to react in response to higher interest rates.

More broadly, owing to the variability in the lags and strength of the transmission process, there were several reasons why the transmission of monetary policy remained uncertain and might be less powerful than suggested by historical patterns and models. While the first leg in the transmission of monetary policy, to financing conditions, had been rapid and strong, transmission to the real economy was more uncertain and might be weaker. Several factors played a role here: the strong labour market, the relatively strong balance sheets of firms, households and banks, and the greater weight of less interest-sensitive sectors, such as services, in overall value added. The staff projections therefore remained subject to significant uncertainty with respect to the medium-term outlook for economic activity and prices. This also reflected the lack of clarity about the interplay between cyclical factors and structural changes in the wake of the pandemic and other supply shocks, as well as the possibility of new shocks hitting the economy.

Turning to the labour market, it was noted that employment had remained resilient and had even edged up further, while hours worked was more subdued. At the same time, current levels of indicators should not lead to complacency about the strength of the labour market, which could change abruptly and had to be monitored carefully. Reference was made to potential non-linear changes in macroeconomic conditions if firms were to adjust employment in a synchronised way or if the present high degree of labour hoarding should become more costly, particularly at a time when profits were weakening, albeit from high levels. As the labour market was the main mechanism supporting the projected economic recovery in the period ahead, a potential non-linear response of the labour market posed downside risks to the economic outlook.

A broader question was raised regarding the extent to which the economic slowdown was cyclical or structural in nature. It was highlighted that, on the basis of the regular annual review of the supply side undertaken by staff, potential output had been revised down in the staff projections, albeit moderately, partly reflecting structurally higher energy prices and weaker capital formation. Many euro area corporations found it hard to compete internationally, owing to the high energy costs in Europe. As investment in renewables was running into capacity problems, the energy transition was not going to provide much relief from high energy prices in the near term. The downward revision to potential output also had implications for the implied output gap and for inflationary dynamics. Overall, the outlook for both productivity growth and potential output growth was seen as weak.

Regarding fiscal and structural policies, members reiterated that, as the energy crisis faded, governments should continue to roll back the related support measures. This was essential to avoid driving up medium-term inflationary pressures, which would otherwise call for even tighter monetary policy. Fiscal policies should be designed to make the economy more productive and to gradually bring down high public debt. Structural reforms and investments to enhance the euro area’s supply capacity could help reduce price pressures in the medium term, while supporting the green and digital transitions.

It was argued that the fiscal stance was likely to become tighter overall in the years ahead, which would imply a drag on economic activity. However, automatic stabilisers working in the opposite direction in a context of lower growth and lower inflation were likely to impede any meaningful improvement in the fiscal balance, thus complicating the fiscal outlook. It was stressed that a well-functioning monetary union with a stability-oriented monetary policy required a set of clear and simple fiscal rules.

Against this background, members assessed the risks to economic growth as remaining tilted to the downside. Growth could be lower if the effects of monetary policy turned out to be stronger than expected. A weaker world economy or a further slowdown in global trade would also weigh on euro area growth. Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East were key sources of geopolitical risk. This could result in firms and households becoming less confident about the future. Conversely, growth could be higher if rising real incomes led to spending increasing by more than anticipated or the world economy grew more strongly than expected.

With regard to price developments, members broadly agreed with the assessment presented by Mr Lane in his introduction. They underlined that the recent decline in inflation was good news, as it suggested a faster than anticipated disinflationary process. The decline was not just driven by the fading out of the energy shocks but was broad-based and also reflected developments in core components. In the short run, however, inflation was expected to pick up again in the coming months, mainly owing to energy-related base effects. Inflation numbers also remained affected by the unwinding of past shocks to the food and non-energy industrial goods components, as well as by the reversal of fiscal measures, which made it harder to discern an underlying trend. The latest inflation numbers were therefore to be treated with caution, and it was too early to be fully confident that inflation would return to target. More data were needed to confirm the decline, in particular data on wage growth, which were only expected in the spring of next year. In this context, it was also highlighted that market-based measures of inflation expectations had only started to decline significantly after inflation data had come in lower than expected. This underscored the importance of inflation outturns over the coming months as drivers of inflation expectations, particularly given that household expectations had remained sticky.

At the same time, measures of inflation momentum – namely seasonally adjusted three-month-on-three-month growth rates – suggested that both headline and core inflation had essentially been back at target in November. While such measures were volatile, it was argued that these were often better predictors of future inflation than annual growth rates. However, it was also pointed out that price adjustments were typically more frequent at the start of the year and therefore at the end of the year the signals from such measures on future inflation had to be interpreted with particular caution, in part owing to statistical difficulties with seasonal adjustments in the present conditions.

More broadly, it was pointed out that the envisaged decline in inflation also interacted with the strength of economic activity, which in turn determined the scale and speed at which price-setters were able to pass on their costs to final prices. On the one hand, as the outlook for economic activity in the staff projections seemed too optimistic, it was argued that the strength of disinflation was likely to be underestimated. This concern seemed to be confirmed by recent market expectations, which embodied a notably lower inflation path than the staff projections – for 2024 in particular. On the other hand, scepticism was expressed about whether the recent downward trend in inflation would be confirmed in the coming quarters, particularly as fiscal policy would probably remain loose for some time and a tight labour market would keep pushing up wages and, indirectly, services inflation. Moreover, renewed stronger price increases for energy and food could not be ruled out.

Turning to wage developments, members recalled that the wage outlook was key in understanding medium-term inflation pressures. Labour remained scarce and wage growth was still strong, with compensation per employee growing at an elevated rate and only limited signals of stabilisation coming from negotiated wages and the ECB wage trackers. Coupled with falling productivity growth, unit labour costs had been growing at a record pace of 6.6% in the third quarter, which was contributing to persistence in domestic inflation at levels not consistent with medium-term price stability. This called for remaining vigilant. Moreover, the projected strong pick-up in productivity growth might not materialise if part of its decline proved to be structural or if labour hoarding persisted for longer. It would therefore be important to monitor future rounds of wage negotiations. As negotiations on many wage agreements would only be concluded early next year, members did not expect substantial hard evidence corroborating the projected moderation of wage growth to be available before the middle of the year. While stronger wage growth therefore constituted an upward risk to the staff inflation projections, it was also acknowledged that the recently observed – and projected – further drop in inflation should lead to lower wage demands. If inflation continued to be particularly low, this might also make second-round effects less likely. At the same time, it was pointed out that lower inflation was so far not fully reflected in the perceptions of firms and the general public, so it should not be taken for granted that lower inflation figures would immediately translate into lower wage demands.

One of the reasons why domestic inflation had started to stabilise recently, in spite of the continued rapid increase in wages, might be that firms were moderating their markups. While already embedded in previous staff projections, an important assumption in the December projections had been a declining contribution from unit profits to the GDP deflator measure of inflation. This underpinned the convergence of medium-term inflation trends back towards the target. The significant downward adjustment in the contribution of unit profits seen in the latest national accounts data for the third quarter had lent support to these expectations. It appeared consistent with the return of unit profits to their previous trend, as assumed in the projections. This return to trend was partly of a cyclical nature, but it could well proceed more or less quickly than currently projected, which underlined the particularly high uncertainty surrounding this component of the ongoing and projected disinflation.

As regards longer-term inflation expectations, members took note of the assessments by Ms Schnabel and Mr Lane of the latest developments in market-based measures of inflation compensation and survey-based indicators. Market-based inflation expectations remained broadly anchored at 2% and had come down recently, reflecting the market view that inflation would fall rapidly and stabilise at 2%. At the same time, professional forecasters continued to be more cautious. It was also underlined that the inflation expectations of households and firms remained sticky and well above the ECB’s target. More broadly, it was felt that the exceptionally large gap that had formed between the interest rate path derived from financial market prices and the interest rate assumptions embodied in the staff projections pointed to upside risks to the inflation path projected by staff. However, it was hard to establish to what extent the equally substantial fall in the price of energy since the cut-off date for the projections would provide further downward impetus to inflation in the months to come.

Against this background, members highlighted a number of risks to the medium-term inflation outlook, going in both directions. Upside risks to inflation included the heightened geopolitical tensions, which could push energy prices higher in the near term, and extreme weather events, which could drive up food prices. Inflation could also turn out higher than anticipated if inflation expectations were to move above the target, or if wages or profit margins increased by more than expected. By contrast, inflation could surprise on the downside if monetary policy dampened demand by more than expected or the economic environment in the rest of the world worsened unexpectedly, potentially owing in part to the recent rise in geopolitical risks. Overall, risks were mostly seen as broadly balanced, with some members assessing risks as pointing to the upside and other members judging them as having shifted to the downside, consistent with prevailing downside risks to economic activity.

In this context, members debated the notion of the “last mile” in the disinflation trajectory being the hardest to cover. On the one hand, it was argued that the notion was a useful way to summarise the challenges facing the Governing Council in determining the persistence of inflation pressures and the required duration of monetary policy restriction. From the beginning, it had been understood that bringing inflation all the way down from levels exceeding 10% to 2% would hardly be possible without incurring side effects, such as lower employment and lower output. Surprisingly, so far, progress on the inflation front was advancing at a relatively mild cost in terms of economic activity, with the prospect of a soft landing remaining in place. Therefore, with services inflation still running at 4% and continued strong wage growth, a potentially challenging “last mile” was still looming. In this respect, it was reiterated that the staff projections were predicated on a moderation of wage growth, a buffering of wage growth by lower unit profits and a sustained rebound in productivity growth helping to bring down the growth rate of unit labour costs. Further progress in disinflation thus rested on a number of benign assumptions and on inflation expectations remaining well anchored. In addition, potential rigidities in prices and wages – stemming for example from backward-looking features of wage negotiations – and the impact of structural shocks on the economy and inflation dynamics could well contribute to “last mile”-type delays in disinflation. There was also a risk of new shocks, such as further energy or food price shocks, and effects of climate change on food prices, as well as climate-related measures such as higher carbon taxes, which could render inflation more persistent and more easily unanchor inflation expectations after a long period of above-target inflation.

On the other hand, the view was expressed that the notion of a difficult “last mile” might undermine confidence in the ECB’s inflation target being achieved in a timely manner. More fundamentally, it was not clear why the nature of the disinflationary process would change as the target drew closer. Looking at the annual inflation data for the last few years, it appeared that disinflation to date had actually been faster than the previous surge in inflation, questioning the empirical relevance of the “last mile” narrative. It was argued that inflation depended on the state of the economy and on monetary policy. With a weaker economy, tighter monetary policy and the world economy losing momentum, it should not be surprising to see inflation falling rapidly. Finally, it was argued that the main condition that would make inflation more persistent in the proximity of the inflation target was if inflation expectations became unanchored, which ultimately depended on the credibility of monetary policy.

Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, members largely concurred with the assessment provided by Mr Lane in his introduction. The most significant development since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting had been the marked fall in market interest rates, which had intensified following the FOMC’s policy decisions and press conference on 13 December, as evident in the update on market developments provided by Ms Schnabel. Market-based measures of inflation expectations had also declined considerably across horizons, to approach 2%, reflecting the view of market participants that inflation would fall rapidly and stabilise at that level. Nevertheless, real interest rates had fallen significantly beyond the near term because nominal interest rates had dropped by more than the corresponding inflation expectations embedded in market prices. Overall, the decline in market interest rates and the rise in risk asset prices had led to looser financial conditions according to most measures. However, the recent appreciation of the euro was going in the opposite direction.

Members generally agreed that this repricing in financial markets could, at least partially, be attributed to recent good news on the broad-based slowdown in inflation in the euro area and other major advanced economies. However, it was widely felt that market expectations reflected significant optimism and were inconsistent with the outlook in the staff projections, with respect to both the inflation outlook and the rate path embodied in the technical assumptions. Reflecting the forward curve at the time of the cut-off date, the projections had incorporated only about 75 basis points of rate cuts for 2024. In addition, it was recalled that analysts, including those participating in the Survey of Monetary Analysts, remained much more cautious. It was also recalled that market expectations were volatile. Market perceptions and narratives had shifted dramatically since the Governing Council’s last monetary policy meeting, more than reversing the earlier move which, between September and October, had pushed rates higher on the back of a high-for-longer narrative. This suggested that there might well be another reversal in sentiment over the coming months.

Concern was expressed that the sharp market repricing threatened to loosen financial conditions excessively, which could derail the disinflationary process. Against this background, it was widely regarded as important not to accommodate market expectations in the post-meeting communication.

Overall, some humility was advised with respect to judging market expectations given prevailing uncertainties, including the uncertainty surrounding the outlook for growth and inflation. It was also noted that, if and when inflation fell further, the current level of interest rates would become increasingly tight over time.

Members agreed that, thus far, monetary policy had continued to be transmitted strongly into broader financing conditions. The average interest rates for business loans and mortgages had risen again in October. Higher borrowing rates, subdued loan demand and tighter loan supply had further weakened credit dynamics. With weaker lending and the reduction in the Eurosystem balance sheet, broad money – as measured by annual growth in M3 – had continued to contract for the fourth consecutive month and M1 growth had remained negative for the tenth consecutive month. At the same time, it was noted that the recent financial market repricing had already started to translate into lower interest rates on new mortgage lending and that, in some jurisdictions with a greater prevalence of floating rate mortgages, the average rate on the outstanding stock of housing loans could start to decline within the coming quarter.

The overall transmission of monetary policy to loan growth remained very strong. The annual growth rate of bank loans to non-financial corporations had fallen into negative territory for the first time since July 2015 and growth in loans to households also remained subdued. It was contended that there were signs of “over-tightening” in the banking sector, reflecting the dual effect of higher policy rates and lower deposits amid a declining supply of liquidity, although it was also argued that there was no serious risk in the present environment in which excess liquidity was still abundant. Furthermore, it was recalled that the decline in liquidity in the system had had a limited impact and banks had continued to repay the TLTROs voluntarily.

The Governing Council held its biannual structured exchange on the links between monetary policy and financial stability. Members concurred that euro area banks had demonstrated their resilience, had high capital ratios and had become significantly more profitable over the past year. However, the situation could worsen if banks’ funding costs or credit risk were to increase by more than expected, but these risks were assessed to be contained if the market reaction to such scenarios were orderly. It was reiterated that macroprudential policy remained the first line of defence against the build-up of financial vulnerabilities, and that the measures in place contributed to preserving the resilience of the financial system.

Monetary policy stance and policy considerations

Turning to the assessment of the monetary policy stance, members highlighted that, if maintained for a sufficiently long duration, the current monetary policy stance was sufficiently restrictive to bring inflation back to target in a timely manner. Based on the interest rates embedded in the staff projections – which lay above market interest rates – the projections suggested that the rate path was in line with reaching the inflation target in the second half of 2025.

Against this background, members assessed the data that had become available since the last monetary policy meeting in accordance with the three main elements of the “reaction function” that the Governing Council had communicated earlier in 2023. These comprised the implications of the incoming economic and financial data for the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. Overall, the view was held that all three elements of the reaction function were moving in the right direction, providing clear evidence that monetary policy was working as intended.

Starting with the inflation outlook, members broadly concurred with the assessment presented by Mr Lane in his introduction. Overall, the process of disinflation seemed to be proceeding well and probably more strongly than had been anticipated, with the November flash estimates coming in significantly lower than expected. The fall in inflation was encouraging and had been broad-based, spanning all main components, including core items. This was indicative of weak demand and reflected the impact of monetary policy as well as diminishing effects from other factors that had been pushing inflation up. It gave grounds for increased confidence that inflation would be brought back to target in a timely manner. But it was highlighted that inflation would likely pick up in the very near term on account of an upward base effect for the cost of energy and would decline only slowly in the course of 2024.

Furthermore, projected inflation for 2025 was largely unchanged in the December projections from the September round and remained slightly above target, especially for core inflation. However, it was noted that services inflation had started to ease and that, more generally, inflationary pressures were receding in all components. This was indicative of weak demand, affected in part by monetary policy. It was underlined that future wage dynamics remained highly uncertain, with many new agreements to be negotiated early in 2024. Convincing evidence of a sustained turnaround in wages had yet to emerge, and this was necessary for sufficient confidence to be gained that inflation would continue to fall back to the ECB’s 2% target. At the same time, it was noted that quarter-on-quarter inflation rates had plunged over the past year and the new Eurosystem staff projections contained a large downward revision in inflation for 2024. Moreover, there were some signs of wage growth stabilising or coming down, and it was argued that wages were a lagging indicator. However, it was stressed that the projection for 2025 had been broadly unchanged in the December round, and core inflation remained above 2% at that horizon. Upside risks to inflation from the outlook for fiscal policy, including higher carbon taxes, and for energy and food prices were also seen as elevated, as were the prevailing geopolitical risks. If such upside risks to inflation materialised or clearer adverse structural changes were to emerge, inflation pressures might become more persistent.

Members agreed that indicators of underlying inflation appeared to have passed their peak and continued to decline. However, the dynamics of underlying inflation remained strong from a historical perspective, including when looking at the measures adjusted for energy shocks and supply bottlenecks. In particular, domestic inflation remained elevated and was edging lower at a slow pace, with sticky wage growth and services inflation in particular reflecting the still strong labour market. It was also pointed out that base effects and fiscal measures made it more challenging to ascertain the true dynamics of underlying inflation.

Turning to the assessment of monetary policy transmission, members generally agreed that transmission was proceeding strongly and helping to dampen inflationary pressures for both goods and services. Moreover, it was argued that a significant part of the interest rate pass-through was still pending, with the overall peak impact on activity seen in early 2024 and the bulk of the impact on inflation still expected over the next two years. The view was expressed that transmission to financing conditions and lending activity was working more strongly than initially expected and non-linearities or financial amplification could be at work. Such effects were typically not included in standard models and the projection baseline and could bolster the strength of transmission to economic activity and prices.

Reference was made to the wide range of estimates for the impact of monetary policy normalisation since December 2021, with large differences as to the extent and persistence of the effects depending on the various models used for policy analysis and in the projections as well as on different underlying assumptions. In this context, the argument was made that the observed disinflation did not validate the notion that the surge in inflation had been transitory but rather supported the view that decisive policy action by the ECB had been instrumental in achieving this outcome.

Looking ahead, it was also emphasised, however, that further transmission was still in the pipeline and that firms’ cash buffers and households’ excess savings, which had to some extent limited the impact of monetary policy on aggregate demand, could decline alongside the contraction of the Eurosystem balance sheet. This was seen as suggesting that the impact of tight financing conditions might be stronger than expected in the coming quarters. However, it was argued that there was limited evidence of the effects of policy tightening having strengthened, since economic activity was developing broadly according to expectations, the labour market remained tight and downward adjustments in inflation expectations appeared to follow downward inflation surprises more than weakness in the economy.

All in all, on the basis of the December Eurosystem staff projections, members expressed increased confidence that inflation would be brought back towards the 2% target in 2025, although there were different views as to whether there were grounds for sufficient confidence that the target would be reached in a timely manner. Hence a need was seen for continued vigilance and patience, and for the maintenance of a restrictive stance for some time.

It was stressed that there was no room for complacency and that it was not the time for the Governing Council to lower its guard. Caution was warranted, as inflation would probably pick up in the near term and there were continued uncertainties in relation to wages and underlying inflation dynamics. This suggested that it was still too early to be confident that the task had been accomplished.

Monetary policy decisions and communication

Against this background, all members agreed with the proposal by Mr Lane to maintain the three key ECB interest rates at their current level. All three elements of the Governing Council’s reaction function were considered to support the case for this decision. Confidence was expressed that the monetary policy stance continued to be sufficiently restrictive, which gave the Governing Council the opportunity to hold rates at current levels and take time to assess the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. Restating the Governing Council’s data-dependent approach was seen to be important, with a focus on the three elements of the reaction function, which provided a structured approach to monetary policy decision-making and communication. This also was seen as an integral part of the Governing Council’s meeting-by-meeting orientation and offered the necessary flexibility.

Turning to the policies affecting the size and composition of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet, a very large majority of members agreed with Mr Lane’s proposal to advance the normalisation of the balance sheet at a measured and predictable pace.

This was viewed as a proportionate response in view of the initial objectives of the PEPP, which was an instrument designed to counter the serious risks to the monetary policy transmission mechanism and the outlook for the euro area posed by the pandemic. As the pandemic, or at least its emergency dimension, was over, maintaining full reinvestments was no longer appropriate. In addition, markets were currently functioning smoothly and fragmentation concerns were limited. This meant that the risks from ending full reinvestments were contained, especially since moving to partial reinvestments still allowed flexible reinvestments if necessary. Hence it was an opportune time to take this decision, which would be another logical step in the normalisation of the Eurosystem balance sheet.

The proposal was also broadly in line with market expectations, so it would not surprise market participants. Moreover, the approach would allow a smooth adjustment, in particular since redemptions in the PEPP portfolio were very small relative to other sources of balance sheet shrinkage in 2024. At the same time, it was seen as crucial that any decision to end full reinvestments earlier than originally planned should be fully delinked from monetary policy stance decisions relating to level of the policy interest rates. This meant it was important to stress that interest rate decisions were the main instrument of the Governing Council’s monetary policy.

While some members favoured an earlier end to full reinvestments than had been proposed, suggesting that tapering could start earlier and be more gradual, other members argued that full reinvestments should continue until the end of 2024. In this context, it was argued that the difference between starting tapering or ending reinvestments a couple of quarters sooner or later would not affect the proportionality assessment.

Members unanimously agreed with Mr Lane’s proposal to continue applying flexibility in reinvesting redemptions falling due in the PEPP portfolio.

Taking into account the foregoing discussion among the members, upon a proposal by the President, the Governing Council took the monetary policy decisions as set out in the monetary policy press release. The members of the Governing Council subsequently finalised the monetary policy statement, which the President and the Vice-President would, as usual, deliver at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting.

Monetary policy statement

Monetary policy statement for the press conference of 14 December 2023

Press release

Monetary policy decisions

Meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council, 13-14 December 2023

Members

  • Ms Lagarde, President
  • Mr de Guindos, Vice-President
  • Mr Centeno
  • Mr Cipollone
  • Mr Elderson
  • Mr Hernández de Cos
  • Mr Herodotou
  • Mr Holzmann
  • Mr Kazāks*
  • Mr Kažimír
  • Mr Knot
  • Mr Lane
  • Mr Makhlouf
  • Mr Müller
  • Mr Nagel
  • Mr Panetta*
  • Mr Reinesch*
  • Ms Schnabel
  • Mr Scicluna*
  • Mr Šimkus*
  • Mr Stournaras
  • Mr Välimäki, temporarily replacing Mr Rehn
  • Mr Vasle
  • Mr Villeroy de Galhau
  • Mr Vujčić
  • Mr Wunsch

* Members not holding a voting right in December 2023 under Article 10.2 of the ESCB Statute.

Other attendees

  • Mr Dombrovskis, Commission Executive Vice-President**
  • Ms Senkovic, Secretary, Director General Secretariat
  • Mr Rostagno, Secretary for monetary policy, Director General Monetary Policy
  • Mr Winkler, Deputy Secretary for monetary policy, Senior Adviser, DG Economics

** In accordance with Article 284 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Accompanying persons

  • Mr Dabušinskas
  • Mr Demarco
  • Mr Garnier
  • Mr Gavilán
  • Mr Gilbert
  • Mr Haber
  • Mr Horváth
  • Mr Kaasik
  • Mr Kelly
  • Mr Koukoularides
  • Mr Lünnemann
  • Mr Nicoletti Altimari
  • Mr Novo
  • Mr Pösö
  • Mr Rutkaste
  • Mr Šošić
  • Mr Tavlas
  • Mr Ulbrich
  • Mr Vanackere
  • Ms Žumer Šujica

Other ECB staff

  • Mr Proissl, Director General Communications
  • Mr Straub, Counsellor to the President
  • Ms Rahmouni-Rousseau, Director General Market Operations
  • Mr Arce, Director General Economics
  • Mr Sousa, Deputy Director General Economics

Release of the next monetary policy account foreseen on 22 February 2024.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2024/account-of-the-monetary-policy-meeting-13-14-december-2023/ Nyhet Thu, 18 Jan 2024 12:30:00 GMT
I november utbetalades mer bostadslån än vid motsvarande tidpunkt i fjol https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/monetara-finansinstituts-balansrakning_new/2023/i-november-utbetalades-mer-bostadslan-an-vid-motsvarande-tidpunkt-i-fjol/ I november 2023 utbetalades nya bostadslån för 1,2 miljarder euro, vilket är 5 % mer än vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan. Trots en liten återhämtning utbetalades mindre nya bostadslån än normalt i november 2023. I genomsnitt har nya bostadslån betalats ut för 1,5 miljarder euro i november. Utbetalningarna av bostadslån är typiskt minst i december–februari.

Till återhämtningen i utbetalningarna av bostadslån kan eventuellt ha bidragit ändringarna i överlåtelseskatten[1]. Den vanligaste referensräntan på bostadslån, dvs. 12 månaders Euribor, sjönk något i november och fortsatte att sjunka i december. Nedgången har också för sin del kunnat pigga upp bolånemarknaden. Vid utgången av december 2023 var 12 månaders Euribor 3,51 %.

Genomsnittsräntan på nya bostadslån sjönk från oktober och var 4,63 % i november 2023. I november bands 90 % av de nya bostadslånen till Euribor, när andelen vid motsvarande tidpunkt för ett år sedan var 97 %. Andelen nya bostadslån som bundits till bankernas egna referensräntor (primräntor) har under det senaste året ökat och var 7 % i november. I november var genomsnittsräntan på nya Euriborbundna bostadslån 4,68 % och på bostadslån som bundits till bankernas egna referensräntor 4,14 %.

Efter att räntorna stigit har 12 månaders Euribor använts som referensränta för bostadslån mindre än tidigare och kortare Euriborräntor har använts mer än tidigare. I november 2023 var 46 % av de nya bostadslånen bundna till 12 månaders Euribor, 12 % till 6 månaders Euribor och 32 % till 3 månaders Euribor. Under de rådande låga räntorna de senaste åren var andelen nya bostadslån som bundits till 12 månaders Euribor typiskt 80–90 %.

Genomsnittsräntan på hushållens utestående bostadslån översteg 4 % i november 2023. Trots att räntorna stigit snabbt har andelen oreglerade[2] bostadslån inte ökat nämnvärt. I november var andelen oreglerade bostadslån 1,6 % av de utestående bostadslånen.

 

I november utbetalades mer bostadslån än vid motsvarande tidpunkt i fjol

 

Utlåning

De finländska hushållen lyfte i november 2023 nya bostadslån för 1,2 miljarder euro, vilket är 60 miljoner euro mer än vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan. Av de nya utbetalda bostadslånen stod investeringsbostadslånen för 95 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på nya bostadslån sjönk från oktober och var 4,63 % i november. Det utestående beloppet av bostadslån uppgick vid slutet av november 2023 till 106,5 miljarder euro och årsökningen var –1,8 %. Investeringsbostadslånens andel av de utestående bostadslånen var 8,6 miljarder euro. Av utlåningen till de finländska hushållen bestod 17,1 miljarder euro av konsumtionskrediter och 17,6 miljarder euro av övriga lån vid utgången av november 2023.

De finländska företagen lyfte i november nya lån[3] för 1,8 miljarder euro, och av dem utgjorde bostadsbolagslånen 370 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på nya utbetalda företagslån steg från oktober och var 6,08 % i november. Det utestående beloppet av lån som beviljats finländska företag uppgick vid slutet av november till 106,3 miljarder euro, varav andelen lån till bostadsbolag utgjorde 43,9 miljarder euro.

 

Inlåning

Inlåningen från hushållen i Finland uppgick totalt till 108,0 miljarder euro vid slutet av november 2023 och genomsnittsräntan var 1,13 %. I beloppet ingick inlåning över natten för 70,7 miljarder euro och tidsbunden inlåning för 10,3 miljarder euro. De finländska hushållen tecknade i november nya tidsbundna inlåningsavtal för 1,3 miljarder euro. Genomsnittsräntan på ny tidsbunden inlåning var i november 3,45 %.

 

Utlåning och inlåning till Finland, preliminär uppgift*
  September, mn euro Oktober, mn euro November, mn euro November, 12 mån förändring1, % Genomsnitts-ränta, %
Utlåning till hushåll, utestående belopp 141 596 141 257 141 151 -1,5 4,57
    - varav bostadslån 106 719 106 535 106 524 -1,8 4,04
    - varav investeringsbostadslån 8 650 8 641 8 638   4,24
Utlåning till icke-finansiella företag2, utestående belopp 106 100 105 873 106 306 0,1 4,73
Inlåning från hushåll, utestående belopp 110 110 108 351 107 987 -3,6 1,13
           
Nya utbetalda bostadslån till hushåll 1 131 1 128 1 237   4,63
    - varav investeringsbostadslån 101 100 95   4,82

* Omfattar utlåning och inlåning i alla valutor till Finland. I Finlands Banks statistikpublikationer till och med januari 2021 och i ECB:s statistikpublikationer presenteras utlåning och inlåning i euro för euroområdet och hushållen omfattar också hushållens icke-vinstsyftande organisationer, varför siffrorna i tabellen avviker från uppgifterna i dessa publikationer.
1 Den procentuella förändringen är beräknad på månatliga stockförändringar som är justerade för omklassificeringar och omvärderingar.  
2 Till de icke-finansiella företagen räknas bostadssammanslutningar.

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Markus Aaltonen, telefon 09 183 2395, e-post: markus.aaltonen(at)bof.fi,

Antti Hirvonen, telefon 09 183 2121, e-post: antti.hirvonen(at)bof.fi.

 

Nästa månadspublicering 31.1.2024 kl. 10.

 

Statistiksiffror och grafik som utgör underlag för meddelandet kan läsas på https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/.

 

[1] Överlåtelseskatten sänktes och skattefriheten för första bostad avskaffades från början av 2024. Lagen trädde i kraft vid årsskiftet, men de nya skattesatserna tillämpas retroaktivt på överlåtelser från och med den dag då regeringens proposition lämnats till riksdagen, den 12 oktober 2023 (https://valtioneuvosto.fi/-/10623/varainsiirtovero?languageId=sv_SE).

[2] Ett lån betraktas som oreglerat när det har förfallit för mer än 90 dagar sedan eller det finns anledning att anta

att gäldenären inte kommer att fullgöra sin betalning.

[3] Exkl. konto- och kortkrediter.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/monetara-finansinstituts-balansrakning_new/2023/i-november-utbetalades-mer-bostadslan-an-vid-motsvarande-tidpunkt-i-fjol/ Statistik Thu, 04 Jan 2024 08:00:00 GMT
Referensränta och dröjsmålsräntor enligt räntelagen för tiden 1.1.–30.6.2024 https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/referensranta-och-drojsmalsrantor-enligt-rantelagen-for-tiden-1.1.30.6.2024/ Referensräntan enligt 12 § i räntelagen (633/1982) är 4,5 % för tiden 1.1–30.6.2024. Dröjsmålsräntan för denna period är 11,5 % per år (referensräntan med tillägg för sju procentenheter enligt 4 § i räntelagen). Den dröjsmålsränta som tillämpas i kommersiella avtal är 12,5 % per år (referensräntan med tillägg för åtta procentenheter enligt 4 a § i räntelagen).

Den referensränta som dröjsmålsräntan ska beräknas på bestäms enligt 12 § i räntelagen. Referensräntan är därmed den ränta som Europeiska centralbanken tillämpat vid den sista huvudsakliga refinansieringstransaktionen före den första kalenderdagen i varje halvårsperiod avrundad uppåt till närmast följande halva procentenhet. Denna referensränta ska tillämpas under de följande sex månaderna.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/referensranta-och-drojsmalsrantor-enligt-rantelagen-for-tiden-1.1.30.6.2024/ Pressmeddelande Fri, 22 Dec 2023 12:27:00 GMT
Finlands Bank har gett ut nya kommunikationsriktlinjer som speglar bankens strategi https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/finlands-bank-har-gett-ut-nya-kommunikationsriktlinjer-som-speglar-bankens-strategi/ Kommunikationsmiljön har förändrats snabbt. De traditionella medierna är den primära informationskällan, men de sociala mediernas roll har blivit allt viktigare. Nyheter publiceras dygnet runt och nyhetscykeln har blivit allt snabbare. Sätten att söka och hantera information har blivit mer fragmenterade. Kommunikationsarbetet förändras när ny teknik, såsom artificiell intelligens, tas i bruk.

Den snabba omvärldsförändringen har gjort det svårare att nå ut till olika intressenter. Det är därför viktigt att kommunicera begripligt och flerspråkigt i flera kanaler. ”Finlands Banks nya kommunikationsriktlinjer hjälper oss att agera i en föränderlig omvärld och ger våra intressenter en möjlighet att bilda sig en uppfattning om vår verksamhet”, berättar vice ordföranden i Finlands Banks direktion Marja Nykänen.

Finlands Banks nya kärnbudskap speglar bankens samhällsviktiga roll  

Finlands Bank har en viktig uppgift för att stärka landets övergripande säkerhet genom att upprätthålla ekonomisk stabilitet. Finlands Banks kärnbudskap publicerades i dag och sammanfattar bankens viktiga roll: Vi bygger stabilitet på beprövade fakta.

”I fejknyheternas och informationspåverkans tid producerar och tolkar vi på Finlands Bank forskningsbaserad information om ekonomin. Vårt mål är att vi själva och de intressenter som utnyttjar informationen ska kunna fatta mer välgrundade beslut för samhällets bästa”, framhåller Marja Nykänen.

Forskning och analys som bedrivs av Finlands Banks sakkunniga är avsedd för bredare användning i samhället. Genom vår kommunikation främjar vi uppfyllelsen av policymål och för en dialog med olika intressenter.

Finlands Bank är en del av Eurosystemet. Kommunikationen är ett viktigt penningpolitiskt verktyg som används för att påverka olika aktörers förväntningar om den ekonomiska utvecklingen. Tydlig kommunikation bidrar till förståelsen av centralbankens politik i olika konjunkturlägen. Finlands Bank säkerställer att intressenterna får de uppgifter de behöver om Europeiska centralbankens verksamhet och beslut.

Läs Finlands Banks kommunikationsriktlinjer (på finska)

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/finlands-bank-har-gett-ut-nya-kommunikationsriktlinjer-som-speglar-bankens-strategi/ Nyhet Wed, 20 Dec 2023 13:00:00 GMT
Den finländska ekonomin befinner sig i recession och återhämtningen går trögt https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/den-finlandska-ekonomin-befinner-sig-i-recession-och-aterhamtningen-gar-trogt/ Ekonomin i Finland befinner sig i recession. Den ekonomiska utvecklingen är fortsatt svag ännu nästa år och ekonomin börjar återhämta sig först i slutet av 2024. ”Finlands externa omvärld är svår och konjunkturutsikterna har försämrats ytterligare under hösten. Samtidigt har inflationen i Finland emellertid avtagit och hushållens köpkraft stärkts”, konstaterar prognoschef Meri Obstbaum vid Finlands Bank.

Finlands Bank har publicerat sin prognos för 2023–2026. Bruttonationalprodukten krymper med 0,5 % under 2023 och med 0,2 % under 2024. Efter det stiger BNP-tillväxten tillbaka nära den genomsnittliga tillväxten på lång sikt. För 2025 förutspås en ekonomisk tillväxt på 1,5 % och för 2026 är tillväxtprognosen 1,3 %.

Den ekonomiska tillväxten är för närvarande svag på bred front. De högre räntorna uppmuntrar hushållen att spara i stället för att konsumera. Ökningen i hushållens konsumtion bromsas också upp av de högre priserna och räntorna samt osäkerheten om framtiden. Den ekonomiska återhämtningen begränsas också av att investeringarna minskat betydligt. Särskilt investeringarna i bostadsbyggande är låga. På grund av det svaga konjunkturläget stiger arbetslösheten tillfälligt.

Tiden med hög inflation verkar vara förbi i Finland. Inflationen kommer att vara måttlig under prognosåren 2024–2026. Energipriserna har sjunkit från de höga nivåerna i fjol och de förväntas fortsätta att sjunka. I och med den skärpta penningpolitiken och lågkonjunkturen är pristrycket lågt framför allt nästa år.

När inflationen bromsar in snabbt, stärks hushållens köpkraft. ”Den starkare köpkraften stimulerar hushållens konsumtion och ekonomin börjar långsamt återhämta sig. Konsumtionsökningen backas också upp av stigande löner och en fortsatt hyfsad sysselsättning”, berättar Obstbaum. Dessutom räknar finansmarknaden med att räntorna sjunker under prognosåren och tillväxten på exportmarknaden återhämtar sig successivt, vilket stärker den ekonomiska tillväxten från och med slutet av 2024.

Underskottet i de offentliga finanserna blir djupare trots försöken att konsolidera ekonomin och skuldsättningen fortsätter under åren framöver. År 2026 överskrider den offentliga skuldkvoten redan 80 %. De offentliga finanserna belastas under de närmaste åren av en betydligt svagare utveckling av skatteintäkterna än tidigare, lättnader i socialförsäkringsavgifterna och en kraftig ökning av de utbetalda sociala förmånerna, den offentliga efterfrågan och ränteutgifterna. Enligt Finlands Banks uppdaterade uppskattning är hållbarhetsunderskottet i de offentliga finanserna på lång sikt 4,5 % av BNP.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/den-finlandska-ekonomin-befinner-sig-i-recession-och-aterhamtningen-gar-trogt/ Pressmeddelande Tue, 19 Dec 2023 09:00:00 GMT
Ett starkt Finland behöver en stark ekonomi https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/ett-starkt-finland-behover-en-stark-ekonomi/ Finlands externa omvärld har snabbt försvårats och ekonomin befinner sig i recession. ”En svag konjunktur framhäver betydelsen av en hållbar och långsiktig ekonomisk politik”, säger vice ordföranden i Finlands Banks direktion Marja Nykänen.

Inflationen har fortsatt att sjunka i enlighet med Europeiska centralbankens penningpolitiska mål. Penningpolitiken har stramats åt genom höjning av styrräntorna och inskränkningar i centralbankens köpprogram för värdepapper. ECB-rådet beslutade i december att hålla styrräntorna oförändrade. Den viktigaste styrräntan ligger på 4 %.

Finlands näringsgrensstruktur bygger till stor del på industri och byggnadsverksamhet, vilket ökar räntekänsligheten i ekonomin. Dessutom löper bostadslånen i Finland i regel med rörlig ränta, vilket innebär att penningpolitiken får ett något snabbare genomslag på den ekonomiska tillväxten och inflationen. Den viktigaste bidragande faktorn till styrkan i genomslaget är hur stort ekonomiskt handlingsutrymme hushållen har att stödja sig på för att klara sina ökade lånebetalningsutgifter.

Underskottet i Finlands offentliga finanser djupnar trots konsolideringsåtgärderna. Finlands Banks uppskattning av hållbarhetsunderskottet i förhållande till BNP har ökat till ca 4 ½ %. Oro inger framför allt den växande skuldkvoten. Utöver de åldersrelaterade utgifterna utövar också de nödvändiga försvars- och andra beredskapsutgifterna ett ökat tryck på de offentliga utgifterna.

”Konsolideringen av de offentliga finanserna kräver både konkreta inkomst- och utgiftsrelaterade åtgärder och tillväxtfrämjande strukturella reformer”, betonar Marja Nykänen. ”Finland har alla förutsättningar att lyckas då vi sätter skuldhållbarhet som vår gemensamma prioritering och förbinder oss till detta över valperioderna”, fortsätter Nykänen.

Under åren framöver bromsas den ekonomiska tillväxten i Finland upp av en minskning av befolkningen i arbetsför ålder, svag produktivitetstillväxt, den avstannade ökningen av utbildningsnivån och svagare inlärningsresultat.

Det högre arbetskraftsdeltagandet och genomförda reformer har främjat sysselsättningen. I takt med att dessa positiva trender tappar momentum blir det allt viktigare att finna nya åtgärder som ökar utbudet av arbete. ”Det behövs alltjämt reformer för att öka den totala arbetsinsatsen i samhällsekonomin”, preciserar Marja Nykänen.

Genom att investera i högklassig utbildning stärker vi vår förmåga både att skapa egna och att utnyttja andras innovationer. Innovationer, forskning och utvecklingsarbete som leder till investeringar i ny teknik uppkommer inte utan utbildad arbetskraft. Kunnig arbetskraft behövs också för att på bred front lansera nya idéer och arbetssätt.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/ett-starkt-finland-behover-en-stark-ekonomi/ Pressmeddelande Tue, 19 Dec 2023 09:00:00 GMT
ECB-rådets beslut (utöver räntebeslut) https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/ecb-radets-beslut-utover-rantebeslut4/ ECB-rådets beslut (utöver räntebeslut) december 2023

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/ecb-radets-beslut-utover-rantebeslut4/ Nyhet Fri, 15 Dec 2023 14:00:00 GMT
Penningpolitiskt utlåtande https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/ECB-ordforandens-inledningsanforanden/2023/penningpolitiskt-utlatande7/ ECB:s presskonferens 14 december 2023

Christine Lagarde, ECB:s ordförande,
Luis de Guindos, ECB:s vice ordförande
Frankfurt am Main den 14 december 2023

God eftermiddag, vice ordföranden och jag önskar er hjärtligt välkomna till vår presskonferens.

ECB-rådet beslutade idag att hålla de tre styrräntorna oförändrade. Även om inflationen har gått ner under de senaste månaderna är det sannolikt att den ta fart igen inom kort. Enligt de senaste prognoserna av Eurosystemets experter för euroområdet väntas inflationen sjunka gradvis under loppet av nästa år för att sedan närma sig vårt tvåprocentsmål 2025. På det hela taget förutser experterna att den totala inflationen i genomsnitt blir 5,4 procent 2023, 2,7 procent 2024, 2,1 procent 2025 och med 1,9 procent 2026. Jämfört med prognoserna från september innebär detta en nedrevidering för 2023 och särskilt för 2024.

Den underliggande inflationen har lättat ytterligare. Men inhemskt pristryck förblir fortsatt högt, framför allt beroende på den starka tillväxten i enhetsarbetskostnader. Eurosystemets experter räknar med att inflationen, exklusive energi och livsmedel, i genomsnitt blir 5,0 procent 2023, 2,7 procent 2024, 2,3 procent 2025 och 2,1 procent 2026.

Våra tidigare räntehöjningar fortsätter att med kraft slå igenom i ekonomin. Stramare finansieringsförhållanden dämpar efterfrågan och detta hjälper till att driva ner inflationen. Eurosystemets experter väntar sig att den ekonomiska tillväxten förblir dämpad den närmaste tiden. Därefter torde ekonomin återhämta sig beroende på stigande reala inkomster – i och med att människor drar nytta av sjunkande inflation och stigande löner – och förbättrad utländsk efterfrågan. Eurosystemets experter förutser därför att tillväxten tar fart från ett genomsnitt på 0,6 procent för 2023 till 0,8 procent för 2024 och till 1,5 procent för både 2025 och 2026.

Vi är fast beslutna att se till att inflationen inom rimlig tid återgår till vårt medelfristiga tvåprocentsmål. Baserat på vår aktuella bedömning anser vi att ECB:s styrräntor är på nivåer som, om de upprätthålls tillräckligt länge, kommer att ge ett viktigt bidrag för att nå detta mål. Våra framtida räntebeslut kommer att säkerställa att våra styrräntor sätts på tillräckligt restriktiva nivåer så länge som är nödvändigt.

Vi kommer att fortsätta att följa ett databeroende tillvägagångssätt för att fastställa vilken nivå som är lämplig och hur länge restriktionen ska bestå. Framför allt kommer våra räntebeslut att baseras på bedömning av inflationsutsikterna med beaktande av inkommande ekonomiska och finansiella data, dynamiken i underliggande inflation och styrkan i den penningpolitiska transmissionen.

ECB s styrräntor är vårt viktigaste verktyg för att ange den penningpolitiska inriktningen. Vi beslutade även idag att driva på normaliseringen av Eurosystemets balansräkning. ECB-rådet avser att under första halvåret 2024 fortsätta att fullt ut återinvestera förfall av värdepapper förvärvade inom PEPP-programmet (stödköpsprogram föranlett av pandemin). Under det andra halvåret 2024 ämnar ECB-rådet reducera PEPP-portföljen med i genomsnitt 7,5 miljarder euro per månad. ECB-rådet avser upphöra med återinvesteringar i PEPP i slutet av 2024.

Mer om dagens beslut finns i ett pressmeddelande på vår webbplats.

Jag kommer nu att mer i detalj beskriva hur vi tror att ekonomin och inflationen kommer att utvecklas och därefter förklara vår bedömning av de monetära och finansiella förhållandena.

Ekonomisk aktivitet

Euroområdets ekonomi minskade något under det tredje kvartalet, främst beroende på en nedgång i varulager. Stramare finansieringsförhållanden och dämpad efterfrågan kommer troligen att fortsätta tynga den ekonomiska aktiviteten under den närmaste tiden. Utsikterna ser särskilt svaga ut för byggindustrin och tillverkningsindustrin, de två sektorer som påverkas mest av högre räntor. Tjänstesektorn ser också ut att försvagas under de kommande månaderna. Detta beror på följdeffekter av den svagare industrikonjunkturen, avtagande effekter av återöppnande av ekonomin och det allt bredare genomslaget av stramare finansieringsförhållanden.

Arbetsmarknaden ger fortsatt stöd till ekonomin. Arbetslösheten låg på 6,5 procent i oktober och sysselsättningen växte med 0,2 procent under det tredje kvartalet. Samtidigt dämpar den svagare ekonomin företagens efterfrågan på arbetskraft och företagen annonserade färre lediga tjänster de senaste månaderna. Även om fler människor har arbete sjönk det totala antalet arbetade timmar med 0,1 procent under det tredje kvartalet.

När nu energikrisen avtar bör offentliga stödåtgärder fortsätta att avvecklas. Detta är viktigt för att undvika att driva upp medelfristigt inflationstryck, vilket annars skulle nödvändiggöra en ännu stramare penningpolitik. Finanspolitik bör utformas så att vår ekonomi blir mer produktiv och att den höga statsskulden gradvis minskar. Strukturreformer och investeringar för att stärka euroområdets utbudskapacitet – som skulle stödjas om NGEU-programmet (Next Generation EU programme) till fullo implementerades – kan bidra till minskat pristryck på medellång sikt och samtidigt främja den gröna och digitala övergången. Följaktligen är det viktigt att snabbt komma överens om reformen av ramverket för EU:s ekonomiska styrning. Vidare är det avgörande att framsteg görs i riktning mot en kapitalmarknadsunion och att arbetet med att färdigställa bankunionen accelereras.

Inflation

Under de senaste två månaderna sjönk inflationen, ner till en årstakt på 2,4 procent i november enligt Eurostats snabbstatistik. Denna nedgång var brett baserad. Energiprisinflationen gick ner ytterligare och livsmedelsinflationen kom också ner men är trots allt fortfarande relativt hög. Den här månaden lär inflationen ta fart på grund av uppåtriktade baseffekter för energikostnader. 2024 räknar vi med att inflationen sjunker långsammare beroende på ytterligare uppåtriktade baseffekter och utfasning av tidigare finanspolitiska åtgärder inriktade på att begränsa återverkningarna av energiprischocken.

Inflationen, exklusive energi och livsmedel, föll med nästan en hel procentenhet under två månader, ner till 3,6 procent i november. Detta återspeglar förbättrade utbudsförhållanden, de avtagande effekterna av den tidigare energiprischocken och effekten av stramare penningpolitik på efterfrågan och företagens prissättningsförmåga. Inflationstakten på varor och tjänster föll till 2,9 procent respektive 4,0 procent.

Alla mått på underliggande inflation sjönk i oktober men inhemskt pristryck var fortsatt högt, främst beroende på stark löneutveckling samt avtagande produktivitetstillväxt. De flesta mått på långsiktiga inflationsförväntningar ligger på runt 2 procent och vissa marknadsbaserade indikatorer för inflationskompensation har sjunkit från höga nivåer.

Riskbedömning

Hoten mot ekonomisk tillväxt ligger fortsatt på nedåtsidan. Tillväxten kan bli lägre om effekterna av penningpolitiken visar sig bli starkare än förväntat. En svagare världsekonomi eller en ytterligare nedgång i den globala handeln skulle också tynga tillväxten i euroområdet. Rysslands omotiverade krig mot Ukraina och den tragiska konflikten i Mellanöstern är viktiga källor till geopolitisk risk. Det kan resultera i att företag och hushåll bli mindre optimistiska om framtiden. Tillväxten kan bli högre om stigande realinkomster ökar konsumtionen mer än förutsett, eller om världsekonomin skulle växa snabbare än väntat.

Uppåtrisker för inflationen inkluderar de ökade geopolitiska spänningarna, vilket kan höja energipriserna på kort sikt, och extrema väderhändelser, vilket kan leda till högre livsmedelspriser. Inflationen kan också bli högre än vad som förutses om inflationsförväntningarna skulle gå över vårt mål eller om löner eller vinstmarginaler skulle öka mer än väntat. Inflationen skulle dock kunna överraska på nedåtsidan om penningpolitiken dämpar efterfrågan mer än väntat eller om de ekonomiskt förhållandena i resten av världen oväntat skulle försämras, potentiellt delvis på grund av den senaste tidens ökade geopolitiska risker.

Finansiella och monetära förhållanden

Marknadsräntor har fallit markant sedan vårt förra sammanträde och ligger under de räntor som är inbäddade i experternas prognoser. Vår restriktiva penningpolitik fortsätter att med kraft slå igenom i bredare finansieringsförhållanden. Utlåningsräntorna steg igen i oktober, till 5,3 procent för företagslån och 3,9 procent för bostadslån.

Högre låneräntor och dämpad efterfrågan på lån har ytterligare försvagat kreditutvecklingen. Företagslån minskade i en årstakt på 0,3 procent i oktober och även utlåningen till hushåll var fortsatt dämpad med en årlig tillväxttakt på 0,6 procent. Med svagare utlåning och minskningen i Eurosystemets balansräkning har det breda penningmängdsmåttet (M3) fortsatt att gå ned. I oktober föll takten mätt på årsbasis till 1,0 procent.

I linje med vår penningpolitiska strategi gjorde ECB-rådet en djupgående bedömning av samspelet mellan penningpolitik och finansiell stabilitet. Bankerna i euroområdet har visat sig vara motståndskraftiga. De har höga kapitalkvoter och de har blivit väsentligt mer lönsamma under det gångna året. Men utsikterna för den finansiella stabiliteten fortsätter att vara svaga i det rådande läget av stramare finansieringsförhållanden, svag tillväxt och geopolitiska spänningar. Situationen skulle framför allt kunna försämras om bankernas kostnader för finansiering ökade mer än väntat och om fler låntagare fick problem med att betala tillbaka sina lån. Samtidigt skulle den övergripande effekten av ett sådant scenario för ekonomin kunna begränsas om finansmarknaderna reagerade på ett ordnat sätt. Makrotillsynen är fortsatt den främsta försvarslinjen mot uppkomsten av finansiella sårbarheter och de åtgärder som finns tillgängliga bidrar till att bevara det finansiella systemets motståndskraft.

Slutsats

ECB-rådet beslutade idag att hålla de tre styrräntorna oförändrade. Vi är fast beslutna att se till att inflationen inom rimlig tid återgår till vårt medelfristiga tvåprocentsmål. Baserat på vår aktuella bedömning anser vi att ECB:s styrräntor är på nivåer som, om de upprätthålls tillräckligt länge, kommer att ge ett viktigt bidrag för att inflationen inom rimlig tid når detta mål. Våra framtida beslut kommer att säkerställa att ECB:s styrräntor sätts på tillräckligt restriktiva nivåer så länge som är nödvändigt för att säkerställa en återgång inom rimlig tid. Vi kommer att fortsätta att följa ett databeroende tillvägagångssätt för att fastställa vilken nivå som är lämplig och hur länge restriktionen ska bestå.

ECB-rådet avser reducera PEPP-portföljen under det andra halvåret 2024 och upphöra med återinvesteringar i PEPP i slutet av 2024.

Under alla omständigheter står vi redo att inom ramen för vårt mandat vid behov justera alla våra instrument så att inflationen återgår till vårt medelfristiga mål och bevara en smidig transmission av penningpolitiken.

Vi är nu beredda att svara på era frågor.

Se den engelska versionen för den exakta formulering som ECB-rådet har enats om.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/ECB-ordforandens-inledningsanforanden/2023/penningpolitiskt-utlatande7/ ECB-tal Thu, 14 Dec 2023 15:45:00 GMT
Eurosystemets penningpolitiska beslut https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/eurosystemets-penningpolitiska-beslut9/ ECB:s pressmeddelande 14 december 2023

ECB-rådet beslutade idag att hålla de tre styrräntorna oförändrade. Även om inflationen har gått ner under de senaste månaderna är det sannolikt att den ta fart igen inom kort. Enligt de senaste prognoserna av Eurosystemets experter för euroområdet väntas inflationen sjunka gradvis under loppet av nästa år för att sedan närma sig 2-procentsmålet 2025. På det hela taget förutser experterna att den totala inflationen i genomsnitt blir 5,4 procent 2023, 2,7 procent 2024, 2,1 procent 2025 och 1,9 procent 2026. Jämfört med prognoserna från september 2021 innebär detta en nedrevidering för 2023 och särskilt för 2024.

Den underliggande inflationen har lättat ytterligare. Men inhemskt pristryck förblir fortsatt högt, framför allt beroende på den starka tillväxten i enhetsarbetskostnader. Eurosystemets experter räknar med att inflationen, exklusive energi och livsmedel, i genomsnitt blir 5,0 procent 2023, 2,7 procent 2024, 2,3 procent 2025 och 2,1 procent 2026.

De tidigare räntehöjningarna fortsätter att med kraft slå igenom i ekonomin. Stramare finansieringsförhållanden dämpar efterfrågan och detta hjälper till att driva ner inflationen. Eurosystemets experter väntar sig att den ekonomiska tillväxten förblir dämpad den närmaste tiden. Därefter torde ekonomin återhämta sig beroende på stigande reala inkomster – i och med att människor drar nytta av sjunkande inflation och stigande löner – och beroende på förbättrad utländsk efterfrågan. Eurosystemets experter förutser därför att tillväxten tar fart från ett genomsnitt på 0,6 procent för 2023 till 0,8 procent för 2024 och till 1,5 procent för både 2025 och 2026.

ECB-rådet är fast beslutet att se till att inflationen inom rimlig tid återgår till det medelfristiga 2-procentsmålet. Baserat på sin aktuella bedömning anser ECB-rådet att dess styrräntor är på nivåer som, om de upprätthålls tillräckligt länge, kommer att ge ett viktigt bidrag för att nå detta mål. ECB-rådets framtida räntebeslut kommer att säkerställa att dess styrräntor sätts på tillräckligt restriktiva nivåer så länge som är nödvändigt.

ECB-rådet kommer att fortsätta att följa ett databeroende tillvägagångssätt för att fastställa vilken nivå som är lämplig och hur länge restriktionen ska bestå. Framför allt kommer räntebesluten att baseras på bedömningen av inflationsutsikterna med beaktande av inkommande ekonomiska och finansiella data, dynamiken i underliggande inflation och styrkan i den penningpolitiska transmissionen.

ECB s styrräntor är det viktigaste verktyget för att ange den penningpolitiska inriktningen. ECB-rådet beslutade även idag att driva på normaliseringen av Eurosystemets balansräkning. Avsikten är att under det första halvåret 2024 fortsätta att fullt ut återinvestera förfall av värdepapper förvärvade inom PEPP-programmet (stödköpsprogram föranlett av pandemin). Under det andra halvåret 2024 ämnar ECB-rådet reducera PEPP-portföljen med i genomsnitt 7,5 miljarder euro per månad. ECB-rådet avser upphöra med återinvesteringar i PEPP i slutet av 2024.

ECB:s styrräntor

Räntan på de huvudsakliga refinansieringstransaktionerna och räntorna på marginalutlåningsfaciliteten och inlåningsfaciliteten förblir oförändrade på 4,50 %, 4,75 % respektive 4,00 %.

Programmet för köp av tillgångar (APP) och stödköpsprogrammet föranlett av pandemin (PEPP)

APP-portföljen minskar i en måttlig och förutsägbar takt eftersom Eurosystemet inte längre återinvesterar värdepapper som förfaller.

ECB-rådet avser fortsätta att fullt ut återinvestera förfall av värdepapper förvärvade inom PEPP-programmet (stödköpsprogram föranlett av pandemin) under det första halvåret 2024. Under det andra halvåret 2024 ämnar ECB-rådet reducera PEPP-portföljen med i genomsnitt 7,5 miljarder euro per månad. ECB-rådet avser upphöra med återinvesteringar i PEPP i slutet av 2024.

ECB-rådet kommer att fortsätta tillämpa flexibilitet vid återinvestering av kommande förfall i PEPP-portföljen i syfte att motverka risker mot transmissionsmekanismen relaterat till pandemin.

Refinansieringstransaktioner

Allt eftersom bankerna återbetalar belopp som upplånats under de riktade långfristiga refinansieringstransaktionerna kommer ECB-rådet regelbundet att granska hur riktade utlåningstransaktioner och relaterad pågående återbetalning bidrar till den penningpolitiska inriktningen.

***

ECB-rådet står redo att, inom ramen för sitt mandat, vid behov justera alla sina instrument så att inflationen återgår till 2-procentsmålet på medellång sikt och bevara en smidig välfungerande transmission av penningpolitiken. Instrumentet för transmissionsskydd finns också tillgängligt för att motverka oönskade, störande marknadskrafter som utgör ett allvarligt hot mot den penningpolitiska transmissionen i samtliga länder i euroområde och möjliggör för ECB-rådet att mer effektivt uppfylla sitt prisstabilitetsmandat.

ECB:s ordförande kommer att redogöra för de överväganden som ligger bakom dessa beslut vid en presskonferens som börjar kl. 14:45 (centraleuropeisk tid) idag.

Se den engelska versionen för den exakta formulering som ECB-rådet har enats om.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/eurosystemets-penningpolitiska-beslut9/ Nyhet Thu, 14 Dec 2023 13:21:00 GMT
ECB pressmeddelande: ECB publicerar rapport om Eurosedlarnas miljöavtryck https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/ecb-publicerar-rapport-om-eurosedlarnas-miljoavtryck/

ECB pressmeddelande 11 december 2023

  • Miljöavtrycket av en människas årsanvändning av eurosedlar motsvarar 8 km med bil
  • Eurosystemet har som åtagande att ytterligare minska eurosedlarnas miljöavtryck och samtidigt säkerställa att kontanter förblir lättåtkomliga och allmänt accepterade

Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) publicerar idag en studie om miljöavtryck av eurosedlar som betalningsinstrument. Den visar att det genomsnittliga miljöavtrycket från betalningar med eurosedlar var 101 (micropoints (µPt)) per euroinvånare 2019. Detta motsvarar att en människa i euroområdet kör en bil 8 km, eller 0,01 % av det totala miljöavtrycket av en europés årliga konsumtion.

I studien mäts det potentiella miljöavtrycket av alla aktiviteter i en hel kontantcykel av eurosedlar – från anskaffning av råmaterial, tillverkning, distribution och omlopp till avyttring av de nationella centralbankerna i euroområdet. Den baseras på European Commission’s Product Environmental Footprint methodology och bygger på det arbete som inleddes i livscykelanalysen av eurosedlar i den första serien eurosedlar 2004.

De viktigaste bidragande faktorerna till miljöavtrycket från eurosedlar som betalningsmedel är energiförbrukning av bankautomater samt och transport, följt av centralbankernas hantering, papperstillverkning och äkthetskontroll av sedlar i affärer. Sedlarnas livslängd och det faktum att de används för många betalningar innebär att effekten av sedeltillverkning är lägre än den för transport och distribution.

Piero Cipollone, ledamot av ECB:s direktion, säger att Eurosystemet har åtagit sig att ytterligare minska eurosedlarnas påverkan på miljön och samtidigt säkerställa att kontanter förblir lättåtkomliga och allmänt accepterade.

Sedan 2004 gör Eurosystemet ansträngningar att minska eurosedlarnas miljöavtryck, t.ex. genom användning av 100 procent hållbar bomull samt förbud mot deponi av sedelrester.

Vidare har framsteg gjorts av producenter av bankautomater och av banker för att minska miljöavtryck från de maskiner de använder. I den studie som idag publiceras visas att förbättringar av bankautomaters energieffektivitet har bidragit till en 35-procentig minskning mellan 2004 och 2019.

Omfattande forskning och utveckling görs så att framtida eurosedlar blir ännu mer miljövänliga under alla stadier av sin livscykel. Så undersöker ECB alternativa metoder för deponi av sedelavfall, som recyklering och återanvändning av restmaterial, samt möjliga förbättringar av material och komponenter som används vid sedelframställningen.

Dessa åtgärder ingår i ECB:s bredare åtagande för hur klimatförändringar kan bemötas, inom dess mandat, och hur ECB:s egna miljöavtryck kan minskas i linje med målen i Parisavtalet och Europeiska unionens mål om klimatneutralitet. Detaljerad information ges ECB:s årliga miljöredovisning.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/ecb-publicerar-rapport-om-eurosedlarnas-miljoavtryck/ Nyhet Mon, 11 Dec 2023 12:39:44 GMT
De kontaktlösa betalningarna ökade till antal och värde under tredje kvartalet 2023 https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/betalnings_new/2023/de-kontaktlosa-betalningarna-okade-till-antal-och-varde-under-tredje-kvartalet-2023/ Antalet betalningstransaktioner som gjorts med finländska betalkort

 

Under tredje kvartalet 2023 initierades 99 miljoner kortbetalningar med dator eller mobil enhet, vilket var 28 % mer än under samma period för ett år sedan. Det totala värdet av kortbetalningar på distans (3,9 miljarder euro) var 35 % större än vid motsvarande tidpunkt för ett år sedan.

 

Det totala värdet av betalningstransaktioner som gjorts med finländska betalkort

 

De totala värdet av kontaktlösa betalningar uppgick till 6,2 miljarder euro under tredje kvartalet 2023, vilket var 14 % mer än vid motsvarande tidpunkt för ett år sedan. Under tredje kvartalet 2023 gjordes 397 miljoner kortbetalningar med kontaktlös betalning, vilket var 11 % mer än under det tredje kvartalet 2022.

Antalet kortbetalningar med chip eller magnetremsa ökade med 1 % från andra kvartalet 2023 och uppgick till 137 miljoner transaktioner under det tredje kvartalet. Det totala värdet av kortbetalningar med chip eller magnetremsa minskade med 155 miljoner euro (2 %) från andra kvartalet och var 8 miljarder euro tredje kvartalet.

Med finländska betalkort gjordes sammanlagt 0,6 miljarder kortbetalningar under det tredje kvartalet 2023, vilket var 10 % mer än under samma period i fjol. Det totala värdet av kortbetalningarna utgjorde det tredje kvartalet 2023 sammanlagt 18,5 miljarder euro, vilket var 4 % mer än under det andra kvartalet.

 

Korttransaktionernas värde ökade i euroländerna

Det sammanlagda värdet av korttransaktioner som gjorts med finländska betalkort i övriga euroländer uppgick till 1,5 miljarder euro tredje kvartalet 2023, vilket var 21 % mer än under det tredje kvartalet för ett år sedan. Det sammanlagda värdet av betalningstransaktioner som gjorts med finländska betalkort utanför EU var 0,4 miljarder euro tredje kvartalet 2023.

Med kort utgivna i ett annat euroland än Finland gjordes i Finland 16 % mer kortbetalningar under det tredje kvartalet än under det andra kvartalet 2023. Det totala värdet av dessa betalningar uppgick till 0,2 miljarder euro. Med kort utgivna utanför EU gjordes i Finland under tredje kvartalet 2023 kortbetalningar till ett värde av sammanlagt 0,2 miljarder euro, vilket var 30 % mindre än vid samma tidpunkt för ett år sedan.

Under tredje kvartalet 2023 gjordes 306 miljoner betalningsöverföringar, vilket var 3 % mer än vid motsvarande tidpunkt för ett år sedan. Det totala värdet av betalningsöverföringarna det tredje kvartalet utgjorde 884 miljarder euro, vilket var 4 % mindre än under föregående kvartal. Det totala värdet av betalningsöverföringar till finländska motparter minskade med 4 % från det andra kvartalet 2023 och utgjorde 704 miljarder euro under årets tredje kvartal.

 

De siffror som behandlas i detta meddelande har publicerats i den nya dashboarden för betalningsstatistik. Dashboardens innehåll utökas senare.

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Tia Kurtti, telefon 09 183 2043, e-post: tia.kurtti(at)bof.fi,

Tuomas Nummelin, telefon 09 183 2373, e-post: tuomas.nummelin(at)bof.fi.

 

Nästa publiceringstillfälle mars 2024.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/betalnings_new/2023/de-kontaktlosa-betalningarna-okade-till-antal-och-varde-under-tredje-kvartalet-2023/ Statistik Tue, 05 Dec 2023 08:00:00 GMT
ECB-rådets beslut (utöver räntebeslut) https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/ecb-radets-beslut-utover-rantebeslut3/ ECB-rådets beslut (utöver räntebeslut) november 2023

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/ecb-radets-beslut-utover-rantebeslut3/ Nyhet Fri, 01 Dec 2023 14:00:00 GMT
Svag efterfrågan på företagslån i oktober 2023 https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/monetara-finansinstituts-balansrakning_new/2023/svag-efterfragan-pa-foretagslan-i-oktober-2023/ I oktober 2023 utbetalades nya företagslån[1] (exkl. bostadsbolagslån) av banker med verksamhet i Finland till ett värde av 1,3 miljarder euro. Det är det minsta statistikförda utbetalda beloppet för oktober sedan 2010. Genomsnittsräntan på nya företagslån var 5,70 %, vilket är 0,18 procentenheter högre än i september 2023. På grund av den svaga efterfrågan i oktober 2023 minskade det utestående beloppet av företagslån (58,5 miljarder euro) med –3,0 % jämfört med ett år tidigare.

Genomsnittsräntan på nya företagslån steg mest i kategorin för stora lån på över 1 miljon euro. Genomsnittsräntan på dessa stora lån steg med 0,15 procentenheter från september och var 5,44 % i oktober 2023. I oktober var genomsnittsräntan 6,32 % på små lån under 250 000 euro och 6,19 % på medelstora lån (över 250 000 och högst 1 miljon euro).

Av de nya utbetalda företagslånen i oktober 2023 hänförde sig 13,5 % till industrisektorn. Detta är mindre än normalt. Samtidigt var fastighetssektorns andel (21,9 %) av de nya utbetalningarna större än i regel.

Av de utbetalda företagslånen i oktober 2023 var merparten (55 %) lån med en återbetalningstid på över 1 år och högst 5 år, och genomsnittsräntan på dem var 5,68 %. Genomsnittsräntan på nya företagslån med en återbetalningstid på högst 1 år var 6,43 % och deras andel av de utbetalda företagslånen var 19 %. För långa företagslån med en återbetalningstid på över 5 år var genomsnittsräntan 5,30 %.

 

Svag efterfrågan på nya företagslån i oktober 2023

 

Utlåning

De finländska hushållen lyfte i oktober 2023 nya bostadslån för 1,1 miljarder euro, dvs. 140 miljoner euro mindre än vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan. Av de nya utbetalda bostadslånen stod investeringsbostadslånen för 100 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på nya bostadslån steg från september och var 4,73 % i oktober. Det utestående beloppet av bostadslån uppgick vid slutet av oktober 2023 till 106,5 miljarder euro och årsökningen var –1,9 %. Investeringsbostadslånens andel av de utestående bostadslånen var 8,6 miljarder euro. Av utlåningen till de finländska hushållen bestod 17,1 miljarder euro av konsumtionskrediter och 17,7 miljarder euro av övriga lån vid utgången av oktober.

De finländska bostadsbolagen lyfte i oktober nya lån[2] för 560 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på nya utbetalda bostadsbolagslån steg från september och var 5,38 % i oktober. Det utestående beloppet av lån som beviljats finländska bostadsbolag uppgick vid slutet av oktober till 43,8 miljarder euro.

 

Inlåning

Inlåningen från hushållen i Finland uppgick totalt till 108,4 miljarder euro vid slutet av oktober 2023 och genomsnittsräntan var 1,03 %. I beloppet ingick inlåning över natten för 72,0 miljarder euro och tidsbunden inlåning för 9,7 miljarder euro. De finländska hushållen tecknade i oktober nya tidsbundna inlåningsavtal för 1 110 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på ny tidsbunden inlåning var i oktober 3,36 %.

 

Utlåning och inlåning till Finland, preliminär uppgift*
  Augusti, mn euro September, mn euro Oktober, mn euro Oktober, 12 mån förändring1, % Genomsnitts-ränta, %
Utlåning till hushåll, utestående belopp 141 676 141 596 141 257 -1,6 4,51
    - varav bostadslån 106 749 106 719 106 535 -1,9 3,97
    - varav investeringsbostadslån 8 640 8 650 8 641   4,17
Utlåning till icke-finansiella företag2, utestående belopp 105 407 106 100 105 873 -0,4 4,68
Inlåning från hushåll, utestående belopp 109 278 110 110 108 351 -3,9 1,03
Nya utbetalda bostadslån till hushåll 1 139 1 131 1 128   4,73
    - varav investeringsbostadslån 112 101 100   4,87

* Omfattar utlåning och inlåning i alla valutor till Finland. I Finlands Banks statistikpublikationer till och med januari 2021 och i ECB:s statistikpublikationer presenteras utlåning och inlåning i euro för euroområdet och hushållen omfattar också hushållens icke-vinstsyftande organisationer, varför siffrorna i tabellen avviker från uppgifterna i dessa publikationer.
1 Den procentuella förändringen är beräknad på månatliga stockförändringar som är justerade för omklassificeringar och omvärderingar.  
2 Till de icke-finansiella företagen räknas bostadssammanslutningar.

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Tuomas Nummelin, telefon 09 183 2373, e-post: tuomas.nummelin(at)bof.fi,

Usva Topo, telefon 09 183 2056, e-post: usva.topo(at)bof.fi.

 

Nästa månadspublicering 4.1.2023 kl. 10.

 

Statistiksiffror och grafik som utgör underlag för meddelandet kan läsas på https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/.

 

 

[1] Exkl. konto- och kortkrediter.

[2] Exkl. konto- och kortkrediter.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/monetara-finansinstituts-balansrakning_new/2023/svag-efterfragan-pa-foretagslan-i-oktober-2023/ Statistik Thu, 30 Nov 2023 08:00:00 GMT
Account of the monetary policy meeting, 25-26 October 2023 https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/account-of-the-monetary-policy-meeting-25-26-october-2023/ Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Athens on Wednesday and Thursday, 25-26 October 2023

23 November 2023

1. Review of financial, economic and monetary developments and policy options

Financial market developments

Ms Schnabel started her presentation by noting that the market’s immediate response to the dramatic geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East, following the terrorist attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023, had so far been contained. Bolstered by continued robust economic growth in the United States, the surge in global long-term bond yields that started over the summer had continued in recent weeks, as investors were increasingly internalising the prospect of interest rates staying high for longer. At the same time, expectations for the future path of short-term interest rates had remained broadly unchanged.

Long-term sovereign bond yields had risen globally. Yields on both sides of the Atlantic were now approaching levels seen from 2005 to 2007 during the last monetary policy tightening cycle. The differential between US and euro area ten-year interest rates had fallen back to the levels observed when the ECB started increasing its key policy rates in July 2022. On aggregate, the recent rise in sovereign bond yields in the euro area had been predominantly driven by an increase in the risk-free rates. However, the rise in yields had not been uniform across euro area countries. Idiosyncratic factors had likely contributed to these developments, and there had been no signs of market fragmentation.

The question arose as to why long-term risk-free rates had risen so sharply at a time when most central banks were nearing the end of the tightening cycle. A decomposition of the increase into real rates and the inflation component showed that the higher ten-year overnight index swap (OIS) rate since the beginning of September 2023 had entirely reflected a rise in the real interest rate. Furthermore, a substantial change could be seen in the term premium, which had increased by around 25 basis points since early September. ECB staff analysis suggested that the repricing of term premia was likely to have largely emanated from the United States as a result of policy and macro spillovers.

Looking at the evolution of the ten-year term premia for the United States and the euro area since the last tightening cycle that started in 2005, the US term premium had remained exceptionally compressed. From a historical perspective, this was exceptional for periods in which interest rates were above the effective lower bound. In the euro area, the term premium had been rising continuously and persistently for over a year. This rise in risk compensation had been broadly expected, as uncertainty about the inflation and policy outlook had increased. However, in the euro area too, the term premium remained visibly below the levels observed during the previous tightening cycle.

The timing of the rise in the global term premium could be explained by the coincidence of three broad factors. The first factor was that many investors had become convinced earlier this year that a global recession was imminent and that central banks worldwide would have to cut interest rates substantially in 2024. Policy expectations had changed substantially since then, however. Investors currently expected cumulative rate cuts of around 60 to 70 basis points in 2024 in the euro area, down from 100 basis points in May. In the latest ECB Survey of Monetary Analysts, median expectations regarding the timing of the first 25 basis point cut had been pushed out to September 2024, from June 2024 previously. At present, investors appeared less certain that the fight against inflation could be rapidly won. This was a global phenomenon extending to many advanced economies. It raised uncertainty about the entire future path of short-term interest rates, resulting in a higher term premium.

The second factor that had likely contributed to the sudden rise in the term premium was related to changes in the supply of, and demand for, US Treasuries. By comparison, net issuance in the euro area was generally expected to be lower in 2024 than in 2023. This was happening as the odds of a policy pivot in Japan were increasing. The market was currently pricing in the Bank of Japan exiting negative rates by April 2024, with the potential for another adjustment in its Yield Curve Control framework as early as October 2023.

The third factor that had likely reinforced the increase in the global term premium had been investors’ positioning in the US Treasury market.

In the euro area, market-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations illustrated by the five-year forward index-linked swap rates five years ahead had finally started to come down from their cyclical highs, although they remained volatile and well above 2%. Measures of inflation compensation had declined across the curve, with most of the change at longer tenors reflecting a decline in the inflation risk premium.

The decline in inflation compensation was particularly notable in the current environment, as the conflict in the Middle East implied that risks to energy prices were skewed to the upside. On aggregate, gas futures prices and oil prices were appreciably higher than they had been a few months ago.

The fact that measures of inflation compensation had declined in this environment suggested that the tightening stemming from the ECB’s interest rate hike in September 2023, in combination with higher real rates as a result of global spillovers, had fostered the market’s confidence in the Governing Council’s commitment to bring inflation back to its 2% target in a timely manner.

The speed and magnitude of the rise in real rates, together with the conflict in the Middle East, were also affecting risk assets by weighing on risk sentiment. Stock market volatility had increased visibly, although it remained well below the levels seen after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Global stock market valuations had declined considerably in recent weeks. That said, valuations in the euro area remained above the levels observed before the start of the monetary policy tightening cycle. One reason was the resilience of the equity risk premium. Although economic sentiment had deteriorated measurably, the risk premium had been constant. A similar phenomenon was observed in the corporate bond market. These marked deviations from past regularities suggested that, when interest rates went up, the risk-taking channel of policy transmission might work differently from when rates went down.

Nevertheless, there were differences across rating categories. Credit spreads for higher-rated issuers had been largely insensitive to the rise in yields. In contrast, the spreads of riskier, high-yield issuers had widened more measurably in recent weeks, although even these were nearer the lows recorded during the current cycle than the highs.

The speed of the bond market rout had also left a significant mark on foreign exchange markets. Since mid-July the euro had fallen by nearly 6% against the US dollar. This constituted a headwind to the Eurosystem’s efforts to reduce inflation in a timely manner. The appreciation of the US dollar during this time had been broad-based. So, from a foreign exchange perspective, real yields in the United States were likely seen as a sign of strength by investors, as growth was holding up better than expected.

The global environment and economic and monetary developments in the euro area

Mr Lane then went through the latest economic, monetary and financial developments in the global economy and the euro area. Starting with the global economy, Mr Lane pointed to global growth momentum continuing to slow. The global composite output Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) had fallen for the fourth consecutive month in September, as the deterioration in the services sector converged towards the contractionary readings for manufacturing. In China, the real estate sector continued to be a drag on growth, but the GDP figure for the third quarter of the year suggested that the economy may be finding its footing again. In contrast, while the US economy had remained robust in the third quarter, it was now showing clearer signs of deceleration. Since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting on 13-14 September, the euro had depreciated both against the US dollar and in nominal effective terms. Its previous appreciation was still adversely affecting euro area trade.

The escalating conflict between Israel and Hamas was increasing uncertainty and posed upside risks to oil and gas prices over the near term. So far, however, the impact on futures prices further ahead had been limited. Oil prices were higher than both at the time of the September meeting and at the cut-off date for the September ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. However, the negative slope of the current oil futures curve was steeper than in the projections. Mr Lane also recalled that, after a period of elevated levels, crack spreads (the difference between crude oil prices and prices for refined products such as petrol and diesel) had fallen by 36% since the September meeting, while gasoline crack spreads had even fallen by 90%. For the overall energy prices for consumers it was important to monitor the prices of both refined and crude oil. For its part, the gas market still faced a number of supply risks. Gas prices remained lower than at the cut-off date for the September staff projections but were higher than at the time of the previous monetary policy meeting. As regards other commodities, the overall pattern remained one of declining prices for metals and food, which could be linked to the weaker global economy.

The euro area economy had remained weak in the third quarter. The European Commission’s composite economic sentiment indicator and the PMI pointed to declining consumer confidence and business activity. Manufacturing output continued to fall in October, according to the flash release, owing to lower inventories, declining orders and tighter financing conditions. Housing and business investment contracted, as demand weakened in response to higher borrowing costs. The decline in housing investment had in fact already started in the second quarter of 2022, with a rebound at the start of 2023 driven by the positive impact of the mild winter. The PMI and the forward-looking indicators of the European Commission pointed to a further decline in housing investment in the fourth quarter of 2023. It was evident that the construction sector accounted for a large part of the weakness in overall activity.

In contrast to housing investment, business investment had held up for a sustained period of time, helped by backlogs being worked through. In the second quarter of 2023, business investment had increased only marginally and new orders were pointing to a contraction in the second half of the year. The outlook for investment would have been significantly worse without the support of the Next Generation EU programme.

Although demand in contact-intensive services sectors still exceeded pre-pandemic levels and activity in tourism remained supportive, the services sector was losing steam. This was due to the fact that weaker industrial activity had started to spill over to business-oriented services, the impetus from reopening effects was fading and the impact of higher interest rates was broadening across sectors. The services PMI had continued its decline in October, according to the flash release, and had been in contractionary territory since August.

Private consumption was expected to have remained weak in the third quarter. Looking ahead, while the European Commission’s consumer confidence indicator had been improving until spring 2023, it had started to deteriorate again in the summer months and remained well below its historical average.

Turning to trade, the outlook for exports was weakening. Survey data for September 2023 showed that new export orders for both goods and services remained in contractionary territory, indicating that the global weakness continued to weigh on euro area exports. Furthermore, firms had worked through their backlogs, suggesting that the support coming from this factor was fading. Another key factor dampening the demand for euro area goods was the loss of competitiveness as a result of persistently high energy prices and the past appreciation of the euro.

The labour market was still resilient, with the unemployment rate at a historical low of 6.4% in August. Momentum was starting to soften, however, as the economy remained weak. Employment expectations had declined further in October for both services and manufacturing, according to the PMI flash release, with manufacturing employment expectations falling to their lowest level since August 2020. The labour force had expanded further in the second quarter of the year and was now 2.3% larger than before the pandemic, but fewer new jobs were currently being created.

Turning to fiscal policy, the draft budgetary plans for 2024 indicated a significant decline in support measures, which would imply a restrictive fiscal stance. However, this restrictive stance was not reflecting austerity measures but the winding-down of energy subsidies.

The risks to economic growth remained tilted to the downside. Growth could be lower if the effects of monetary policy turned out stronger than expected. A weaker world economy would also weigh on growth. Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict sparked by the terrorist attacks in Israel were key sources of geopolitical risk. This could result in firms and households becoming less confident about the resilience of the world economy and more uncertain about the future, and dampen growth further. Conversely, growth could be higher than expected if the still resilient labour market and rising real incomes meant that people and businesses became more confident and spent more, or the world economy grew more strongly than expected.

Headline inflation had dropped markedly in September to 4.3%, in line with the September staff projections. It was also expected to come down further in the near term, before a temporary mechanical uptick around the turn of the year. The decline in September was visible across all the main components, confirming the general disinflationary process that was under way. Energy prices had fallen by 4.6% on account of negative base effects, and food inflation, while still high, had decreased to 8.8%.

Inflation excluding energy and food, as measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICPX), had also dropped sharply in September, to 4.5%. This was 0.2 percentage points lower than expected in the September staff projections. The fall had been supported by improving supply conditions, the pass-through of previous declines in energy prices, the impact of tighter monetary policy on demand and corporate pricing power. Non-energy industrial goods inflation had fallen to 4.1% in September, with the monthly dynamics now reverting to historical averages. Services inflation had declined for the second consecutive month in September, to 4.7%. This had been driven in part by the discontinuation of the €9 public transport ticket in Germany last year and the reduction in the impact of changes in HICP weights. However, it might also have reflected some softening of activity in the travel and tourism sectors with the fading out of post-pandemic reopening effects.

Most measures of underlying inflation continued to decline. Measures that adjusted for past energy and supply shocks had largely confirmed their downward trajectory in August. The adjusted Persistent and Common Component of Inflation measure – a good predictor of inflation developments in the past – was now close to 2%. At the same time, domestic inflation remained persistent and had hovered around 5.5% until August, before edging down to 5.2% in September. The still high level of this indicator underscored the significance of continuing wage pressures for underlying inflation.

Moving to the latest wage developments, negotiated wage growth had remained robust in the third quarter. However, the Indeed wage tracker, which captured wage growth for new hires, showed continued evidence of an easing of wage pressures. Contacts in the corporate sector had reported ongoing strong wage growth, although Corporate Telephone Survey respondents expected some moderation next year. Overall, the available indicators continued to suggest that the wage forecast included in the September staff projections was broadly on track. Wage developments would need continuous monitoring in the months ahead, as most wage negotiations would only take place at the start of 2024. The Corporate Telephone Survey also suggested that profit margins had been squeezed during 2023 and would contract further in 2024. This evidence was in line with the expected decline in profit margins over the coming quarters, embedded in the September staff projections.

Inflation expectations reported in the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters had remained broadly unchanged in October. Most of the distribution had remained concentrated around 2%. The ECB Consumer Expectations Survey showed that consumers had not yet adjusted downwards their perception of past inflation. This could suggest that willingness to revise perceived inflation downwards was not as sensitive to actual developments in inflation as willingness to revise it upwards. Consumer inflation expectations had moved up in September, particularly for the one-year ahead horizon. While these developments were in line with those in countries outside the euro area, such as the United States, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and appeared to be linked to the recent increase in energy prices, they needed close monitoring.

The risks to inflation remained twofold. On the one hand, upside risks to inflation could come from higher energy and food costs. The heightened geopolitical tensions could drive up energy prices in the near term while making the medium-term outlook more uncertain. Extreme weather, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could push food prices up by more than expected. Additionally, a lasting rise in inflation expectations above the inflation target, or higher than anticipated increases in wages or profit margins, could also drive inflation higher, including over the medium term. On the other hand, weaker demand – for example owing to a stronger transmission of monetary policy or a worsening of the economic environment in the rest of the world amid greater geopolitical risks – would ease price pressures, especially over the medium term.

Turning to monetary and financial developments, short-term risk-free rates had been stable since the September monetary policy meeting. Long-term rates had risen markedly, however, resulting in some additional tightening of financing conditions. The transmission of the ECB’s past monetary policy actions to financing conditions continued to be exceptionally strong and was increasingly affecting the broader economy and dampening demand, thereby helping push down inflation. The rise in bank lending rates for firms and for households for house purchase – to 5.0% and 3.9% respectively in August – had continued to outpace previous hiking cycles, and these costs had reached their highest levels in over a decade.

According to the latest euro area bank lending survey, credit standards for loans to firms and households had tightened further in the third quarter, as banks were becoming more concerned about the risks faced by their customers and were less willing to take on risks themselves. Credit dynamics had weakened further. The annual growth rate of loans to firms had dropped sharply, from 2.2% in July to 0.7% in August and 0.2% in September, when a positive monthly net flow only partially compensated for the large outflow registered in August. Loans to households remained subdued, with the growth rate slowing from 1.3% in July to 1.0% in August and 0.8% in September. The annual growth rate of M3 – the broad monetary aggregate – had remained negative in September, despite a considerable monthly inflow both from the rest of the world and from a partial reversal of the large net redemptions in loans to firms in August. With positive nominal GDP growth in 2023, the currently slightly negative growth in M3 on an annual basis implied that real money growth was strongly negative. Growth in M1 – currency in circulation and overnight deposits – had increased slightly but remained highly negative. Firms and households continued to shift funds from overnight deposits to term deposits – although this had moderated somewhat in recent months – reflecting attractive rates on the latter. This continued to explain the unprecedented rates of contraction in M1.

Overall, the transmission of the policy tightening to lending rates and lending volumes was strong by historical standards, even taking into account the steep path of the ECB’s policy rates in the recent past.

Monetary policy considerations and policy options

On the basis of the three elements of the Governing Council’s reaction function, Mr Lane proposed maintaining the three key ECB interest rates at their current levels. The incoming information had broadly confirmed the Governing Council’s previous assessment of the medium-term inflation outlook. Inflation was still expected to stay too high for too long, and domestic price pressures remained strong. At the same time, inflation had dropped markedly in September and most measures of underlying inflation had continued to ease. The Governing Council’s past interest rate increases continued to be transmitted forcefully into financing conditions. This was increasingly dampening demand and thereby helped push down inflation.

Holding the key ECB interest rates at their current levels would confirm the Governing Council’s assessment in September that the rates were at levels that, maintained for a sufficiently long duration, would make a substantial contribution to a timely return of inflation to target. This was supported by a range of model-based simulations suggesting that, while the tightening cycle had so far had a substantial downward impact on inflation and GDP growth, the further tightening in the pipeline from the current policy stance would press down further on inflation over time. By its December monetary policy meeting the Governing Council would have new data on GDP growth for the third quarter, the October and November inflation figures, fresh monetary data and a new round of projections.

The Governing Council’s future decisions should ensure that the key ECB interest rates would be set at sufficiently restrictive levels for as long as necessary. The Governing Council should continue to follow a data-dependent approach to determining the appropriate level and duration of restriction. In particular, its interest rate decisions should remain based on its assessment of the inflation outlook in light of incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

Finally, preserving the option to apply flexibility in pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) reinvestments with a view to countering risks to the monetary policy transmission mechanism related to the pandemic continued to be warranted.

2. Governing Council’s discussion and monetary policy decisions

Economic, monetary and financial analyses

As regards the external environment, members took note of the assessment provided by Mr Lane that, while the latest trade data had been better than expected, the near-term outlook for trade had deteriorated compared with the September ECB staff projections. The question was raised as to what extent this was still compatible with expectations that euro area export demand would pick up and be a driver of a strengthening economy in the period ahead. However, it was also stressed that growth in both China and the United States had been better than expected, which pointed to improvements in the international environment.

Turning to commodity markets, it was argued that the 1970s were not a good benchmark for assessing the impact of the latest spikes in oil prices, as energy substitution was easier now than it had been then. Moreover, wholesale gas prices, which had been the main source of recent high levels of energy inflation, had remained well below previous peaks. At the same time, concerns were expressed that the developments in the Middle East could lead to energy-related supply shocks, which, as in the 1970s, would have negative consequences for both growth and inflation worldwide.

With regard to economic activity in the euro area, members generally concurred with Mr Lane that the economy remained weak and the outlook was deteriorating. Subdued foreign demand and tighter financing conditions were increasingly weighing on investment and consumer spending. Recent information suggested that manufacturing output had continued to fall and that the services sector was also weakening. Several factors were at play here: subdued industrial activity was spilling over to other sectors, the impetus from the post-pandemic reopening effects was fading and the impact of higher interest rates was broadening across sectors. The economy was likely to remain weak for the remainder of 2023. However, as inflation fell further, household real incomes recovered and the demand for euro area exports picked up, the economy should strengthen over the coming years.

It was widely underlined that the outlook for the global economy and for the euro area was surrounded by elevated uncertainty. In this context, members noted that the weaker outlook for economic growth since the September monetary policy meeting implied a materialisation of the downside risks that had already been identified at the time of that meeting. Nowcasting tools indicated lower growth in the third and fourth quarters of 2023 than had been expected in the September ECB staff projections, and even implied that there would be a technical recession. It was suggested that continuing weakness in the fourth quarter would increase concern about whether activity would really pick up gradually in that quarter, as had previously been expected, or whether weakness could persist well into 2024. At the same time, it was argued that, while PMI indicators still pointed towards a deeper downturn, they might have lost some predictive power. Furthermore, the latest information pointed to stagnating activity rather than a deep recession.

There were therefore concerns that the weaker short-term outlook, combined with a slight worsening of external demand and a further tightening of financing conditions, could also imply weaker than expected growth in 2024 and 2025. More fundamentally, the question was raised as to where the improvement in economic activity projected by staff in September would come from if growth was currently slowing in all components of demand – namely consumption, investment and exports – and while fiscal and monetary conditions were tightening. At the same time, it was argued that even a somewhat weaker growth outlook was still compatible with a “soft landing” narrative, as entailed in the September ECB staff projections, if inflation continued to decline and real incomes recovered. The observed weaker growth also partly reflected the successful transmission of tighter monetary policy. This transmission was well advanced and its impact now appeared to be close to peaking. The bleaker short-term outlook thus did not stand in the way of the gradual recovery in 2024 and 2025 expected in the staff projections.

A soft landing scenario was seen to be supported by sound household balance sheets. Available data suggested that higher savings in the second quarter of this year reflected, to a large extent, repayments of loans rather than increased cash holdings. While this suggested that households were not imminently about to start consuming more, the improvement in balance sheets was positive for financial stability and made household positions safer in the longer term.

Turning to employment, it was noted that the strength of the labour market had so far been supporting economic activity. Members emphasised different aspects of the latest data. On the one hand, they noted that the labour market was still tight and had once again performed better than expected, with a historically low unemployment rate. Firms holding on to their employees was an essential part of the narrative that growth would resume owing to higher spending. Moreover, even a limited increase in unemployment would still be compatible with a soft landing scenario. On the other hand, the point was made that signs of labour market weakening constituted an important change from earlier assessments. The concern was expressed that the strong performance of the labour market was in part due to labour hoarding and thus was fragile. It was argued that labour markets in Europe today were much more exposed to the vagaries of external shocks and that adjustments, when they occurred, would be stronger than before. If the weakness in foreign demand were to continue, this could be transmitted to the labour market in a more abrupt manner and therefore implied downside risks to growth. In this context, it was also noted that both productivity and average hours worked per person employed had not yet fully recovered from the pandemic, and that it was uncertain whether the economy could find itself in a new normal where these two indicators were simply lower on a structural basis. This also had implications for the inflation outlook in the medium term.

With regard to fiscal policies, members reiterated that, as the energy crisis faded, governments should continue to roll back the related support measures. This was essential to avoid driving up medium-term inflationary pressures, which would otherwise call for even tighter monetary policy. Fiscal policies should be designed to make the economy more productive and to gradually bring down high public debt. Structural reforms and investments to enhance the euro area’s supply capacity – supported by the full implementation of the Next Generation EU programme – should help reduce price pressures in the medium term, while supporting the green and digital transitions. To that end, the reform of the EU’s economic governance framework should be concluded before the end of the year and progress towards a capital markets union and the completion of the banking union should be accelerated.

Members noted that countries’ draft budgetary plans remained broadly in line with the assumption of a slightly more restrictive fiscal stance in 2024 than in 2023 for the euro area as a whole, as incorporated in the September ECB staff projections. However, further analysis of the impact of the economic cycle and the current economic slowdown on the overall budget balance and the cyclically adjusted balance was seen as warranted. Another issue was the sustainability of recent and future debt developments. In particular, it was pointed out that recent reductions in debt-to-GDP ratios reflected, to a large extent, the impact of high inflation and should not be interpreted as policy-driven consolidation efforts. With inflation receding, these windfall gains could not be counted on any longer, and the impact of higher interest rates on government funding costs was also yet to have its full effect.

Concerns were expressed that ongoing discussions on the fiscal rules in the context of the deliberations about the EU’s economic governance framework could imply a vacuum for 2024, as the Stability and Growth Pact had not yet been replaced by new regulations. Disciplined fiscal policies were considered paramount for achieving price stability. However, it was argued that the current fiscal stance risked pushing in the opposite direction, including via measures that altered borrowing costs and could hence be seen as directly interfering with monetary policy transmission. At the same time, the point was made that fiscal tightening without structural reforms would be of limited help and that the economy needed support from the supply side.

Members assessed that the risks to economic growth remained tilted to the downside. Growth could be lower if the effects of monetary policy turned out stronger than expected. A weaker world economy would also weigh on growth. Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict sparked by the terrorist attacks in Israel were key sources of geopolitical risk. This might result in firms and households becoming less confident about the future, and could dampen growth further. Conversely, growth could be higher than expected if the still resilient labour market and rising real incomes meant people and businesses became more confident and spent more, or if the world economy grew more strongly than expected.

It was noted that while downside risks identified earlier had materialised, additional risks and uncertainty had arisen since the Governing Council’s September monetary policy meeting. This related mainly to the impact of the conflict in the Middle East, particularly if it were to escalate further. As this had come on top of the war in Ukraine, the resulting uncertainty could make firms more apprehensive, leading to less demand for investment. Given that developments in China also remained a source of fragility, it was suggested that downside risks mainly stemmed from the external environment. These also included the possibility of spillovers from the United States, owing to euro area long-term yields moving higher in tandem with those in the United States. At the same time, recent positive surprises suggested that developments in the United States and China could also turn out better than expected. Overall, while growth continued to be weak, the Eurosystem staff projections in December would provide a more comprehensive picture.

Turning to price developments, members broadly agreed with the assessment presented by Mr Lane in his introduction. The incoming information had largely confirmed the previous assessment of the medium-term inflation outlook. Inflation had dropped to 4.3% in September, which was due partly to strong base effects, with the decline broad-based. In the near term, inflation was likely to come down further, as the sharp increases in energy and food prices recorded in autumn 2022 would drop out of the yearly rates. However, energy prices had risen again recently and had become less predictable in view of the new geopolitical tensions.

Regarding headline inflation, members observed that the latest developments had been broadly in line with the September ECB staff projections. Furthermore, it was remarked that the indicators of underlying inflation had been moving in the right direction over recent months and that most had passed their peak and were continuing to decline. Costs, notably for industrial raw materials, had fallen and, overall, pipeline price pressures continued to decline and were being passed through to consumer prices. At the same time, it was noted that domestic price pressures remained strong, reflecting the persistence of services inflation and the impact of continuing wage pressures on underlying inflation. There had been increases in momentum across most components of headline inflation, with the exception of services inflation.

Members noted that the latest information on wages also appeared to be broadly in line with the expectations entailed in the September ECB staff projections. It was highlighted that the increase in the wage drift component had been stronger than growth in negotiated wages. Wage drift being more sensitive to cyclical developments could, however, also imply a more pronounced weakening of wage growth dynamics if demand were to weaken and employment to stagnate. It was remarked that there had been limited signs of second-round effects and no evidence of wage-price spirals thus far. In cumulative terms, real wages in the euro area remained subdued compared with at the beginning of the inflationary process. Information from the ECB wage trackers on recently signed wage agreements pointed to continued strong wage growth. While this was expected to moderate over time, the decline had yet to materialise and was subject to high uncertainty. Rising energy prices might delay or dampen the expected decline in wage growth, as they might be used to justify higher wage demands.

Measures of longer-term inflation expectations were mostly around 2%, but some indicators remained elevated and needed to be monitored closely. The recent decline in market-based inflation compensation was seen as a welcome development and in line with a reinforced credibility for bringing inflation back to target. However, it was also the case that markets were more forward-looking in their expectations, while the expectations of households and parts of the business sector had strong backward-looking elements. This difference needed to be borne in mind in case there were new surprises in inflation. In this context, inflation expectations were seen as fragile, as was visible in the renewed uptick in consumer expectations, possibly in response to the higher energy prices. Moreover, in the latest ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters, respondents had seen an upshift in the balance of risks for inflation expectations at the two-year horizon and a one-third probability that inflation would be above 2.5% in the longer term.

Members also considered that the increased uncertainty surrounding the outlook for economic growth translated into additional uncertainty for the outlook for inflation, particularly beyond the short term. It was noted that headline inflation would likely continue to decline in the near term, largely owing to base effects. At the turn of the year, a temporary rebound in headline inflation could be expected because of energy-related base effects.

Members underlined that the outlook for wage growth continued to be highly uncertain. The picture for wage developments would only gradually crystallise during the course of next year, in view of the long lags between hard data releases. It was argued that the strong decline observed in headline inflation and the increased confidence in inflation returning to the ECB’s target should help contain upward pressure on wages in coming negotiations. The high levels of uncertainty surrounding the outlook for wages, as well as the outlook for productivity and average hours worked per person employed, implied a highly uncertain outlook for unit labour costs and, in turn, for inflation. Moreover, unit profits also played a crucial role in determining the future path of inflation. It was noted that the previous upward shift of profit margins could prove temporary if cyclical conditions weakened. At the same time, an easing in other cost factors might help mitigate any upward pressures on margins.

Against this background, members assessed that there were both upside and downside risks to inflation. Upside risks could come from higher energy and food costs. The heightened geopolitical tensions could drive up energy prices in the near term and make the medium-term outlook more uncertain. Extreme weather, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could push food prices up by more than expected. Higher than anticipated increases in wages or profit margins, or a lasting rise in inflation expectations above target, could also drive inflation higher, including over the medium term. By contrast, weaker demand – for example owing to a stronger transmission of monetary policy or a worsening of the economic environment in the rest of the world amid greater geopolitical risks – would ease price pressures, especially over the medium term. There were differing views on the overall balance of risks for inflation. Some members viewed the overall balance as tilted to the upside, owing to upside risks to wage growth and energy prices. Upside risks could also stem from the impact of the recent depreciation of the euro, primarily against the US dollar. Other members saw inflation risks as balanced, with inflation broadly seen evolving as projected and converging back to the 2% target over the medium term, possibly even with a risk of undershooting. Some downside risks to core inflation were seen, owing to economic activity being weaker than expected and recent data for core inflation being slightly lower than expected.

Regarding the consequences of further negative supply shocks, specifically related to energy, the view was expressed that such a scenario was unlikely to play out in the same way as the large commodity price shocks of 2021-22, which had coincided, amid persistent supply bottlenecks, with the release of pent-up demand and the post-pandemic reopening. The increases in oil prices stemming from the conflict in the Middle East had so far been limited, and the market had seen the recent increase as a spike rather than a very persistent shift. The weaker aggregate demand due to tighter monetary policy should, in principle, induce firms to either resist large increases in unit labour costs or absorb them into profit margins rather than pass them on to consumers. It was argued that the large increases in profit margins in 2022 suggested that in future there would be scope to absorb higher energy costs into margins. Still, the upside risks from higher energy prices – coming after a long period of inflation substantially above target – were not seen as insignificant, even if the current macroeconomic environment was quite different. In this context, any persistence in higher energy prices could trigger further second-round effects, especially with a large number of wage agreements being negotiated at the start of the coming year. This could imply a delay or a reduction in the expected decline in wage growth. Overall, the risks posed by the geopolitical environment, including direct or indirect effects of higher commodity prices or its impact on economic sentiment among firms and households, warranted close monitoring.

Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, members largely concurred with the assessment provided by Mr Lane in his introduction. The most significant development since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting was the marked rise in longer-term interest rates, reflecting large increases in other major economies, notably the United States. The decline in the five-year forward inflation-linked swap rate five years ahead was also noted. This had contributed to a more pronounced increase in real interest rates and was seen as a welcome sign of the credibility of the Governing Council’s recent monetary policy actions. Overall, the rise in long-term rates and the correction of risk asset prices were judged as further tightening financial conditions, while the depreciation of the euro had the opposite effect.

Members discussed a range of explanations for the rise in US longer-term interest rates, which could also have different implications for expected spillovers to the euro area. These explanations included better than expected US macroeconomic developments supporting narratives of rates remaining high for longer, and a rise in the term premium. An increase in potential output in the United States or rising concerns about the financing requirements associated with persistently high US budget deficits could both have pushed up the natural interest rate. It was noted that technical factors were playing a role. It was also argued that an environment of quantitative tightening – lacking stable demand for bonds from central banks – would naturally increase the term premium, as the market clearing rate for long-term bonds was higher than before, especially in the face of spikes in volatility as seen recently.

There was broad agreement that spillovers from the United States were a major driver of the increase in euro area longer-term interest rates, contributing to a rise in euro area OIS rates of just over 20 basis points since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting. It was noted that the developments were not related to the underlying economic fundamentals and the inflation outlook in the euro area, and that they were driven by the term premium component rather than the expectations component of long-term interest rates. In this regard, it was also argued that euro area fiscal policy may have played a role in driving term premia higher. An additional possibility was that financial markets had started to price in a higher natural interest rate for the euro area.

Members generally agreed that the rise in longer-term interest rates in the euro area had tightened financing conditions by more than anticipated. It was argued that this made it more likely that the Governing Council’s monetary policy stance was restrictive enough, although there were still uncertainties around this assessment.

There were different views on the desirability of higher long-term rates for the euro area. On the one hand, they could be seen as undesirable in that they were not linked to euro area developments but contributed to additional tightening. This could unnecessarily weaken economic activity by more than intended and might cause inflation to undershoot. Moreover, higher long-term rates could render fiscal sustainability more challenging for some euro area countries. On the other hand, higher long-term rates could be welcomed after a long period in which term premia had been substantially compressed. They would strengthen monetary policy transmission to activities based on longer-term credit and signal to governments that longer-term borrowing would be more costly in the future. In addition, such tightening would enhance the credibility of inflation returning to target in a timely manner and be consistent with maintaining the policy rates at sufficiently restrictive levels for an extended period. From an economic growth perspective, the impact on the euro area depended on whether the rise in US long-term interest rates was being driven by better growth prospects for the US economy, which would imply positive spillover effects via stronger euro area external demand.

Members agreed that monetary policy continued to be transmitted strongly into broader financing conditions. Funding had become more expensive for banks, and average interest rates for business loans and mortgages had risen again in August, although rates on longer-term loans to non-financial corporations had declined. The latest bank lending survey indicated a further sharp drop in credit demand in the third quarter, driven by higher borrowing rates and cuts in investment plans and house purchases. Credit standards for loans to firms and households had also tightened further. At the same time, it was noted that the resilience of the banking sector was not seen as a concern, that the latest Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises suggested financial constraints remained contained in a historical comparison, and that the latest Corporate Telephone Survey suggested banks were still willing to lend to firms in most sectors of the economy.

Against this background, monetary and credit aggregates continued to decline rapidly. Amid weak lending and the reduction in the Eurosystem balance sheet, M3 continued to contract sharply. In August it had fallen, in annual terms, at the fastest rate recorded since the introduction of the euro and in September had remained negative. Credit dynamics had weakened further, with the annual growth rate of loans to firms dropping sharply and that of loans to households remaining subdued. At the same time, it was noted that there were no indications of financial amplification, i.e. weaknesses in the banking sector reinforcing negative macroeconomic developments. Moreover, the earlier large negative flows in credit to non-financial companies were seen as driven mainly by a decline in short-term lending, typically associated with the financing of working capital needs and inventories. Moreover, loan momentum was not falling as quickly as previously, with the large negative net flows recorded in August partly reversed in September.

Still, monetary transmission via the bank lending channel was generally seen to have been stronger than previously anticipated, including by banks themselves, and to have led to a significant tightening of financing conditions. It was also noted that transmission could have been even stronger if it had not been for structural labour shortages and resilient risk sentiment in the financial markets, as reflected in robust equity markets and relatively compressed risk premia. At the same time, it was mentioned that the services sector, which was accounting for most of the persistence of inflation, appeared not to be very sensitive to the tightening of financing conditions according to the Corporate Telephone Survey. Three out of four services firms had not seen an impact from tighter financing conditions on their business activity over the past 12 months and the ratio was even higher looking ahead over the next 12 months. Financial conditions still had indirect effects on the services sector through the slowdown in the growth of aggregate demand. Nevertheless, until recently, this had been compensated for by strong reopening effects.

It was highlighted that for some countries the reduction in mortgage lending was a particular concern. Reference was made to a few countries that had introduced measures to support the mortgage market, which were counteracting the effect of monetary policy measures to bring down inflation. However, it was observed that this was not a general situation across the euro area and, overall, it was widely felt that monetary transmission was working well and was strong yet gradual and orderly.

Looking ahead, it was argued that further transmission was still to come as fixed rate lending was rolled over, especially in countries with a higher ratio of fixed to variable rate loans. This suggested that transmission was unfolding only very gradually owing to long mortgage fixation periods. Moreover, attention was drawn to large cash buffers in parts of the corporate sector that could reduce the need for new borrowing for some time, in conjunction with the inventory cycle coming to an end. The extent of additional transmission remained uncertain but there was a possibility that it could strengthen further, in part because higher long-term interest rates could dampen growth in long-term credit. At the same time, it was noted that the latest bank lending survey suggested banks were expecting to tighten credit standards to a lesser extent in the coming quarter. Such an outcome would mean that, all else being equal, this subset of financing conditions might soon plateau.

Monetary policy stance and policy considerations

Turning to the assessment of the monetary policy stance, members highlighted that the uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook had increased compared with at the time of the September Governing Council meeting, also affecting the assessment of the appropriate monetary policy stance. At the same time, it was noted that financing conditions had tightened on account of the spillovers from the United States, which increased confidence that – barring significant deviations in inflation from the September ECB staff projections – the monetary policy stance was sufficiently restrictive and would bring inflation back to target in a timely manner. Moreover, the view was held that markets had revised their expected interest rate path to higher levels, which – if maintained for some time – would contribute to a sufficiently restrictive monetary policy stance. It was cautioned, however, that in view of the tight labour market the current level of policy rates might not be as restrictive as generally thought. Moreover, the fact that market participants had also moved back the date at which they expected a first rate cut was seen as evidence that they did not perceive a risk of overtightening.

Against this background, members assessed the data that had become available since the September monetary policy meeting in accordance with the three main elements of the “reaction function” that the Governing Council had communicated earlier in the year. These comprised the implications of the incoming economic and financial data for the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. Overall, the view was held that all three elements of the reaction function were moving in the right direction, providing clear evidence that monetary policy was working as intended.

Starting with the inflation outlook, members broadly concurred with the assessment presented by Mr Lane in his introduction. Overall, the process of disinflation seemed to be proceeding largely as expected, reflecting not only diminishing effects from exogenous factors that had been pushing inflation up, but also the impact of monetary policy. Headline inflation had evolved as projected, although growth had turned out to be weaker than expected, partly owing to a materialisation of downside risks. It was noted that the slowdown in economic activity was also reflecting the dampening effect of past interest rate increases. At the same time, comfort was drawn from the fact that forecast errors for inflation were close to zero and, if anything, the disinflation process was proceeding somewhat faster than expected. Overall, these developments were seen as creating confidence that this process would continue, bringing inflation back to target in a timely manner. It was cautioned, however, that most of the dampening effects from past interest rate increases on inflation had yet to materialise over the coming two years, for which uncertainty – stemming mainly from future wage dynamics, fiscal policy and geopolitical risks – was still high. If upside risks to inflation from these factors materialised, it would likely take some time before their effects on inflation became evident. Moreover, it was recalled that monetary policy faced challenges in addressing the effects of adverse supply shocks on inflation. Overall, it was maintained that, given the current outlook, it could be expected that the Governing Council would be able to bring inflation back to its 2% target by 2025. Although it was generally assumed that the “last mile” in bringing inflation back to target was the most difficult, it was argued that the Governing Council should be careful that its efforts to tame inflation did not eventually lead to an undershooting of the target.

Members agreed that most indicators of underlying inflation appeared to have passed their peak and continued to decline, a signal for which the Governing Council had been waiting for months. At the same time, domestic inflation was stubbornly high and longer-run inflation projections still seemed to be above the Governing Council’s target.

Turning to the assessment of monetary policy transmission, members generally agreed that transmission was proceeding more strongly than had been anticipated in September. Moreover, a significant part of the interest rate pass-through was still pending and likely to restrain activity and inflation over the projection horizon. It was also pointed out that all successful disinflationary periods had required a prolonged period of rates in restrictive territory and weakening labour markets. At the same time, downside risks were highlighted that could strengthen transmission to economic activity and inflation even further.

In any case, it was stressed that there was no room for complacency, as the difficult part of the disinflation process was only starting. Inflation dynamics over the remainder of the year would likely be characterised by various base effects that could be misinterpreted as a reversal in the inflation trend and lead to market volatility, although the inflation uptick would be short-lived and would not change the overall disinflationary outlook. In this context, it was cautioned against declaring victory over inflation at the current stage, when inflation was still more than twice the ECB’s target.

Overall, confidence was expressed in the progress made, although it was seen as important to maintain the restrictive stance for a sufficient time. With rates in restrictive territory, patience and persistence were needed to ensure that inflation converged towards the medium-term target in a timely manner. The Governing Council would assess incoming data as they arrived and act if needed.

Monetary policy decisions and communication

Against this background, all members agreed with the proposal by Mr Lane to maintain the three key ECB interest rates at their current levels. All three elements of the Governing Council’s reaction function were considered to support the case for a “hold” in the hiking cycle, after ten consecutive increases in interest rates. Confidence was expressed that the current monetary policy stance was sufficiently restrictive, which gave the Governing Council the opportunity to keep rates at current levels and take time to assess the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

It was observed that markets were expecting policy rates to stay high for a longer period than predicted ahead of the Governing Council’s September meeting. Expectations were moving from a hump-shaped interest rate path – one that macroeconomic models tended to prescribe as optimal – to a flatter profile with a later first cut in the deposit facility rate. It was deemed important for the Governing Council to avoid an unwarranted loosening of financial conditions. Moreover, members argued in favour of keeping the door open for a possible further rate hike, in keeping with the Governing Council’s emphasis on data-dependence.

While the decision at the September meeting had been a close call, the interest rate hike in September had reinforced progress towards the price stability objective. Another important element had been the definition of the 2% inflation target that the Governing Council had introduced following its monetary policy strategy review in 2021. It was noted that throughout this inflation episode, market and survey-based indicators of medium-term inflation expectations had remained anchored at target.

Members agreed that the focus of the current meeting was communication rather than action. It was seen as necessary for the Governing Council to adapt its communication to the considerable uncertainty surrounding the evolving economic and inflation outlook during a phase in which the economy was slowing down. At the same time, it was argued that the Governing Council should strive for continuity and consistency and stick to its previous communication as closely as possible to avoid sending a message of complacency.

Members agreed that the Governing Council should continue to stress its determination to set policy rates, through its future decisions, at sufficiently restrictive levels for as long as necessary to bring inflation back to target in a timely manner. In view of the high uncertainty and the risk that further supply shocks could materialise, the Governing Council’s data-dependent approach was also reaffirmed. Even if interest rates were left unchanged at the current meeting, the view was held that the Governing Council should be ready, on the basis of an ongoing assessment, for further interest rate hikes if necessary, even if this was not part of the current baseline scenario.

In conclusion, it was stressed that the Governing Council had to be both persistent and vigilant. Persistence was seen as essential to bring inflation back to 2% in the medium term. This was also meant to convey perseverance and patience in the face of new shocks that could materialise. Vigilance implied that, while the Governing Council had to assert the effectiveness of its measures and to acknowledge the progress that had been made, overconfidence and complacency had to be avoided in view of possible new challenges that could lie ahead until inflation was brought back to target.

Members also agreed with the Executive Board’s proposal to continue applying flexibility in reinvesting redemptions falling due in the PEPP portfolio. There was broad agreement that continuity in PEPP reinvestments would be consistent with a decision to keep interest rates unchanged at the October meeting, while a discussion of an early termination of PEPP reinvestments at the current meeting was seen as premature.

Taking into account the foregoing discussion among the members, upon a proposal by the President, the Governing Council took the monetary policy decisions as set out in the monetary policy press release. The members of the Governing Council subsequently finalised the monetary policy statement, which the President and the Vice-President would, as usual, deliver at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting.

Monetary policy statement

Monetary policy statement for the press conference of 26 October 2023

Press release

Monetary policy decisions

Meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council, 25-26 October 2023

Members

  • Ms Lagarde, President
  • Mr de Guindos, Vice-President
  • Mr Centeno
  • Mr Elderson
  • Mr Hernández de Cos*
  • Mr Herodotou*
  • Mr Holzmann
  • Mr Kazāks
  • Mr Kažimír
  • Mr Knot
  • Mr Lane
  • Mr Makhlouf*
  • Mr Müller
  • Mr Nagel
  • Mr Panetta
  • Mr Reinesch
  • Ms Schnabel
  • Mr Scicluna
  • Mr Šimkus
  • Mr Stournaras*
  • Mr Välimäki, temporarily replacing Mr Rehn
  • Mr Vasle
  • Mr Villeroy de Galhau
  • Mr Visco
  • Mr Vujčić*
  • Mr Wunsch

* Members not holding a voting right in October 2023 under Article 10.2 of the ESCB Statute.

Other attendees

  • Ms Senkovic, Secretary, Director General Secretariat
  • Mr Rostagno, Secretary for monetary policy, Director General Monetary Policy
  • Mr Winkler, Deputy Secretary for monetary policy, Senior Adviser, DG Economics

Accompanying persons

  • Ms Bénassy-Quéré
  • Mr Dabušinskas
  • Mr Demarco
  • Mr Gavilán
  • Mr Haber
  • Mr Kaasik
  • Mr Kroes
  • Mr Koukoularides
  • Mr Lünnemann
  • Mr Madouros
  • Mr Martin
  • Mr Nicoletti Altimari
  • Mr Novo
  • Mr Pösö
  • Mr Rutkaste
  • Mr Šošić
  • Mr Tavlas
  • Mr Ulbrich
  • Mr Vanackere
  • Ms Žumer Šujica

Other ECB staff

  • Mr Proissl, Director General Communications
  • Mr Straub, Counsellor to the President
  • Ms Rahmouni-Rousseau, Director General Market Operations
  • Mr Arce, Director General Economics
  • Mr Sousa, Deputy Director General Economics

Release of the next monetary policy account foreseen on 18 January 2024.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/account-of-the-monetary-policy-meeting-25-26-october-2023/ Nyhet Thu, 23 Nov 2023 13:00:00 GMT
Finlands Banks regler för motparter och kunder – regeluppdatering 20.11.2023 https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/finlands-banks-regler-for-motparter-och-kunder--regeluppdatering-20.11.2023/ ECB-rådet godkände den 7 september 2023 riktlinjen (EU) 2023/2415 om ändring av riktlinje (EU) 2022/912 om en ny version av det transeuropeiska automatiserade systemet för bruttoavveckling av betalningar i realtid (TARGET) (ECB/2022/8), (ECB/2023/22).

Finlands Bank har gjort motsvarande tillägg och ändringar.  De nya reglerna för TARGET-Suomen Pankki-systemet, se Finlands Banks regler för motparter och kunder.  Dessa regler träder i kraft den 20 november 2023.  

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/finlands-banks-regler-for-motparter-och-kunder--regeluppdatering-20.11.2023/ Nyhet Mon, 20 Nov 2023 10:00:00 GMT
Ökat intresse för räntefonder https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/sparande-och-investering/2023/okat-intresse-for-rantefonder/ Ännu 2022 gjordes klart mest inlösen från räntefonder[1]. Under 2023 har trenden vänt och i januari–september gjordes mest teckningar i räntefonder. Nya teckningar i räntefonder gjordes till ett värde av 13,6 miljarder euro och inlösen för 11,3 miljarder euro, vilket innebär att nettoteckningarna i räntefonderna var 2,4 miljarder euro. Av nettoteckningarna i räntefonder hänförde sig största delen (76 %) till korta räntefonder.

I januari–september 2023 gjordes näst mest nettoteckningar (1,9 miljarder euro) i aktiefonder. I en jämförelse av samtliga fondtyper översteg under samma period endast inlösen från fastighetsfonder beloppet av nya teckningar. Nettoinlösen från fastighetsfonder var −200 miljoner euro. Ännu 2022 gjordes i fastighetsfonder mest nya investeringar netto.

I januari–september 2023 stod hushållen för merparten av teckningarna[2] (till ett värde av 2,2 miljarder euro) i finskregistrerade investeringsfonder. Av dem gjordes 63 % av finländska hushåll.

År 2022 minskade investeringsfondernas[3] fondkapital betydligt och utgjorde vid slutet av året 137,5 miljarder euro. I januari–september 2023 har fondkapitalet åter ökat. Vid utgången av september 2023 uppgick det till 146,3 miljarder euro. Tillväxten kan tillskrivas de nya investeringar som gjorts under 2023 (4,7 miljarder euro) och ökningen i fondkapitalets värde (4,1 miljarder euro). Värdeökningen beror till största del på att aktieinvesteringarna ökat i värde.

Vid utgången av september 2023 var aktiefondernas fondkapital 63,5 miljarder euro och räntefondernas 54,8 miljarder euro. Aktie- och räntefonderna omfattar 81 % av investeringsfondernas totala fondkapital. De till sitt kapital följande största fondtyperna är bland- och fastighetsfonder.

 

Ökat intresse för räntefonder

 

Merparten av räntefondernas investeringar hänförde sig till utlandet

Vid utgången av september 2023 hänförde sig 24 % av räntefondernas investeringar för 55,7 miljarder euro till hemlandet och 76 % till utlandet.

Av de inhemska investeringarna var merparten (44 %) fondernas ömsesidiga investeringar. Av investeringarna hänförde sig 33 % direkt till obligationslån, varav över hälften hade emitterats av företag.

Räntefondernas största utländska investeringar hänförde sig till Sverige (6,7 miljarder euro) och Luxemburg (6,4 miljarder euro). Av investeringarna utomlands var 78 % obligationslån och av dem var 32 % obligationslån emitterade av företag och 27 % obligationslån emitterade av banker.

 

De finländska hushållen största ägare i investeringsfonderna

Vid utgången av september 2023 ägde de finländska hushållen direkt fondandelar i finskregistrerade investeringsfonder till ett värde av 32,1 miljarder euro, vilket är 7 % mer än vid slutet av 2022. Hushållen hade mest investeringar i aktiefonder (12,8 miljarder euro) och näst mest investeringar i räntefonder (8,8 miljarder euro). De finländska hushållens tillgångar kanaliseras också i stor mängd till inhemska investeringsfonder genom fondanknutna försäkringsavtal som hushållen ingått med försäkringsföretag. I Finlands Banks fondstatistik syns dessa som investeringar gjorda av försäkringsföretag.

 

Finländarnas insättningar och investeringar (mn euro), 2023Q3
  Totalt** Hushåll Arbetspensions-anstalter
  stock (flöden) omvärder-ing stock (flöden) omvärder-ing stock (flöden) omvärder-ing
Finländarnas investeringar            
Noterade aktier 202 578 -8 214 42 468 -2 077 33 861 -1 001
  (413)   (-397)   (232)  
- inhemska aktier 115 622 -6 213 37 207 -1 865 15 918 -585
  (-416)   (-549)   (111)  
             
Räntebärande värdepapper 212 677 -828 1 280 -1 29 334 -196
  (-4 533)   (-47)   (-277)  
- inhemska räntebärande värdepapper 92 859 -777 780 -2 4 765 -30
  (-5 391)   (-14)   (71)  
             
Fondandelar            
Inhemska investeringsfonder 112 642 -948 32 114 -398 5 155 -12
  (1 080)   (485)   (-40)  
             
Utländska fonder 174 255 1 370 5 920 -120 128 515 1 683
  (818)   (182)   (-408)  
             
Finländarnas insättningar på bank            
Inlåning över natten (transaktionskonton) 142 936 71 74 555 8 3 635 5
  (-9 533)   (-3495)   (-522)  
Andra insättningar 44 444 6 35 555 0 -* -*
  (3 572)   (2720)   -*  

* Konfidentiell.
** Försäkringsbolagens värdepapper- och fondinformation saknas.

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Markus Aaltonen, telefon 09 183 2395, e-post: markus.aaltonen(at)bof.fi,

Ville Tolkki, telefon 09 183 2420, e-post: ville.tolkki(at)bof.fi.

 

Statistiksiffror och grafik som utgör underlag för meddelandet kan läsas på https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/.

 

Nästa publiceringstillfälle 8.2.2024 kl. 10.

 

[1] År 2022 var nettoinlösen från räntefonder 5,6 miljarder euro.

[2] Teckningar netto.

[3] Inkluderar finskregistrerade investeringsfonder och specialinvesteringsfonder.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/sparande-och-investering/2023/okat-intresse-for-rantefonder/ Statistik Thu, 09 Nov 2023 08:00:00 GMT
Ökningen i e-handeln syntes i kortbetalningarna https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/betalnings_new/2023/okningen-i-e-handeln-syntes-i-kortbetalningarna/ År 2022 gjordes med finländska betalkort sammanlagt 2,1 miljarder kortbetalningar, vilket var 11 % mer än 2021. Kortbetalningarnas totalvärde ökade med 12 % från 2021 till sammanlagt 64 miljarder euro. År 2022 var debetkort den vanligaste typen av kort vid betalningstransaktioner och användes i 90 % av samtliga kortbetalningstransaktioner. Av värdet av samtliga kortbetalningstransaktioner härrörde 82 % från betalningar med debetkort.

 

Kortbetalningar efter kortfunktion

 

Med dator eller mobil enhet gjordes 295 miljoner elektroniska[1] kortbetalningar, och deras värde var 11 miljarder euro. Antalet sådana kortbetalningar ökade 2022 med en tredjedel och deras totala värde med 41 % från året innan. Av dessa transaktioner gjordes 90 % i samband med e-handel. Kontaktlös betalning användes bl.a. också vid betalningar mellan två personer som initierats via en mobilapplikation.

Ökningen av kontaktlösa betalningar mattades av 2022 och andelen elektroniska kortbetalningar som gjorts med betalkortets funktion för kontaktlös betalning av samtliga korttransaktioner var 60 %. Ett år tidigare var motsvarande andel 59 %. Det genomsnittliga värdet på kontaktlösa betalningar[2] var 15,4 euro 2022.

År 2022 gjordes 548 miljoner kortbetalningar med chip eller magnetremsa. Till sitt totalvärde var de 2022 emellertid fortfarande störst av kortbetalningarna (33 miljarder euro) med en andel på 52 % av det totala värdet av samtliga kortbetalningar.

Med terminaler belägna i Finland mottogs sammanlagt 1,5 miljarder kortbetalningar till ett värde av 44 miljarder euro 2022. Merparten (98 %) av betalningstransaktionerna gjordes med inhemska betalkort. I den resterande andelen av kortbetalningstransaktionerna var kortet utgivet i euroområdet (andel 1 % av betalningarna) eller i övriga länder (andel 1 % av betalningarna). Kontaktlös betalning är det allmännaste betalningssättet också vid betalningar med utländska kort.

 

Kontantuttag via automat i Finland och utomlands

 

Med finländska kort gjordes kontantuttag i uttagsautomat i hemlandet till ett värde av sammanlagt 7,5 miljarder euro 2022. Som jämförelse gjordes 2021 uttag i uttagsautomater till ett värde av 6,6 miljarder euro och 2019 till ett värde av 10,3 miljarder euro. Med finländska kort gjordes 2022 kontantuttag från uttagsautomater utomlands till ett värde av sammanlagt 328 miljoner euro, vilket är nästan hälften mindre än åren 2017–2019 i genomsnitt.

Från finländska konton gjordes 1,2 miljarder betalningsöverföringar 2022. Det totala värdet av betalningsöverföringarna[3] var 4 071 miljarder euro, och av detta utgjorde andelen enskilda elektroniska betalningsöverföringar 81 %. Andelen betalningsöverföringar i anslutning till e-handel var 9 % av andelen enskilda elektroniska betalningsöverföringar.

De siffror som behandlas i detta meddelande har publicerats i en dashboard för betalningsstatistik.

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Tia Kurtti, telefon 09 183 2043, e-post: tia.kurtti(at)bof.fi,

Tuomas Nummelin, telefon 09 183 2373, e-post: tuomas.nummelin(at)bof.fi.

 

[1] Kortbaserade betalningstransaktioner betraktas som elektroniska, om de har initierats via en elektronisk betalterminal, bankautomat eller annan fysisk terminal som möjliggör elektroniska transaktioner eller som distanstransaktion med hjälp av elektronisk överföring. Kortbaserade betalningstransaktioner betraktas som icke-elektroniska, om de har initierats via en fysisk betalterminal med användning av manuell auktorisation (t.ex. kortdragare) eller via postorderförsäljning eller telefonförsäljning (MOTO).

[2] 50 euro är den största summan som Europeiska bankmyndigheten för närvarande godkänner för en enskild kontaktlös betalning med kort. För summor som överstiger gränsen för kontaktlös betalning krävs alltid att kortet matas in i betalterminalens kortläsare. Vid betalning med vissa mobilapplikationer gäller inte gränsen på 50 euro för kontaktlös betalning.

[3] Sedan 2022 ingår i betalningsöverföringar betalningar som hänför sig till värdepappershandel och avvecklingstjänster, vilket höjer värdet på betalningsöverföringarna jämfört med tidigare år.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/betalnings_new/2023/okningen-i-e-handeln-syntes-i-kortbetalningarna/ Statistik Fri, 03 Nov 2023 08:00:00 GMT
Hushållen har överfört sina tillgångar till inlåningskonton med högre ränta https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/monetara-finansinstituts-balansrakning_new/2023/hushallen-har-overfort-sina-tillgangar-till-inlaningskonton-med-hogre-ranta/ I och med att räntorna stigit har de finländska hushållens intresse för tidsbunden inlåning och placeringsdepositioner[1] ökat och intresset för inlåning över natten[2] minskat. Under januari–september 2023 har andelen för tidsbunden inlåning och placeringsdepositioner av hushållens totala inlåning ökat med nästan 7 procentenheter, när hushållen överfört sina finansiella tillgångar till inlåningskonton med högre ränta till ett värde av inemot 7 miljarder euro. Under motsvarande tid har tillgångarna på konton för inlåning över natten minskat med 8,5 miljarder euro.

Vid utgången av september 2023 utgjorde inlåningen från hushållen totalt 110,1 miljarder euro. Merparten av hushållens inlåning (74,6 miljarder euro) var inlåning över natten, som också omfattar transaktionskonton. Av inlåningen över natten var största delen[3] (49,2 miljarder euro) insättningar på konton med fast ränta, vars genomsnittsränta var 0 %. Vid utgången av september uppgick hushållens tillgångar i tidsbunden inlåning till 9 miljarder euro och placeringsdepositioner till 26,5 miljarder euro.

Vid utgången av september 2023 var den genomsnittliga räntan på hushållens inlåning 0,91 %, då den vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan var 0,05 %. I och med den högre räntenivån har skillnaderna i räntan på olika inlåningskonton ökat. I september var genomsnittsräntan på inlåning över natten 0,30 %, tidsbunden inlåning 2,30 % och placeringsdepositioner 2,15 %. Genomsnittsräntan på ny tidsbunden inlåning steg till 3,18 % i september och nya avtal om tidsbunden inlåning ingicks för 1,2 miljarder euro. Vid motsvarande tidpunkt för ett år sedan ingicks nya avtal till ett värde av 240 miljoner euro.

I statistiken har klassificeringen av inlåning som är förenad med restriktiva uttagsvillkor i många fall ändrats från inlåning över natten till placeringsdepositioner. Ändringen ökade mängden placeringsdepositioner och minskade inlåningen över natten. Historiska data har korrigerats från och med oktober 2022. De största klassificeringsändringarna i statistiken hänför sig till oktober 2022 och januari 2023. Se närmare uppgifter om ändringen av klassificeringen som gäller inlåning (Länk).

 

Vid utgången av september 2023 utgjorde inlåningen från hushållen 110,1 miljarder euro

 

Utlåning

De finländska hushållen lyfte i september 2023 nya bostadslån för 1,1 miljarder euro, vilket är 450 miljoner euro mindre än vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan. Av de nya utbetalda bostadslånen stod investeringsbostadslånen för 101 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på nya bostadslån steg från augusti och var 4,65 % i september. Det utestående beloppet av bostadslån uppgick vid slutet av september 2023 till 106,7 miljarder euro och årsökningen var -1,8 %. Investeringsbostadslånens andel av de utestående bostadslånen var 8,6 miljarder euro. Av utlåningen till de finländska hushållen bestod 17,1 miljarder euro av konsumtionskrediter och 17,8 miljarder euro av övriga lån vid utgången av september 2023.

De finländska företagen lyfte i september nya lån[4] för 1,8 miljarder euro, och av dem utgjorde bostadsbolagslånen 360 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på nya utbetalda företagslån sjönk från augusti och var i september 5,45 %. Det utestående beloppet av lån som beviljats finländska företag uppgick vid slutet av september till 106,1 miljarder euro, varav andelen lån till bostadsbolag utgjorde 43,6 miljarder euro.

 

Utlåning och inlåning till Finland, preliminär uppgift*
  Juli, mn euro Augusti, mn euro September, mn euro September, 12 mån förändring1, % Genomsnitts-ränta, %
Utlåning till hushåll, utestående belopp 141 675 141 676 141 596 -1,4 4,41
    - varav bostadslån 106 855 106 749 106 719 -1,8 3,86
    - varav investeringsbostadslån 8 622 8 640 8 650   4,05
Utlåning till icke-finansiella företag2, utestående belopp 105 263 105 407 106 100 0,4 4,57
Inlåning från hushåll, utestående belopp 109 878 109 278 110 110 -3,0 0,91
Nya utbetalda bostadslån till hushåll 1 005 1 139 1 131   4,65
    - varav investeringsbostadslån 86 112 101   4,79

* Omfattar utlåning och inlåning i alla valutor till Finland. I Finlands Banks statistikpublikationer till och med januari 2021 och i ECB:s statistikpublikationer presenteras utlåning och inlåning i euro för euroområdet och hushållen omfattar också hushållens icke-vinstsyftande organisationer, varför siffrorna i tabellen avviker från uppgifterna i dessa publikationer.
1 Den procentuella förändringen är beräknad på månatliga stockförändringar som är justerade för omklassificeringar och omvärderingar.  
2 Till de icke-finansiella företagen räknas bostadssammanslutningar.

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Markus Aaltonen, telefon 09 183 2395, e-post: markus.aaltonen(at)bof.fi,

Antti Hirvonen, telefon 09 183 2121, e-post: antti.hirvonen(at)bof.fi.

 

Nästa månadspublicering 30.11.2023 kl. 10.

 

Statistiksiffror och grafik som utgör underlag för meddelandet kan läsas på https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/.

 

[1] Placeringsdepositioner är inlåning med uppsägningstid. De har ingen överenskommen löptid (till skillnad från tidsbunden inlåning), men de kan tas ut i kontanter efter en viss uppsägningstid eller mot straffavgift (till skillnad från inlåning över natten). I denna kategori ingår också placeringskonton utan uppsägningstid eller överenskommen löptid men med restriktiva uttagsvillkor.

[2] Omfattar transaktionskonton och övriga konton, från vilka tillgångar kan tas ut eller överföras fritt.

[3] Överförbar inlåning över natten med fast ränta.

[4] Exkl. konto- och kortkrediter.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/monetara-finansinstituts-balansrakning_new/2023/hushallen-har-overfort-sina-tillgangar-till-inlaningskonton-med-hogre-ranta/ Statistik Tue, 31 Oct 2023 08:00:00 GMT
ECB-rådets beslut (utöver räntebeslut) https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/ecb-radets-beslut-utover-rantebeslut2/ ECB-rådets beslut (utöver räntebeslut) oktober 2023

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/ecb-radets-beslut-utover-rantebeslut2/ Nyhet Fri, 27 Oct 2023 13:00:00 GMT
Penningpolitiskt utlåtande https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/ECB-ordforandens-inledningsanforanden/2023/penningpolitiskt-utlatande6/ ECB:s presskonferens 26 oktober 2023

Christine Lagarde, ECB:s ordförande,
Luis de Guindos, ECB:s vice ordförande
Aten, den 26 oktober 2023

God eftermiddag, vice ordföranden och jag önskar er hjärtligt välkomna till vår presskonferens. Jag vill tacka centralbankschef Stournaras för hans gästfrihet och rikta ett särskilt tack till hans personal av den utmärkta organisationen för dagens sammanträde med ECB-rådet.

ECB-rådet har idag beslutat att hålla styrräntorna oförändrade. Den inkommande informationen bekräftar i stort sett vår tidigare bedömning av inflationsutsikterna på medellång sikt. Inflationen väntas fortsatt vara alltför hög under alltför lång tid och inhemskt pristryck fortsatt starkt. Samtidigt sjönk inflationen markant i september, även beroende på starka baseffekter, och de flesta måtten på underliggande inflation har fortsatt att lätta. Våra tidigare räntehöjningar fortsätter att med kraft slå igenom i finansieringsförhållandena. Detta dämpar alltmer efterfrågan vilket hjälper oss att få ner inflationen.

Vi är fast beslutna att se till att inflationen inom rimlig tid återgår till vårt medelfristiga tvåprocentsmål. Baserat på vår aktuella bedömning anser vi att ECB:s styrräntor är på nivåer som, om de upprätthålls under tillräckligt långt tid, kommer att utgöra att substantiellt bidrag i riktning mot det här målet. Våra framtida räntebeslut kommer att säkerställa att våra styrräntor sätts på tillräckligt restriktiva nivåer så länge som är nödvändigt.

Vi kommer att fortsätta att följa ett databeroende tillvägagångssätt för att fastställa vilken nivå som är lämplig och hur länge restriktionen ska bestå. Framför allt kommer våra räntebeslut att baseras på bedömning av inflationsutsikterna med beaktande av inkommande ekonomiska och finansiella data, dynamiken i underliggande inflation och styrkan i den penningpolitiska transmissionen.

Mer om dagens beslut finns i ett pressmeddelande på vår webbplats.

Jag kommer nu att mer i detalj beskriva hur vi tror att ekonomin och inflationen kommer att utvecklas och därefter förklara vår bedömning av de monetära och finansiella förhållandena.

Ekonomisk aktivitet

Ekonomin i euroområdet är fortsatt svag. Nya uppgifter tyder på att industriproduktionen har fortsatt nedåt. Dämpad utländsk efterfrågan och stramare finansieringsförhållanden tynger alltmer investeringar och konsumenternas efterfrågan. Även tjänstesektorn försvagas ytterligare. Detta beror huvudsakligen på att svagare industrikonjunktur spiller över till andra sektorer, impulserna från återöppning avtar och effekterna av högre räntor breddas. Ekonomin lär vara fortsatt svag under resten av det här året. Med när inflationen går ner ytterligt, hushållens reala inkomster återhämtar sig och efterfrågan på export från euroområdet åter tar fart torde ekonomin stärkas under kommande år.

Den ekonomiska aktiviteten har hittills fått stöd av den starka arbetsmarknaden. Arbetslösheten låg kvar på en historiskt låg nivå på 6,4 procent i augusti. Samtidigt finns emellertid tecken på att arbetsmarknaden försvagas. Färre nya arbetstillfällen skapas, även inom tjänstesektorn och detta visar att avkylningen av ekonomin gradvis får resultat på sysselsättningen.

Med avtagande energikris bör offentliga stödåtgärder fortsätta att avvecklas. Detta är viktigt för att undvika att driva upp inflationstrycket på medellång sikt, vilket annars skulle kräva en ännu stramare penningpolitik. Finanspolitik bör utformas så att vår ekonomi blir mer produktiv och att den höga statsskulden gradvis minskar. Strukturreformer och investeringar för att stärka euroområdets utbudskapacitet – som skulle stödjas om NGEU-programmet (Next Generation EU programme) till fullo implementerades – kan bidra till minskat pristryck på medellång sikt och samtidigt främja gröna och digitala övergångar. Således bör reformen av ramverket för EU:s ekonomiska styrning slutföras före årets slut och framsteg i riktning mot en kapitalmarknadsunion och färdigställandet av bankunionen accelereras.

Inflation

Inflationen sjönk till 4,3 procent i september, nästan en hel procentenhet lägre än i augusti. Inom den närmaste tiden kommer den troligen att gå ner ytterligare i och med att de kraftiga prisökningarna på energi och livsmedel som noterades under hösten 2022 försvinner ur årstakten. Nedgången i september var brett baserad. Livsmedelsinflationen blev åter långsammare även om den är hög historiskt sett. På årsbasis gick energipriserna ner med 4,6 procent men har åter stigit den senaste tiden och blivit mindre förutsägbara i och med de nya geopolitiska spänningarna.

Inflationen rensad från energi och livsmedel föll till 4,5 procent i september från 5,3 procent i augusti. Detta fall fick stöd av bättre utbudsförhållanden, genomslaget av tidigare nedgångar i energipriser och effekterna av stramare penningpolitik på efterfrågan och företagens prissättningskraft. Takten på varu- och tjänsteinflation föll kraftigt och landade på 4,1 respektive 4,7 procent varvid tjänsteinflationen också drogs ner av uttalade baseffekter. Pristrycket på turism och resande förefaller dämpas.

De flesta mått på underliggande inflation fortsatte att sjunka. Samtidigt är inhemskt pristryck fortsatt kraftigt, vilket även återspeglar den ökande betydelsen av stigande löner. Måtten på långfristiga inflationsförväntningar ligger i nuläget runt 2 procent. Vissa indikatorer är dock fortsatt förhöjda och måste övervakas noga.

Riskbedömning

Riskerna för den ekonomiska tillväxten ligger främst på nedåtsidan. Tillväxten kan också bli långsammare om effekterna av penningpolitiken visar sig mer kraftfulla än väntat. En svagare världsekonomi skulle också hämma den ekonomiska tillväxten Rysslands orättfärdiga krig mot Ukraina och den tragiska konflikt som utlösts av terroristattackerna i Israel är viktiga upphov till geopolitisk risk. Detta kan resultera i att företag och hushåll ser mer dystert och osäkert på framtiden samt ytterligare dämpa tillväxten. Omvänt skulle tillväxten kunna bli högre än beräknat om den fortsatt starka arbetsmarknaden och avtagande osäkerhet innebär att människor och företag känner mer tillförsikt och ger ut mer pengar, eller om världsekonomin växer starkare än väntat.

Uppåtriskerna för inflationen kan komma från högre energi- och livsmedelspriser. De förhöjda geopolitiska spänningarna kan driva upp energipriserna på kort sikt och göra utvecklingen på medellång sikt mer osäker. Extrema väderförhållanden och den pågående klimatkrisen i stort skulle kunna driva upp livsmedelspriserna mer än väntat. En ihållande ökning i inflationsförväntningarna över vårt mål eller högre löneökningar och vinstmarginaler än beräknat skulle också kunna driva upp inflationen, även på medellång sikt. Svagare efterfrågan, t.ex. som resultat av ett starkare penningpolitiskt genomslag eller ytterligare försämrat ekonomiskt klimat i resten av världen till följd av högre geopolitiska risker skulle däremot lätta pristrycket framför allt på medellång sikt.

Finansiella och monetära förhållanden

De långa räntorna har stigit rejält sedan vårt senaste sammanträde och återspeglar kraftiga ökningar i andra större ekonomier. Vår penningpolitik fortsätter att få kraftigt genomslag i bredare finansieringsförhållanden. Det har blivit allt dyrare för bankerna att finansiera sig och räntorna på företagslån och bolån steg åter i augusti, till 5,0 procent respektive 3,9 procent.

Högre låneräntor, tillsammans med nedskärningar i investeringsplaner och nedgångar i husköp, ledde till ytterligare kraftiga tapp i efterfrågan på krediter under det tredje kvartalet. Detta framgår i vår senaste enkätundersökning om bankernas utlåning. Dessutom stramades kreditstandarderna för lån till företag och hushåll åt ännu mer. Bankerna blir alltmer oroade över vilka risker som deras kunder står inför och är mindre villiga att själva ta dessa risker.

Mot denna bakgrund har kreditutvecklingen försvagats ytterligare. Den årliga ökningstakten i utlåning till företag har fallit kraftigt från 2,2 procent i juli till 0,7 procent i augusti och till 0,2 procent i september. Utlåningen till hushåll var fortsatt dämpad och tillväxttakten gick ner till 1,0 procent i augusti och 0,8 procent i september. I ett läge av svag utlåning och minskningen i Eurosystemets balansräkning sjönk den årliga tillväxttakten i det breda penningmängdsmåttet (M3) till - 1,3 procent i augusti – den lägsta nivån sedan euron infördes - och låg kvar på - 1,2 procent i september.

Slutsats

ECB-rådet har idag beslutat att hålla de tre styrräntorna oförändrade. Den inkommande informationen bekräftar i stort sett vår tidigare bedömning av inflationsutsikterna på medellång sikt. Inflationen väntas fortsatt vara alltför hög under alltför lång tid och inhemskt pristryck fortsatt starkt. Samtidigt sjönk inflationen markant i september, även beroende på starka baseffekter, och de flesta måtten på underliggande inflation har fortsatt att lätta. Våra tidigare räntehöjningar fortsätter att med kraft slå igenom i finansieringsförhållandena. Detta dämpar alltmer efterfrågan vilket bidrar till att få ner inflationen.

Vi är fast beslutna att se till att inflationen inom rimlig tid återgår till vårt medelfristiga tvåprocentsmål. Baserat på vår aktuella bedömning anser vi att ECB:s styrräntor är på nivåer som, om de upprätthålls under tillräckligt långt tid, kommer att utgöra att substantiellt bidrag i riktning mot vårt mål. Våra framtida räntebeslut kommer att säkerställa att ECB:s styrräntor sätts på tillräckligt restriktiva nivåer så länge som är nödvändigt för att säkerställa en återgång inom rimlig tid. Vi kommer att fortsätta att följa ett databeroende tillvägagångssätt för att fastställa vilken nivå som är lämplig och hur länge restriktionen ska bestå.

Under alla omständigheter står vi redo att inom ramen för vårt mandat vid behov justera alla våra instrument så att inflationen återgår till vårt medelfristiga mål och bevara en smidig transmission av penningpolitiken.

Vi är nu beredda att svara på era frågor.

Se den engelska versionen för den exakta formulering som ECB-rådet har enats om.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/ECB-ordforandens-inledningsanforanden/2023/penningpolitiskt-utlatande6/ ECB-tal Thu, 26 Oct 2023 15:00:00 GMT
Eurosystemets penningpolitiska beslut https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/eurosystemets-penningpolitiska-beslut8/ ECB:s pressmeddelande 26 oktober 2023

ECB-rådet har idag beslutat att hålla de tre styrräntorna oförändrade. Den inkommande informationen har i stort sett bekräftat dess tidigare bedömning av de medelfristiga inflationsutsikterna. Inflationen väntas fortsatt vara alltför hög under alltför lång tid och inhemskt pristryck fortsatt starkt. Samtidigt sjönk inflationen markant i september, även beroende på starka baseffekter, och de flesta måtten på underliggande inflation har fortsatt att lätta. ECB-rådets tidigare räntehöjningarna fortsätter att med kraft slå igenom i finansieringsförhållanden. Detta dämpar alltmer efterfrågan vilket bidrar till att få ner inflationen.

ECB-rådet är fast beslutet att se till att inflationen inom rimlig tid återgår till det medelfristiga 2-procentsmålet. Baserat på sin aktuella bedömning anser ECB-rådet att styrräntorna är på nivåer som, om de upprätthålls under tillräckligt långt tid, kommer att utgöra att substantiellt bidrag i riktning mot det här målet. ECB-rådets framtida räntebeslut kommer att säkerställa att styrräntorna sätts på tillräckligt restriktiva nivåer så länge som är nödvändigt.

ECB-rådet kommer att fortsätta att följa ett databeroende tillvägagångssätt för att fastställa vilken nivå som är lämplig och hur länge restriktionen ska bestå. Framför allt kommer ECB-rådets räntebeslut att baseras på bedömningen av inflationsutsikterna med beaktande av inkommande ekonomiska och finansiella data, dynamiken i underliggande inflation och styrkan i den penningpolitiska transmissionen.

ECB:s styrräntor

Räntan på de huvudsakliga refinansieringstransaktionerna och räntorna på marginalutlåningsfaciliteten och inlåningsfaciliteten förblir oförändrade på 4,50 %, 4,75 % respektive 4,00 %.

Programmet för köp av tillgångar (APP) och stödköpsprogrammet föranlett av pandemin (PEPP)

APP-portföljen minskar i en måttlig och förutsägbar takt eftersom Eurosystemet inte längre återinvesterar värdepapper som förfaller.

Vad gäller PEPP-programmet avser ECB-rådet att återinvestera förfall av värdepapper förvärvade inom det programmet fram till åtminstone slutet av 2024. I varje fall kommer den framtida utfasningen av PEPP-portföljen att hanteras så att den inte inverkar på lämplig penningpolitisk inriktning.

ECB-rådet kommer att fortsätta tillämpa flexibilitet vid återinvestering av kommande förfall i PEPP-portföljen i syfte att motverka risker mot transmissionsmekanismen relaterat till pandemin.

Refinansieringstransaktioner

Allt eftersom bankerna återbetalar belopp som upplånats under de riktade långfristiga refinansieringstransaktionerna kommer ECB-rådet regelbundet att granska hur riktade utlåningstransaktioner och relaterad pågående återbetalning bidrar till den penningpolitiska inriktningen.

***

ECB-rådet står redo att, inom ramen för sitt mandat, vid behov justera alla sina instrument så att inflationen återgår till 2-procentsmålet på medellång sikt och bevara en smidig välfungerande transmission av penningpolitiken. Instrumentet för transmissionsskydd finns också tillgängligt för att motverka oönskade, störande marknadskrafter som utgör ett allvarligt hot mot den penningpolitiska transmissionen i samtliga länder i euroområde och möjliggör för ECB-rådet att mer effektivt uppfylla sitt prisstabilitetsmandat.

ECB:s ordförande kommer att redogöra för de överväganden som ligger bakom dessa beslut vid en presskonferens som börjar kl. 14:45 (centraleuropeisk tid) idag.

Se den engelska versionen för den exakta formulering som ECB-rådet har enats om.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/eurosystemets-penningpolitiska-beslut8/ Nyhet Thu, 26 Oct 2023 12:15:00 GMT
En digital euro och en mobil lösning för omedelbara betalningar som en del av den digitaliserade ekonomins trygga framtid https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/en-digital-euro-och-en-mobil-losning-for-omedelbara-betalningar-som-en-del-av-den-digitaliserade-ekonomins-trygga-framtid/ ”När användningen av kontanter minskar, måste vi sörja för att hushållen också framöver har möjlighet att betala med centralbankspengar i ett allt mer digitaliserat samhälle”, säger Finlands Banks direktionsmedlem och medlemmen av ECB-rådet Tuomas Välimäki.

Finlands Bank främjar aktivt utvecklingen av nya betalningsformer

De två mest framträdande temana inom betalningsområdet är utnyttjande av digitalisering och betalningar i real tid. Betalningar förväntas vara effektiva, smidiga och sekundsnabba.

Den digitala euron är det mest aktuella projektet inom det europeiska betalningsfältet. En digital euro skulle utgöra ett nytt betalningssätt med digitala centralbankspengar som kan användas jämsides med kontanter. Den skulle stärka Europas strategiska oberoende inom dagliga betalningar och främja konkurrensen inom euroområdet.

Under den tvååriga undersökningsfasen, som upphör denna månad, har Eurosystemet identifierat många av den digitala eurons egenskaper. I likhet med sedlar skulle den digitala euron redovisas på centralbankens balansräkning som en skuld till allmänheten. Distributionen skulle ske via banker och betalningsinstitut. ”Det eventuella införandet av en digital euro skulle göra det möjligt för konsumenterna att betala med centralbankspengar överallt där elektroniska betalningar accepteras. I praktiken skulle konsumenterna kunna göra betalningstransaktioner med liknande instrument som de nu använder för elektroniska betalningar”, preciserar Välimäki.

På sitt sammanträde den 18 oktober 2023 beslutade ECB-rådet att gå vidare med projektet för en digital euro. Nu följer en tvåårig förberedelsefas som utgör ett konkret steg närmare en situation där Eurosystemet – om det så önskar – kan ge ut digitala kontanter i euro. ECB-rådet fattar beslut om en eventuell utgivning av en digital euro först längre fram.

Finlands Bank deltar också i ett annat projekt för digitala betalningar. På Betalningsrådets initiativ koordinerar banken utformningen av en ny finländsk lösning för omedelbara betalningar som är kompatibel med europeiska standarder. Utvecklingen av kontobaserade omedelbara betalningar ökar både massbetalningarnas konkurrenskraft och funktionssäkerhet och erbjuder ett nytt betalningssätt som fungerar enligt lika villkor och principer för alla.

”Finlands Banks mål är att komplettera utbudet av allmänt tillgängliga betalningssätt med en mobil lösning för mobila betalningar som är oberoende av betalkort”, konstaterar Välimäki.

Finlands Banks uppgift är att sörja för betalnings- och finanssystemets tillförlitlighet

Den finansiella sektorns motståndskraft mot cyberhot utgör ett väsentligt inslag i betalnings- och finanssystemens tillförlitlighet. Den finansiella sektorns förmåga att avvärja cyberhot ligger på en god nivå överlag, men det är viktigt att ytterligare förbättra beredskapen för hantering av föränderliga hotbilder. Finlands Bank verkar för att främja hela betalnings- och finanssystemets motståndskraft mot störningar.

I Finland bedrivs ett omfattande och dagligt beredskapsarbete för att säkerställa samhällskritiska funktioner. Företagen upprättar kontinuitets- och beredskapsplaner för att värna sin verksamhet.  Enskilda aktörers beredskapsarbete kan kompletteras genom ömsesidig samordning och gemensamma bereskapslösningar. Arbetet omfattar enskilda aktörer, branschen som helhet och samarbetet mellan de olika parterna.

Eurosystemets cyberstrategi bildar den primära referensramen för att skydda sig mot cyberhot på olika nivåer och med ändamålsenliga verktyg.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/en-digital-euro-och-en-mobil-losning-for-omedelbara-betalningar-som-en-del-av-den-digitaliserade-ekonomins-trygga-framtid/ Pressmeddelande Thu, 19 Oct 2023 08:00:00 GMT
Eurosystemet går vidare till nästa fas av projektet för en digital euro https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/eurosystemet-gar-vidare-till-nasta-fas-av-projektet-for-en-digital-euro/ ECB:s pressmeddelande 18 oktober 2023

  • ECB-rådet ska inleda förberedelsefasen för en digital euro efter det att den tvååriga undersökningsfasen avslutats om utformning och distribution av en digital euro
  • Förberedelsefasen kommer att lägga grunden för en potentiell digital euro, med arbete med att färdigställa regelboken och att välja ut leverantörer för utveckling av plattformar och infrastruktur
  • Förberedelsefasen kommer att bana väg för ett eventuellt framtida beslut om utgivning av en digital euro

ECB-rådet beslutade idag att gå vidare till nästa fas i projektet för en digital euro: förberedelsefasen.

Detta beslut följer på slutförandet av den undersökningsfas som Eurosystemet inledde i oktober 2021 för att undersöka möjliga utformnings- och distributionsmodeller för en digital euro. Baserat på resultaten från denna fas, som beskrivs i en rapport (engelska) som publiceras idag, har ECB utformat en digital euro som ska vara allmänt tillgänglig för privatpersoner och företag genom distribution av mellanhänder under tillsyn av, t.ex. banker.

Tanken är att den digitala euron ska vara en digital form av kontanter som kan användas för alla digitala betalningar i hela euroområdet. Den skulle vara allmänt tillgänglig utan kostnad för basanvändning och tillgänglig både online och off-line. Det skulle erbjuda högsta möjliga integritet och göra det möjligt för användarna att direkt avveckla betalningar i centralbankspengar. Den skulle kunna användas från person till person, på försäljningsställen, vid e-handel och i offentliga transaktioner. Inga digitala betalningsinstrument erbjuder alla dessa funktioner. En digital euro skulle fylla den luckan.

Nästa fas i projektet för en digital euro – förberedelsefasen –inleds den 1 november 2023 och kommer inledningsvis att pågå i två år. Detta inbegriper att färdigställa regelboken för en digital euro och att välja ut leverantörer som kan utveckla en plattform och infrastruktur för en digital euro. Den kommer även att omfatta tester och experiment för att utveckla en digital euro som uppfyller både Eurosystemets krav och användarnas behov, t.ex. vad gäller användarerfarenhet, integritetsskydd, finansiell inkludering och miljöavtryck. ECB kommer att fortsätta att samarbeta med allmänheten och alla intressenter under denna fas. Efter två år kommer ECB-rådet att besluta om man ska gå vidare till nästa etapp i förberedelserna för att bana väg för en eventuell framtida utgivning och lansering av en digital euro.

Starten av förberedelsefasen är inget beslut om huruvida en digital euro ska ges ut. Det beslutet kommer inte att behandlas av ECB-rådet förrän Europeiska unionens lagstiftningsprocess har avslutats. ECB kommer att ta hänsyn till eventuella ändringar i utformningen av den digitala euron som kan bli nödvändiga till följd av lagstiftningsöverläggningarna.

”Vi behöver förbereda vår valuta för framtiden”, sade Christine Lagarde, ECB:s ordförande. ”Vi ser en digital euro som en digital form av kontanter som kan användas kostnadsfritt för alla digitala betalningar och som uppfyller högsta integritetsstandarder. Den skulle samexistera vid sidan av fysiska kontanter, som alltid kommer att vara tillgängliga och ingen kommer att lämnas på efterkälken.”

Med en digital euro skulle dataskydd prioriteras. Eurosystemet skulle inte kunna se användarnas personuppgifter eller koppla betalningsinformation till privatpersoner. Den digitala euron skulle även uppnå en nivå av integritetsskydd för betalningar off-line som liknar kontanter.

Den digitala euron skulle främja motståndskraft, konkurrens och innovation i den europeiska betalningssektorn. Den skulle säkerställa att det finns en paneuropeisk betalningslösning för euroområdet under europeisk styrning. Den skulle förlita sig på sin egen infrastruktur, vilket skulle stärka motståndskraften. Detta skulle också utgöra en plattform där de europeiska mellanhänder som står under tillsyn skulle kunna bygga upp alleuropeiska tjänster för sina kunder, öka effektiviteten, sänka kostnaderna och främja innovation.

”Eftersom människor allt oftare väljer att betala digitalt bör vi vara redo att ge ut en digital euro jämsides med kontanter”, sade Fabio Panetta, ledamot i ECB:s direktion och ordförande i högnivågruppen för en digital euro. ”En digital euro skulle göra europeiska betalningar effektivare och bidra till Europas strategiska oberoende.”

Distribution av digitala euro

Användarna kunde få tillgång till digitala eurotjänster via sina betaltjänstleverantörers egen app och onlinegränssnitt eller via en digital euroapp som tillhandahålls av Eurosystemet. Personer utan tillgång till ett bankkonto eller digital utrustning skulle också kunna betala med en digital euro, t.ex. med hjälp av ett kort som tillhandahålls av ett offentligt organ, t.ex. ett postkontor. Användarna skulle också kunna växla in en digital euro mot kontanter eller vice versa i uttagsautomater.

Eurosystemet ser fram emot en digital euro som skulle vara fri för grundläggande användning för privatpersoner. En kompensationsmodell mellan mellanhänder och handlare skulle säkerställa att det finns incitament för mellanhänder att distribuera digitala euro, vilket är fallet för andra elektroniska betalningsinstrument, och att det finns lämpliga skyddsåtgärder mot alltför höga serviceavgifter för handlare. Eurosystemet skulle bära sina egna kostnader, även de som hänger samman med systemets förvaltning och avveckling.

Öppenhet och nära samarbete med berörda parter är fortfarande viktiga delar av projektet. Eurosystemet har dragit stor nytta av återkoppling från europeiska beslutsfattare, marknadsaktörer och potentiella användare och kommer att fortsätta att aktivt samverka med en mängd olika intressenter. Vi kommer också att fortsätta sitt nära samarbete med EU:s lagstiftare.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/eurosystemet-gar-vidare-till-nasta-fas-av-projektet-for-en-digital-euro/ Nyhet Wed, 18 Oct 2023 13:42:00 GMT
Account of the ECB Governing Council’s monetary policy meeting, 13-14 September 2023 https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/account-of-the-ecb-governing-councils-monetary-policy-meeting-13-14-september-2023/ Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on Wednesday and Thursday, 13-14 September 2023

1. Review of financial, economic and monetary developments and policy options

Financial market developments

Ms Schnabel noted that, since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting on 26-27 July 2023, investors’ growth outlook for the euro area and for the United States had continued to diverge, widening the gap in both nominal and real yields between the two economies and driving the euro lower against the dollar. Despite the expected deceleration in the euro area’s growth momentum, market expectations for inflation in the medium and longer term had edged up further. Torn between the perception of a weakening euro area economy and stubborn inflation, expectations for the peak deposit facility rate and the shape of the forward rate curve had remained broadly unchanged.

Long-term sovereign yields had risen across major advanced economies, but the increase had been more muted in economies where there had been negative macroeconomic surprises, such as in the euro area. Regarding the impact of these developments on exchange rate markets, the euro had depreciated markedly against the US dollar but only slightly in nominal effective terms, on account of the widespread weakness of other currencies.

A decomposition of nominal one-year yields in the euro area and the United States into real rates and the inflation component showed that the difference in the macroeconomic outlook had been reflected in a stark divergence of real rates across the two economies. Investors priced future one-year euro area real rates lower over the next four years, while the strength of the US economy had pushed investor expectations of future one-year US real rates significantly higher. At the same time, despite the weakening cyclical outlook, euro investors had increased the inflation compensation they demanded over the near and medium-term horizons.

Rising inflation-linked swap (ILS) rates partly reflected an upward revision of investors’ core inflation expectations. Market-implied pricing of euro area genuine synthetic core inflation expectations – that is synthetic core expectations adjusted for risk premia – suggested that market participants had revised up their core inflation expectations from May 2023. Market-based measures of longer-term headline inflation compensation in the euro area had also continued to edge higher. While the continued rise in inflation risk premia accounted for most of the increase in inflation compensation, genuine long-term inflation expectations had also shown a small uptick.

With weakening domestic economic activity and sticky inflation, monetary policy rate expectations in the euro area had remained by and large unchanged since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting. Respondents to the ECB Survey of Monetary Analysts continued to expect a peak deposit facility rate of 4%, to be reached only in October 2023. For September 2023, respondents were almost evenly split, with a slight majority of 53% expecting a pause and 47% expecting another interest rate hike.

The overall amount of rate-cutting priced in from the peak over the course of 2024 was only slightly higher than that expected at the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting. The weakening economic developments had hence not prompted investors to expect a quicker reversal of monetary policy. Instead, investors remained positioned for policy rates to stay at peak levels for an extended period of time. In other words, the shape of the forward curve suggested market participants did not seem to expect a severe recession, which was consistent with the resilience of most risk assets during the current tightening cycle. Sovereign bond spreads had largely withstood the downward revision of the near-term growth momentum and had widened only slightly since the previous meeting. Greek sovereign bonds had outperformed on the back of expected and materialising rating upgrades. Corporate bond spreads had also ticked up but remained below 2022 levels.

In contrast, euro area equity prices had generally declined since the Governing Council’s July meeting, driven, to a significant degree, by a decompression of risk premia over recent weeks. Still, stock prices had been very resilient since the beginning of the tightening cycle, with diverging drivers for non-financial and financial firms. While the shares of non-financial corporations had benefited mostly from a compression of risk premia consistent with improving investor risk sentiment, as well as from dividend pay-outs and share buybacks, their longer-term earnings expectations and higher interest rates had had a dampening effect. For financial firms, stock prices had benefited from higher earnings expectations, as well as from strong dividend pay-outs and share buybacks.

The general resilience of risk assets had been supported by the gradual decline in volatility, on the back of perceptions that the global tightening cycle might be nearing its end. A second explanation for the resilience of risk assets could be that markets were pricing in an increasing probability that the pass-through from tighter financial conditions to growth could be nearing its peak. Financial conditions had tightened sharply in 2022 but had since tightened only moderately. Considering standard lags in the transmission of financial conditions to economic activity, this would suggest that the drag on growth from the tighter conditions was currently likely to be large but could start receding relatively soon. A third explanation of the resilience in risk assets was related to the less pronounced tightening of long-term rates. Nominal longer-term yields had hovered around 3% since October 2022, suggesting that there had been hardly any tightening impulse from the longer end of the curve for almost a year, with term premia remaining compressed. Euro area real rates had also remained by and large unchanged since December 2022 and stood visibly below the peak reached in October 2022.

Developments in commodity markets since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting illustrated the upside risks to inflation. Oil prices, at USD 91 per barrel, had reached their highest level in ten months after OPEC+ producers agreed to extend their supply cuts for the rest of the year. European gas prices had also increased markedly since the July meeting and had shown increased sensitivity to supply outages. Finally, upside risks to inflation could also emanate from food prices, which could react with a lag to this year’s extreme weather events caused by climate change and amplified by El Niño.

In money markets, non-monetary policy deposits had continued to decline since the 26-27 July meeting. Secured money market rates had been broadly unchanged amid limited volatility, suggesting that there was no downward pressure in repo markets from scarcity concerns. Three-month asset swap spreads had narrowed notably since May 2023, as collateral scarcity concerns had receded amid increasing sovereign debt issuance and more balanced positioning. The unsecured money market had also been broadly stable after the change to the remuneration of minimum reserves.

The global environment and economic and monetary developments in the euro area

Mr Lane then went through the latest economic, monetary and financial developments in the global economy and the euro area. The present meeting offered the opportunity to take stock of what had been learnt over the summer. Starting with the international environment, global growth had been supported by services during spring 2023. Its momentum had then started to soften in the second quarter, owing to a growth slowdown in both China, which had slipped back after its post-pandemic reopening, and Japan. Global economic activity had slowed further in the third quarter, but this did not result in a huge slump. It had rather fallen back towards its long-term average. However, the importance of global activity for the euro area was primarily through trade, and global trade in goods had seen a protracted period of decline owing to the ongoing rotation from goods to services, which were less trade-intensive.

Turning to the euro area economic outlook, Mr Lane recalled that in August the flash estimate for annual Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) inflation had remained unchanged at its July level of 5.3%. The decline in inflation had been interrupted owing to the recent jump in energy prices, as the annual inflation rate for energy had risen to -3.3% in August from -6.1% in July. The upward shift in energy price expectations would affect the dynamics of headline inflation in the coming months. Food price inflation had come down from its peak of 15.5% in March but had still been almost 10% in August.

Annual inflation excluding energy and food had fallen to 5.3% in August from 5.5% in July. The non-energy industrial goods inflation rate had declined to 4.8%, since past energy price surges were receding and supply bottlenecks were being resolved. Services inflation had edged down to 5.5% but remained elevated in August, owing to still strong dynamics in tourist-related services and wage pressures.

Overall, the moderation in core inflation was in line with a continued softening in underlying inflation, which reflected the fading impact of previous supply side shocks, a fall in demand-supply mismatches and the gradual pass-through of energy price disinflation. In the coming months, the sharp price increases recorded in the autumn of 2022 would drop out of the yearly rates, thus pulling inflation down.

The momentum of HICP inflation, measured as the annualised rate of the three-month-over-three-month change in the HICP, had been around 3% in August 2023. In other words, the 5.3% outcome was largely the legacy of carry-over effects. This 3% momentum had been helped by still negative momentum for energy inflation. For food inflation, the momentum had been 4%, significantly lower than the annual rate of inflation of around 10%. For the core components, it was possible to observe a significant drop in the momentum of goods inflation during 2023 but a much smaller decline in the momentum of services inflation.

Most indicators of underlying inflation continued to fall, reflecting the fading impact of previous shocks and supply bottlenecks. “Decontaminated” measures, i.e. measures of underlying inflation corrected for past supply shocks, also showed a further, small decline in recent months. While, overall, not all the measures of underlying inflation showed a further, substantial downward adjustment, those that were the best predictors of future inflation were at the lower range of all the measures and continued to decline considerably, with the exception of domestic inflation.

The analysis of pipeline pressures showed a continued downward adjustment upstream in the production chain for both food and goods inflation. It remained the case that the reduction in consumer food inflation had been minor compared with the evolution of the producer price index. The downward pressures from producer prices were expected to start kicking in more substantially as of autumn. However, climate change events and the succession of natural disasters were increasing the risks of price increases in food commodities, feeding into risks of higher food inflation.

For goods, the significant downward correction in pipeline pressures, in particular in import prices for intermediate and non-food consumer goods, was also expected to exert further downward pressure on HICP goods inflation in the coming months.

Services inflation had remained persistently high, largely reflecting the effects of past energy shocks and the post-pandemic reopening. Inflation in the contact-intensive and energy-sensitive categories was still making the largest contribution to total services inflation and had not yet shown signs of a turnaround, with annual price changes remaining around 8%. By contrast, inflation in the non-contact-intensive services categories was significantly lower.

In line with projections from previous rounds, wage pressures had remained elevated in the second quarter of the year. With some decline in the accumulated real wage loss and lower inflation, wage growth should decelerate over time. Mr Lane noted that there was a seasonal pattern in wages, as most contracts were renewed at the start of the year. In other words, the compensation per employee data for the first quarter of 2024 would give an important signal as to whether or not the euro area was on a disinflationary wage path. Until then, it was likely that any additional data would provide little information on the expected path of wages, with uncertainty expected to remain large for some time.

The contribution of unit profits to annual inflation, as defined by the GDP deflator, in the first half of 2023, had moderated relative to its contribution in 2022, suggesting that the rising wage pressures were starting to be absorbed by firms. Most measures of longer-term inflation expectations currently stood at around 2%, although some indicators had increased and needed to be monitored closely.

The September ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area saw headline inflation higher than previously expected for 2023 and 2024, driven by higher energy prices, but lower for 2025 owing to the appreciation of the euro, tighter financing conditions and greater economic slack. Headline inflation was expected to decrease from 8.4% in 2022 to an average of 5.6% for 2023, 3.2% for 2024 and 2.1% for 2025. At the same time, staff had revised down their projections for inflation excluding energy and food for 2024 and 2025, in line with the weaker growth prospects and the appreciation of the euro over the last year. They now saw it reaching 5.1% in 2023, before falling to 2.9% in 2024 and 2.2% in 2025. After the cut-off date, part of the appreciation of the euro embedded in the September projections had reversed. However, the past appreciation was still feeding through into the euro area economy owing to its lagged impact.

Focusing on the fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter percentage changes, which allowed the impact of carry-over effects to be cleaned from the data, it was possible to see that the HICP was only revised upwards in the fourth quarter of 2023. HICP inflation was projected to be 0.4 percentage points higher in the fourth quarter of 2023 than in the fourth quarter of 2024, and no extra inflation momentum was expected in 2024.

Upside risks to inflation included potential renewed upward pressures on the costs of energy and food. Adverse weather conditions, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could push food prices up by more than expected. A lasting rise in inflation expectations above the 2% target, or higher than anticipated increases in wages or profit margins, could also drive inflation higher, including over the medium term. By contrast, weaker demand – for example owing to a stronger transmission of monetary policy or a worsening of the economic environment outside the euro area – would lead to lower price pressures, especially over the medium term.

Euro area economic growth had broadly stagnated over the first half of 2023, while the composite output Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) had fallen in August – at the fastest rate in nearly three years – to a level of 46.7. Manufacturing output was set to remain weak in view of the further moderation in export demand and tight financing conditions, while the past support from order backlogs was declining. Services had so far contributed positively to growth owing to higher demand in contact-intensive categories, but there had been clear signs of a slowdown since June. The worsening of survey indicators had led to a reassessment of the GDP outlook for the second half of 2023. According to the September staff projections, real GDP was expected to stagnate in the third quarter of 2023 and to increase by 0.1% in the fourth quarter.

As regards domestic demand, private consumption had stagnated, while housing investment had contracted in the second quarter, having been on a declining path for most of the past year. Residential building permits, a leading indicator of housing investment, had also fallen in the second quarter and firms’ assessment of their order books had become more downbeat for the third quarter, pointing to a further contraction in housing investment in the period ahead. Higher interest rates had already had a visible impact on this demand component. Business investment growth excluding volatile Irish intellectual property products had moderated significantly in the second quarter, and survey indicators from the European Commission and the PMI for capital goods output were indicating a decline in the second half of the year.

In the near term, private consumption was expected to remain weak, while housing investment and business investment were expected to decline, driven in part by the monetary policy tightening. Over time, economic momentum was expected to pick up, as real incomes were expected to rise, supported by falling inflation, rising wages and a strong labour market, and this would underpin consumer spending. However, activity levels would be dampened as the monetary policy tightening and adverse credit supply conditions increasingly fed through to the real economy. The expected gradual withdrawal of fiscal support was also likely to weigh on economic growth in the coming quarters.

The labour market had so far remained resilient in the face of the slowing economy but showed signs of losing momentum. The unemployment rate had stayed at its historical low of 6.4% in July. While employment had grown by 0.2% in the second quarter, the latest survey data suggested that it had come close to stalling. The strong demand for labour had also started to moderate, with indicators of job vacancy rates edging down over recent months. The growth of the labour force, which had been the main source of employment growth, had slowed in the past few months. Owing to the weaker economic activity, the September projections embedded a lower increase in employment and an increase in unemployment over the projection horizon, which had still been expected to decline further in the June projections. Recent PMI indicators confirmed the slowing of momentum in employment growth, which was particularly notable in the services sectors.

Turning to the fiscal outlook, the September projections incorporated relatively limited changes, with fiscal projections highly uncertain as governments had yet to decide on budgets for next year. Still, on the basis of governments’ intentions, the fiscal projections implied a significant improvement from 2023 to 2024 in the cyclically adjusted primary balance.

In the September staff projections annual average real GDP growth was projected at 0.7% for 2023 (down from 3.4% in 2022), 1.0% for 2024 and 1.5% for 2025. In particular, the September staff projections embedded a significant downward revision in both housing and business investment for 2024 and 2025, in view of the tighter financing conditions and credit supply effects.

Economic growth could be slower if the effects of monetary policy were more forceful than expected, or if the world economy weakened, for instance owing to a further slowdown in China. Conversely, growth could be higher than projected if the strong labour market, rising real incomes and receding uncertainty meant that people and businesses became more confident and spent more.

Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, euro area banks had remained well capitalised over the second quarter of 2023 and had recorded good net interest income and moderate provisioning costs. The improvement in capital/asset ratios was on account of lower total assets, the latter driven by weakening loan dynamics and shrinking liquidity.

Bank funding costs continued to increase, mainly on account of higher deposit and money market rates. The gradual shift of funds away from overnight deposits and towards time deposits was exerting further upward pressure on funding costs. The ECB’s interest rate hikes had increased the attractiveness of longer-term deposits relative to overnight deposits. At the same time, the reduction in central bank funding was leading banks to increasingly rely on debt security issuance.

The monetary policy tightening continued to be transmitted strongly to financing conditions and was increasingly affecting the broader economy. For new business, lending rates had increased and credit volumes had contracted further. For firms, the cost of bank borrowing had continued to increase steeply, reaching 4.9% in July, the highest level since 2008. For households, the composite mortgage rate remained on an upward trajectory and had exceeded 3.7% in July, the highest level since early 2012.

The credit supply channel remained active. The latest bank lending survey pointed to differences in transmission across corporate sectors, with real estate and construction firms experiencing a more substantial tightening of credit standards and weakening of demand than manufacturing and services firms.

Lending to firms and households had remained weak in June and July amid a further tightening of credit standards and higher bank funding costs. July had seen a negative flow of €7 billion in loans to households, which was the lowest on record. Substantial monetary policy tightening was still expected to be passed through to bank rates in the coming months, as more fixed rate loans would expire and banks would face rising funding costs as more savers migrated to term deposits and higher-yielding bank bonds. In line with the decrease in credit creation, the annual growth rate of M3 had turned negative in July (-0.4%) for the first time since 2010 and was expected to decline further in the coming months.

Monetary policy considerations and policy options

On the basis of the assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission, Mr Lane proposed that the Governing Council raise the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points, in order to reinforce progress towards the 2% medium-term inflation target.

The incoming data had largely validated the Governing Council’s previous assessment of the inflation outlook, while most measures of underlying inflation had started to ease. Furthermore, the evidence indicated that the transmission of monetary policy to broader financing conditions and the real economy was firmly taking hold. The economic slowdown since mid-2022 was set to continue in the near term, and the level of GDP at the end of the projection horizon would be considerably lower than previously expected. The resulting additional economic slack would further contribute to the disinflation process, while a significant portion of the tightening from past rate hikes was still in the pipeline.

A range of model-based simulations suggested that a deposit facility rate in the region of 3.75% to 4.00%, so long as it was understood as being maintained for a sufficiently long duration, should be consistent with a return of inflation to target within the projection horizon. The views of external experts were also clustered in this interval, which also matched market pricing.

In view of the uncertainty surrounding model-based simulations, expert surveys and market indicators, the choice between holding the deposit facility rate at 3.75% and moving to 4.00% was finely balanced. However, at the margin, it was safer to decide on an additional hike, given the highly uncertain environment and the significant disinflation that was still required to return to the inflation target in a timely manner.

An additional hike would reinforce progress towards the target for two basic reasons. First, if the economy evolved in line with the staff baseline case, the decision to hike would bolster confidence that inflation would return to target within the projection horizon. Second, a higher interest rate would more strongly limit the amplification of any upside shocks to the inflation path. In consequence, a more secure pace of disinflation and greater insurance against upside risks would also reinforce the anchoring of inflation expectations, which remained a precondition for the disinflation process to keep up its pace.

With this decision, the key policy rates would have been raised by a cumulative 450 basis points over the last ten meetings. On the basis of the current assessment, the Governing Council should consider that the key policy rates were in a range of levels that, maintained for a sufficiently long duration, would make a substantial contribution to the timely return of inflation to the target. The Governing Council’s future decisions would ensure that the key ECB interest rates would be set at sufficiently restrictive levels for as long as necessary. At the same time, the high level of two-sided uncertainty around the baseline meant that the Governing Council should remain data-dependent in determining the appropriate level and duration of restrictiveness in its monetary stance.

Finally, preserving the option to apply flexibility to pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) reinvestments as a first line of defence against fragmentation risks continued to be warranted.

2. Governing Council’s discussion and monetary policy decisions

Economic, monetary and financial analyses

As regards the external environment, members took note of the downward revision of the ECB staff projection for euro area foreign demand, with negative economic surprises for China partly offset by positive surprises in the United States. In this context, it was recalled that the growth performance of the Chinese economy would likely have repercussions for global commodity prices and was thus a risk factor for the euro area inflation outlook. Attention was also drawn to continued high geopolitical risks, which implied an exceptional degree of uncertainty around the outlook for global economic activity and inflation, notably with respect to energy and food.

Turning to commodity markets, oil prices had increased significantly following Saudi Arabia’s and Russia’s extension of their production cuts for the rest of the year. At the same time, different views were expressed as to how persistent the impact of these shocks would be.

On the one hand, it was argued that a real transformation was taking place in energy markets, as suppliers were trying to maximise their revenues through production cuts, in view of the global energy transition. This could put persistent upward pressure on energy prices for years to come. Moreover, it was pointed out that climate change could bring with it a series of new adverse supply-side shocks, with a much greater frequency of extreme weather events resulting in the destruction of harvests and agricultural land. This would likely affect mostly energy and food prices, which tended to be particularly salient for consumers, implying an outsized effect on households’ inflation expectations and, hence, wage negotiations.

On the other hand, the view was expressed that the increase in oil prices, or at least part of the increase, might turn out to be temporary, for three reasons. First, the increase was due to a supply cut by Russia and Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to avoid a fall in revenues due to a possible weakening of global oil demand. Second, global trade in goods was decelerating, and the production of goods was more energy-intensive than the provision of services. Third, demand for oil was likely to weaken significantly in light of the deceleration of the Chinese economy. Moreover, the latest energy shock could also be seen as an aftershock following a larger disruption. It was clearly much smaller than the energy shock in 2021-22, which had very much been a reflection of two main issues: the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine. In this context, caution was expressed about developments in the European gas markets, where volatility had increased and price levels were higher and more vulnerable to upside moves than in other major economies. It was also recalled that in a context in which energy and food supply shocks were dominating, irrespective of their persistence, differentiating between price-level and inflation shocks was important.

With regard to economic activity in the euro area, members concurred with Mr Lane that growth was likely to remain subdued in the coming months. It had broadly stagnated over the first half of the year, and recent indicators suggested it had also been weak or even contracted in the third quarter. Lower demand for the euro area’s exports and the impact of tight financing conditions were dampening activity, including through lower investment. The services sector, which had so far been resilient, was now also weakening. Over time, economic momentum should pick up, as real incomes were expected to rise – supported by falling inflation, rising wages and a strong labour market – and this would underpin consumer spending. The labour market had so far remained resilient despite the slowing economy. However, the services sector, which had been a major driver of employment growth since mid-2022, was now creating fewer jobs.

Members widely acknowledged the weaker than expected growth prospects in the short term. Business sentiment indicators, namely the PMIs, were signalling a fragile economic outlook, with the slowdown in China and higher energy prices likely to exert downward pressure on economic activity. The weakening in activity implied that the economy was flirting with a recession. While soft indicators had become less reliable than in the past, the sheer size of their deterioration was such that the information content about the outlook was still significant. Hard data had also clearly been disappointing, even if they were assessed as being more resilient than the early estimates for the third quarter. Since the fourth quarter of 2022 quarterly GDP growth had essentially been flat. The preliminary indications for the third quarter of 2023 were that GDP growth would again be much lower than foreseen. Financial market expectations for growth were also deteriorating, as indicated by the negative slope of the yield curve.

Weak incoming data were also the main reason why the ECB staff projections had been revised downwards. The size of the revision in the growth projections was seen as very significant, with a cumulative downward revision of close to 1% in the level of GDP at the end of the projection horizon. This was nearly as large as the downward revision in June 2022, when the estimated effect of Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine (-1.2%) was first incorporated into the projections. The latest revisions were mainly concentrated in the third and fourth quarters of 2023, as the projections for quarterly growth in 2024 and 2025 were basically the same as in the June Eurosystem staff projections. Taking into account Eurostat’s downward revision, to 0.1%, of growth in the second quarter of 2023 – compared with the initial estimate of 0.3% included in the September ECB staff projections – would mechanically lead to lower growth for the current year. In addition, nowcasting models were suggesting a lower growth rate than contained in the baseline for the third quarter of the year, so the risks to growth in 2023 were seen as being on the downside.

It was widely felt that, with hindsight, the June projections had been too optimistic about the strength of the economic recovery in 2023. Notably, it was maintained that the projections for consumption and investment seemed too optimistic at a time when the contribution of net trade to economic growth was close to zero. According to the PMIs, the contraction in manufacturing had spread to the services sector. This was noteworthy, as during the summer the services sector had appeared to be very buoyant as far as tourism was concerned, but it suggested that other parts of the services sector might now experience weaker activity. In addition, it was argued that stronger than expected monetary transmission could explain part of the downward revision to growth, as it seemed that the sectors that could be expected to be more affected by monetary policy were those that were indeed growing less.

Looking ahead, optimism about a rebound in private consumption embodied in the baseline beyond 2023 might be questioned, given a prolonged deceleration in annual credit growth. The credit channel was seen as especially relevant for housing and business investment, where activity had been decelerating significantly over the past quarters and had indeed been revised down sharply over the projection horizon. The weakening outlook for investment incorporated into the projections was seen as worrying, given the need for public and private investment in Europe related to the green transition and digitalisation. However, it was also argued that the projected weakening in investment was largely explained by staff judgement on the effects of tighter credit supply conditions, the importance of which could be questioned. The adverse effects on investment from ever tighter monetary policy could also weigh on productivity growth and ultimately push up unit labour costs in a vicious circle. In addition, there was evidence that a large share of monetary tightening was still in the pipeline, and it was argued that this could compress demand more than was currently projected. At the same time, the point was made that most of the financial tightening had already happened in 2022, which could imply that the tightening impact could soon reach its peak.

Overall, it was nevertheless felt that it remained reasonable to expect a gradual economic recovery to take hold, thanks to a recovery in people’s real incomes from rising wages and a strong labour market, and this would underpin consumer spending. In this context, it was recalled that the projected economic recovery was not inconsistent with a growing impact of monetary tightening next year, as this was still a recovery from essentially five quarters of near-zero growth.

The question was also raised as to what extent the current economic slowdown was purely of a cyclical nature. There were signs that the trend in productivity had shifted downwards, which could, at least in part, be permanent. It was also conceivable that the higher level and volatility of energy prices might be permanently scarring parts of the economy. Distinguishing between energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive industries, the weakening in growth was mostly coming from the energy-intensive parts of the economy, which could point to underlying structural drivers. A structural slowdown of this nature would affect potential output and the assessment of economic slack, and ultimately have an upward impact on inflation. In this context, it was mentioned that, while the latest revisions to the outlook for activity and inflation could be labelled as stagflationary, labour market conditions were much more favourable than in the 1970s, when the term had been coined.

Turning to the labour market, it was noted that the September projections now entailed a limited increase in the unemployment rate, in contrast to the continued decline that had still been embedded in the June projections, with labour markets nonetheless remaining relatively tight throughout the horizon. Looking at the sacrifice ratio, which measures the cost of reducing inflation in terms of output and employment, implicit in the projections, the cost of bringing down a significant inflation surge in the form of an increase in unemployment looked remarkably favourable. Overall, it seemed fair to say that the projections were still in line with a soft landing. At the same time, it was pointed out that current indicators and a benign outlook of a (nearly) “immaculate disinflation” should not lead to complacency about the strength of the labour market. The point was made that, during recessions, the decline in employment was typically achieved through a reduction in hiring, not through increased firing. The current slowdown in new hires should thus be seen as a negative signal, requiring further attention. Moreover, it was remarked that, while employment had remained strong so far, this was in part due to the continued presence of job retention schemes. These schemes made it convenient for firms to hold on to cheap and less productive labour. However, this would not last if economic activity failed to pick up, in which case firms would shift from labour hoarding to labour shedding. For the time being, the labour market was, overall, still seen as tight from a cyclical perspective. However, it was arguably also being affected by structural changes, such as a reduction in the average number of hours worked.

As for the real estate market, it was highlighted that, following the tightening of monetary policy, the number of transactions had fallen significantly, while the adjustment in real estate prices had so far remained fairly muted. In this context it was pointed out that, in some countries, real estate transactions had already started to pick up again, presumably owing to reduced uncertainty about the future interest rate path. Indeed, while there had been a massive adjustment of mortgage rates earlier on, they had remained more or less stable at this higher level for quite some time, so households again felt confident in entering the housing market.

Against this background, members assessed that the risks to economic growth were tilted to the downside. Growth could be slower if the effects of monetary policy were more forceful than expected or if the world economy weakened, for instance owing to a further slowdown in China. Conversely, growth could be higher than projected if the strong labour market, rising real incomes and receding uncertainty meant that people and businesses became more confident and spent more.

With regard to price developments, members broadly concurred with the assessment presented by Mr Lane and underlined that, while headline inflation had declined, inflation was still expected to be too high for too long, with headline inflation for 2023 and 2024 in the September staff projections being revised upwards from the June projections. The first time inflation was foreseen to fall below 2% was only at the end of 2025, which was regarded as very late and appeared to be driven by a base effect for energy inflation. Moreover, the gradual disinflation path entailed in the September projections was seen as still being fragile and conditional on a number of benign assumptions, namely a turnaround in wage pressures, a compression of unit profits and a declining path for energy prices. It was also observed that a mechanical update to the projections to include the higher oil prices and weaker euro observed since the cut-off date suggested that headline inflation would no longer fall below the ECB’s target by the end of the horizon.

In a context of recurrent underestimations of inflation over the past year, and despite a more clouded outlook for the real economy, there still appeared to be significant upward pressures on inflation. Especially in view of recent developments in the energy market, it was too early to consider the projected disinflation process as being entrenched. According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, headline inflation had surprised to the upside in August, remaining at a still very high level. This had contributed to an upward revision in the September staff inflation projections, together with other factors such as less favourable energy price assumptions. Despite the weakening of the economy, the inflation data did not yet give sufficient comfort that inflation would return to target in a timely manner, with the “last kilometre” expected to be particularly challenging. At the same time, indicators of inflation momentum were much lower than annual inflation rates, for both headline and core inflation. However, it was pointed out that momentum for several inflation components had rebounded somewhat recently and remained well above the medium-term inflation target. It was argued that core inflation continued to be sticky and that the previous quick progress on headline inflation was increasingly fading as energy base effects vanished or even reversed.

Turning to pipeline pressures, as reflected in the evolution of producer prices and input costs, including world food commodity prices, the picture of receding “upstream” price pressures remained broadly intact. However, it was pointed out that there was evidence of an asymmetry in the pass-through of rising and falling input costs to consumer prices. Reference was made to evidence from some countries which indicated that the share of firms that had lowered prices was increasing now that input costs were falling and this share – for the first time in the current inflation cycle – had exceeded the share of firms that were raising prices, indicating that the disinflation process was progressing. However, it was remarked that the share of firms lowering prices was – while growing – still falling far short of the share of firms that had increased prices when input costs had been going up. This asymmetry in the pass-through also had implications for the sacrifice ratio, i.e. that the Phillips curve would be flatter when inflation fell than when inflation was rising. The fact that prices were changing less frequently slowed down the pass-through of falling input costs.

With regard to the impact of the latest energy price increase on inflation, it was generally felt that this was becoming harder to assess. On the one hand, the rebound in oil prices, in particular, could be a more permanent shock, and therefore could affect wages and prices more persistently. On the other hand, since demand was weak and monetary policy in restrictive territory, the overall effects of the energy shock on headline inflation would likely differ from recent experience and be transitory or less persistent. In a context of volatile inflation due to frequent food and energy supply shocks, the key question was to what extent those shocks would feed into the medium-term inflation outlook. In the short term, they would clearly raise inflation. However, as they weighed on real incomes they would also lead to more subdued demand and lower capacity utilisation, implying a disinflationary impact in the medium term. It was thus seen as crucial to distinguish between one-off shocks to the price level and the effect of such shocks translating into inflation dynamics with relevance for the medium term.

It was also noted that there was particular uncertainty about the outlook for the fiscal stance in the coming year due to the uncertainties surrounding the European fiscal governance framework. Evidence from some countries suggested that fiscal deficits could well be larger than expected in the projection baseline, which would have implications for the inflation outlook.

The latest developments in core inflation were described as encouraging. In the last few months core inflation had largely developed as projected. More broadly, most indicators of underlying inflation appeared to have peaked or were stabilising. However, this was not the case for the indicator of domestic inflation, which remained strong and was likely to reflect more persistent pressures on services prices, which had a high wage content.

Members recalled that wage pressures were key in understanding medium-term inflation pressures. It was generally acknowledged that recent wage developments had remained in line with recent staff projections and that there were tentative signs of an imminent peak in wage pressures. At the same time, it was stressed that there was no firm evidence of a turnaround in wage dynamics yet, and sufficient hard data on wage agreements and employee compensation would only emerge in the course of spring 2024. In this context, it was recalled that labour markets, and wage-setting in particular, very much relied on national institutional frameworks. In some countries, wage-setting had a very strong backward-looking component, for example through wage indexation or cost of living allowances. In other countries, the backward-looking component was much weaker, which would inevitably lead to wage differentials across countries. In the last two quarters there had been no significant projection errors for wages, which was very important because one of the main risks to inflation was that wage growth might be even higher or more persistent than incorporated in the projections. So far, wage data had broadly confirmed the indications obtained from forward-looking indicators such as the ECB wage trackers. It was also remarked that most recently unit profits appeared to have been lower than predicted. This was important because one of the main assumptions in the projection of a downward trajectory for inflation was that, over time, a lower contribution from unit profits to the GDP deflator would compensate for a recovery in real wages and robust growth in unit labour costs.

At the same time, it was underlined that recent increases in unit labour costs had been driven not only by higher wages but also by lower than expected labour productivity growth. On the one hand, the view was expressed that low labour productivity growth should largely be of a temporary nature, owing to labour hoarding. It was not surprising that labour productivity growth was low, given the ongoing economic slowdown and the procyclicality of labour productivity. But labour hoarding was necessarily a temporary phenomenon. If the economy remained weak, firms would start to shed jobs, which would lead to higher productivity, lower unit labour costs and lower inflationary pressures. If GDP growth were instead to accelerate, a cyclical improvement in labour productivity could be expected. All in all, it would be plausible to expect productivity growth to rebound in the near future, which would contain unit labour costs and inflation. On the other hand, structural changes in the labour market, such as the fall in average hours worked, should also be acknowledged as potentially having a permanent impact on labour productivity, unit labour costs and, ultimately, prices.

As regards longer-term inflation expectations, members took note of the assessments by Ms Schnabel and Mr Lane of the latest developments in market-based measures of inflation compensation and survey-based indicators. It was widely acknowledged that, on the basis of ILS rates adjusted for inflation risk premia, long-term market-based genuine inflation expectations had remained broadly stable since the middle of 2022, which was seen as a great achievement of the Governing Council’s monetary policy decisions. This estimated measure of genuine inflation expectations had hardly increased despite the high inflation numbers, although there was no room for complacency.

With the renewed commodity price shocks, it was clear that monetary policy was now in a completely different situation from when the initial energy shocks had hit in 2021-22. At the same time, there were some warning signs, both in surveys and in financial markets, with certain indicators – such as the measure of expectations for inflation five years forward five years ahead – edging up in spite of the weakening economy. This suggested that lower economic growth may not be sufficient to tame underlying price pressures, which could be seen as a warning sign that risks of an unanchoring of inflation expectations remained elevated. The rise in market-based inflation compensation could be due to the risk of supply shocks becoming more prevalent in the future. It mostly reflected risk premia, thus signalling investor concern that inflation would turn out to be higher than the ECB’s target. Moreover, in the Survey of Professional Forecasters, the balance of risk indicator was still clearly tilted to the upside. So even if average expected headline inflation remained flat, there were still upside risks in the inflation expectations surveys. This asymmetric distribution of expected inflation, together with elevated inflation risk premia, suggested that a continued anchoring of inflation expectations should not be taken for granted. If people expected repeated shocks pushing inflation above 2%, it was likely that this would eventually become embedded in inflation expectations, which would in turn affect wages, pushing inflation away from the target.

Against this background, members assessed that there were still upside risks to inflation due to potential renewed upward pressures on the costs of energy and food. Adverse weather conditions, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could push food prices up by more than expected. A lasting rise in inflation expectations above the 2% target, or higher than anticipated increases in wages or profit margins, could also drive inflation higher, including over the medium term. By contrast, weaker demand – for example due to a stronger transmission of monetary policy or a worsening of the economic environment outside the euro area – would lead to lower price pressures, especially over the medium term. At the same time, the view was also expressed that inflation risks had become balanced, as most analyses suggested that inflation was broadly evolving as projected, or that they had even moved to the downside.

Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, members largely concurred with the assessment provided by Mr Lane in his introduction. Monetary policy tightening continued to be transmitted strongly to broader financing conditions. Funding had again become more expensive for banks, as savers were replacing overnight deposits with time deposits that paid more interest and the ECB’s targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) were being phased out. Average lending rates for business loans and mortgages continued to increase.

Attention was drawn to the fact that credit dynamics had weakened further, with the annual growth rate of loans to both firms and households declining. Amid weak lending and the reduction in the Eurosystem balance sheet, money growth was falling sharply. In particular measures of momentum (i.e. annualised growth rates over the past three months) showed monetary and credit aggregates to be decelerating very fast, in a manner that had only previously been seen during the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. The decline in lending likely reflected a combination of weaker loan demand and banks tightening the credit supply, with the respective contributions of the two factors hard to disentangle.

The view was expressed that credit developments primarily reflected weak loan demand and remained broadly in line with historical patterns of monetary policy transmission, while there was little evidence of credit supply constraints playing a role. In addition to the past effects of monetary policy and a deteriorating macroeconomic outlook, lower demand could also reflect the fact that firms still had large cash buffers that they had accumulated in periods of heightened uncertainty related, first, to the pandemic and, more recently, to the energy crisis. This could suggest they had less need for external financing. It was stressed that banks were in a strong position to lend more if loan demand rose. In particular, banks with a duration mismatch on their balance sheet – which had locked in low rates on their loan books before funding costs increased – also had strong incentives to satisfy an eventual increase in demand from creditworthy borrowers to support future profitability. Moreover, it was emphasised that banks’ balance sheets were solid, as reflected in their elevated capital ratios, low levels of non-performing loans and resilient profitability. From a microprudential perspective, banks’ net interest income had adjusted favourably to higher rates, thus mitigating concerns that rate increases were detrimental to banks.

This raised the question of why banks were tightening credit standards, as was emerging from the bank lending survey. On the basis of anecdotal evidence, it was suggested that, despite strong fundamentals, banks had become cautious about extending credit owing to worries about liquidity, especially in view of the turmoil that had occurred in the banking sector in March 2023. While banks were not liquidity-constrained, expectations for overall levels of excess liquidity had declined throughout the year. Banks were faced with the movement from overnight to term deposits, which required higher remuneration, as well as with the run-off of the TLTROs. These developments could have been making banks more careful. Moreover, it was argued that, even if a large part of the credit slowdown could thus far be attributed to demand factors, there was a risk that credit conditions could tighten further once supply restrictions came into play more forcefully.

Against this background, it was argued that the transmission of monetary policy tightening via prices (loan rates) and quantities (credit volumes) since the first rate hike in July 2022 was both much stronger and faster than expected, and much stronger and faster than typically taken into account by macroeconomic models. It was remarked that the pass-through of past interest rate decisions differed greatly across countries. Countries with a large share of floating rate mortgages and a sizeable construction sector had experienced a very rapid pass-through and a sustained weakening of economic activity. Elsewhere, where fixed rate mortgages were prevalent or home ownership more limited, transmission was likely to be more sluggish. This suggested that a large part of the pass-through of past interest rate increases was still in the pipeline.

However, it was argued that the tightening cycle had started long before interest rates were increased, and taking this and the end of net asset purchases into account suggested a transmission that was more in line with historical averages. It was also maintained that, while the impact on loan rates and volumes indeed appeared exceptionally strong, this simply reflected the regular transmission of exceptionally large and rapid interest rate changes, rather than a change in historical regularities in relation to each unit of rate increment. Attention was also drawn to the fact that the pass-through to bank deposit rates was currently still sluggish.

Monetary policy stance and policy considerations

Turning to the assessment of the monetary policy stance, members assessed overall financing conditions as having tightened further since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting on 26-27 July, with the transmission of monetary policy to broader financing conditions and the real economy firmly taking hold. The risk-free forward curve had remained broadly unchanged relative to the levels prior to the previous monetary policy meeting. This could reflect market participants’ assessment that growth was weakening amid still elevated inflation. Real long-term rates had also remained broadly stable in the euro area.

It was underlined that uncertainty about the outlook remained exceptionally high. Against this background, members assessed the data that had become available since the last monetary policy meeting in accordance with the three main elements of the “reaction function” that the Governing Council had communicated earlier in the year. These comprised the implications of the incoming economic and financial data for the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

Starting with the inflation outlook, members broadly concurred with the assessment presented by Mr Lane in his introduction. Overall, the process of disinflation seemed to be proceeding largely as expected. Headline inflation had declined in July but stalled in August on the back of higher energy prices. At the same time, comfort was drawn from the fact that core inflation figures had no longer surprised to the upside over the past few months. Although the staff projections for inflation had been revised upwards in September for 2023 and 2024, there was a downward revision for 2025, albeit with inflation expected to reach the target only in the last quarter of that year. However, it was recalled that the Governing Council’s focus was on medium-term inflation, so that the small upward revision of the inflation projections in the shorter term should not be a large concern, as long as the deviation from the target did not spill over into inflation expectations and second-round effects on wages and profits. In a similar vein, base effects on inflation in the coming months were likely to temporarily push inflation down, without implications for the medium-term inflation outlook, although this profile might raise some communication challenges. Overall, the risks to inflation had become more balanced, as demand had weakened significantly and monetary policy was clearly in restrictive territory. This notwithstanding, a further increase in energy prices and the possibility of upward energy price shocks occurring more often in the future could push inflation up. Moreover, the risk of underestimating the persistence of inflation and of second-round effects from wages remained present.

Members saw most indicators of underlying inflation now more clearly on a moderately declining path and closer together. An exception was domestic inflation, which was still rising. As regards wage growth, there were limited signs that this was starting to turn, although hard evidence of an inflection point still needed to emerge. At the same time, unit profits had been lower than implied by earlier projections, suggesting that rising wage pressures could in part be absorbed by firms over time, which was an important assumption underlying the moderation in the GDP deflator projected by staff, despite an upward revision for 2023 owing to higher unit labour costs.

Turning to the assessment of monetary policy transmission, members noted that ample evidence could now be found that this was proceeding strongly, more so than expected. While this could in part reflect the exceptionally strong increase in the key ECB interest rates, staff analysis suggested that the impact went beyond the usual pattern of transmission. Moreover, a significant part of the interest rate pass-through was still pending and likely to restrain economic activity and inflation over the projection horizon. On the one hand, it was remarked that the effects of the monetary policy tightening could still increase over time and extend well beyond 2025. On the other hand, since the tightening cycle had started a long time previously (before the raising of policy rates in July 2022), its impact could also be expected to recede over time, on the basis of typical transmission lags.

It was underlined that an important channel of monetary transmission was via inflation expectations. Having been able to keep inflation expectations anchored, despite the long period in which inflation had been above target, was seen as a major achievement. At the same time, it was recalled that market-based measures of inflation compensation were still elevated, so this achievement was fragile. There was still a risk of inflation staying above target for too long, which called for humility and caution.

Overall, members concurred that inflation was still expected to remain too high for too long. At the same time, the monetary policy cycle had reached a stage where the risks of tightening too much and the risks of tightening too little had become more balanced. In particular, the key ECB interest rates were in a range of levels that, maintained for a sufficiently long duration, would make a substantial contribution to the timely return of inflation to the ECB’s target. This assessment was supported by model-based simulations, expert surveys and market pricing, which suggested that constellations with a deposit facility rate in the region of 3.75% to 4.00%, as long as it was understood as being maintained for a sufficiently long duration, should be consistent with a return of inflation to target within the projection horizon. In view of the considerable uncertainty, members highlighted that the decision between raising rates and pausing was a close call, and that tactical considerations also played a role.

This situation was also reflected in the forward rate curve, which suggested that the probability of a rate increase versus a pause at the September meeting had been relatively evenly split for some time, as had been the case with analysts’ expectations, such as those reported in the Survey of Monetary Analysts.

Monetary policy decisions and communication

Against this background, while the decision was generally seen as a close call, a solid majority of members expressed support for the 25 basis point rate increase proposed by Mr Lane.

These members emphasised the still high levels of inflation and the fact that a rate increase would signal a strong determination on the part of the Governing Council to bring inflation back to the target in a timely manner. The horizon over which inflation would be brought back to 2% should not extend beyond 2025. According to the latest ECB staff projections this was expected to be the case, although by that time inflation would have exceeded the target for more than four years in a row. Hence erring on the side of pausing the first time the decision was a close call could risk being interpreted as a weakening of the ECB’s determination, especially at a time when headline and core inflation were above 5%.

Emphasis was also placed on the upward revisions to the headline inflation projections for the first two years of the projection horizon and the fact that the projections were conditioned on market interest rates, which embodied a further rate increase by the end of the year. Moreover, although there was tentative evidence suggesting that wage growth was close to a peak, further evidence was required to be sure it was turning. An additional consideration was the risk that the inflation path embedded in the projections was fragile and additional supply shocks could push inflation further above the target for longer, which could feed into inflation expectations. Further climate-related events also risked pushing up food prices. Hence, raising rates further also contained an element of insurance, against the continued elevated risk of inflation remaining above target for too long. It was seen as safer to confront such a situation with interest rates at 4.00% than at 3.75%, since higher rates could reduce the amplification of further shocks and thus lessen the probability of having to raise rates again in the future. In this context, it was argued that when monetary policy had been close to the effective lower bound and inflation low, there had had been a strong case for looking through supply shocks, whereas at present the situation was very different.

These members also argued that a pause could give rise to speculation that the tightening cycle was over, which increased the risk of a rebound in inflation. This situation would require another wave of monetary tightening later on, which could have adverse consequences for real estate markets and financial stability more generally. Not hiking could also send a signal of the Governing Council being more concerned about the economy and a potential recession than too high inflation.

Some members expressed a preference for maintaining rates at their current levels. These members underlined the fact that the Governing Council had made clear its decisions were data-dependent. They viewed the data that had become available since July as, on balance, not supporting a further rate hike: the economy had weakened substantially and inflation was projected to return to around 2% by the end of the projection horizon, while the risks to the inflation outlook were now balanced. Although oil prices had increased, this could turn out to be temporary. The 425 basis point increase in rates that had already taken place since the start of the tightening cycle was seen as sufficiently demonstrating the Governing Council’s commitment to deliver on its mandate of price stability.

These members also maintained that a lot of the pass-through of past rate hikes was still pending, and not all of this was likely to be included in the central scenario, implying that downside risks to economic growth could be significant. They saw little room for upside risks to the growth outlook. Pausing at this meeting would also have the advantage of providing time to assess the impact of previous decisions on the economy and to evaluate whether the slowdown was deeper than expected and whether inflation was actually coming down as projected without requiring a further increase in interest rates. Another consideration was that a further rate hike risked repeating the situation that had occurred in 2011, when interest rate increases had had to be reversed quickly in the face of the economic consequences of the sovereign debt crisis. Against this background, it was recalled that the ECB also had secondary objectives. If the inflation target could be reached at the end of 2025 via a lower interest rate path, thereby increasing the likelihood of a soft landing, this would be preferable. The Governing Council also needed to take into account the economic and social costs of a possible hard landing. From a risk management perspective, the point was made that the risks of hiking at the present time, and later having to reverse course should the economy weaken by more than expected, were larger than those of introducing a pause in the tightening cycle and having to increase rates at one of the coming meetings.

Members also agreed with the Executive Board proposal to continue applying flexibility in reinvesting redemptions falling due in the PEPP portfolio.

Taking into account the foregoing discussion among the members, upon a proposal by the President, the Governing Council took the monetary policy decisions as set out in the monetary policy press release. The members of the Governing Council subsequently finalised the monetary policy statement, which the President and the Vice-President would, as usual, deliver at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting.

Monetary policy statement

Monetary policy statement for the press conference of 14 September 2023

Press release

Monetary policy decisions

Meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council, 13-14 September 2023

Members

Ms Lagarde, President
Mr de Guindos, Vice-President
Mr Centeno
Mr Elderson
Mr Hernández de Cos
Mr Herodotou
Mr Holzmann
Mr Kazāks
Mr Kažimír
Mr Knot
Mr Lane
Mr Makhlouf*
Mr Müller*
Mr Nagel*
Mr Panetta
Mr Reinesch
Ms Schnabel
Mr Scicluna
Mr Šimkus
Mr Stournaras*
Mr Välimäki, temporarily replacing Mr Rehn
Mr Vasle
Mr Villeroy de Galhau
Mr Visco
Mr Vujčić
Mr Wunsch*

* Members not holding a voting right in September 2023 under Article 10.2 of the ESCB Statute.

Other attendees

Mr Dombrovskis, Commission Executive Vice-President**
Ms Senkovic, Secretary, Director General Secretariat
Mr Rostagno, Secretary for monetary policy, Director General Monetary Policy
Mr Winkler, Deputy Secretary for monetary policy, Senior Adviser, DG Economics

** In accordance with Article 284 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Accompanying persons

Ms Bénassy-Quéré
Ms Buch
Mr Dabušinskas
Mr Demarco
Mr Gavilán
Mr Haber
Mr Kaasik
Mr Koukoularides
Mr Lünnemann
Mr Madouros
Mr Martin
Mr Nicoletti Altimari
Mr Novo
Mr Pösö
Mr Rutkaste
Mr Sleijpen
Mr Šošić
Mr Tavlas
Mr Vanackere
Ms Žumer Šujica

Other ECB staff

Mr Proissl, Director General Communications
Mr Straub, Counsellor to the President
Ms Rahmouni-Rousseau, Director General Market Operations
Mr Arce, Director General Economics
Mr Sousa, Deputy Director General Economics

Release of the next monetary policy account foreseen on 23 November 2023.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/account-of-the-ecb-governing-councils-monetary-policy-meeting-13-14-september-2023/ Nyhet Thu, 12 Oct 2023 11:30:00 GMT
Vice ordföranden i Finlands Banks direktion deltar i IMF:s årsmöte https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/vice-ordforanden-i-finlands-banks-direktion-deltar-i-imfs-arsmote/ Vice ordföranden i Finlands Banks direktion deltar som Finlands Banks ställföreträdande chefdirektör i Internationella valutafondens (IMF) och Världsbankens gemensamma årsmöte i Marrakech i Marocko den 13 oktober 2023.

I samband med årsmötet hålls också sammanträden i den internationella monetära och finansiella kommittén och i IMF:s och Världsbankens gemensamma utvecklingskommitté.

I valutafondens möten deltar från Finlands Bank också ställföreträdande direktionsmedlem Kimmo Virolainen och senior ekonom Anni Norring.

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av ställföreträdande direktionsmedlem Kimmo Virolainen, telefon 09 183 22 70.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/vice-ordforanden-i-finlands-banks-direktion-deltar-i-imfs-arsmote/ Pressmeddelande Wed, 11 Oct 2023 07:00:00 GMT
Europeiska centralbanken stramar åt penningpolitiken för att få inflationen att sjunka till målet https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/europeiska-centralbanken-stramar-at-penningpolitiken-for-att-fa-inflationen-att-sjunka-till-malet/ Inflationen i euroområdet har varit hög redan under en längre tid. I år har inflationen saktat in tack vare de lägre energipriserna jämfört med i fjol och Europeiska centralbankens tydliga åtstramning av penningpolitiken. ECB-rådet har höjt sina styrräntor med sammanlagt 4,5 procentenheter sedan juli 2022. Den viktigaste styrräntan, dvs. bankernas inlåningsränta, är 4 %.

I takt med att inflationen skjuter fart stiger ofta också konsumenternas, företagens och marknadens förväntningar om den framtida inflationen. I euroområdet har inflationsförväntningarna dock legat nära ECB:s inflationsmål på 2 %. ”Inflationsförväntningarna har en viktig betydelse för prisutvecklingen och penningpolitiken, eftersom de påverkar både företagens prissättning och löntagarnas lönekrav”, säger Finlands Banks direktionsmedlem Tuomas Välimäki.

Penningpolitiken har stramats åt genom att styrräntorna har höjts och värdepapperen inom APP-köpprogrammet låtits förfalla i en förutsägbar takt. Räntehöjningarna får genomslag i låneräntorna, bromsar kraftigt upp utlåningsökningen och minskar den totala efterfrågan. Ekonomin i euroområdet tyngs också av den svagare globala utvecklingen. Den ekonomiska tillväxten i euroområdet är således långsam för tillfället, men enligt prognoserna ser euroområdet ut att undvika en fullskalig recession.

Inflationen i euroområdet saktar in ytterligare, men väntas ligga för högt för länge. Enligt ECB:s makroekonomiska framtidsbedömningar kommer inflationen i euroområdet år 2025 att ha legat över inflationsmålet på 2 % på medellång sikt kontinuerligt i mer än fyra års tid.

Enligt ECB-rådets bedömning har styrräntorna nu höjts till en nivå som, om de ligger kvar på denna nivå under en tillräckligt lång tid, kommer att kraftigt bidra till att inflationen återvänder till målet”, framhåller Tuomas Välimäki.  ”Med beaktande av riskerna för inflationsutvecklingen innebär detta inte nödvändigtvis att räntehöjningarna är förbi. Då inflationen ligger över målet så här länge, kan det inte godkännas att inflationens återgång till målet skjuts ännu längre på framtiden.” De framtida räntebesluten kommer att basera sig på tillgängliga uppgifter om ekonomin och finansmarknaden. ”Vi bedömer inflationsutsikterna också genom att följa utvecklingen av den underliggande inflationen överlag samt hur de penningpolitiska besluten får genomslag i ekonomin”, fortsätter Välimäki. 

ECB:s penningpolitik gäller hela euroområdet, och det ligger också i Finlands intresse att prisstabilitet enligt ECB:s mål råder i euroområdet. Prisstabiliteten i euroområdet garanterar en välbalanserad ekonomisk utveckling i Finland, eftersom euroområdet är vår inre marknad och en viktig handelspartner för Finland. Penningpolitiken får genomslag på olika sätt och olika snabbt inom euroområdet beroende bland annat på räntebindningen av lån i olika länder.

I Finland löper bostadslånen till största del med rörlig ränta, varför de stigande räntorna snabbt får genomslag inte bara i nya lån utan också i hela lånestocken och därmed i alla bolånetagares disponibla inkomster. Skillnaderna i genomsnittsräntorna för nya bostads- och företagslån mellan olika euroländer är för närvarande mindre än skillnaderna mellan räntorna på utestående lån.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/europeiska-centralbanken-stramar-at-penningpolitiken-for-att-fa-inflationen-att-sjunka-till-malet/ Pressmeddelande Tue, 03 Oct 2023 08:00:00 GMT
ECB-rådets beslut (utöver räntebeslut) https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/ecb-radets-beslut-utover-rantebeslut/ ECB-rådets beslut (utöver räntebeslut) augusti–september 2023

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/nyheter/2023/ecb-radets-beslut-utover-rantebeslut/ Nyhet Fri, 29 Sep 2023 13:00:00 GMT
De oreglerade lånen inom byggbranschen ökade i augusti https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/monetara-finansinstituts-balansrakning_new/2023/de-oreglerade-lanen-inom-byggbranschen-okade-i-augusti/ Av de utestående lånen som beviljats finländska företag inom byggbranschen var 4,1 %, dvs. 123 miljoner euro, oreglerade[1] vid utgången av augusti 2023. Andelen oreglerade lån ökade med 0,9 procentenheter (26 miljoner euro) från juli. I augusti var de oreglerade lånens andel av utlåningen jämfört med byggbranschen högre inom underhållningsbranschen[2] (10,5 %), sektorn för hälsovårds- och socialtjänster (7,2 %) samt inkvarterings- och förplägnadsbranschen (5,4 %)[3].

Som helhet har mängden oreglerade företagslån[4] ökat något från i fjol, men deras andel av den totala utlåningen till företag är fortfarande liten. I augusti 2023 uppgick andelen oreglerade lån av de utestående företagslånen (62,0 miljarder euro) till 1,9 %, när deras andel av de utestående lånen (64,5 miljarder euro) i augusti för ett år sedan var 1,6 %.

Mängden redovisade nedskrivningar[5] och kreditförluster av lån till företag inom byggbranschen har också ökat i år, även om de redovisade nedskrivningarna och kreditförlusterna av företagslån som helhet varit små. Under de senaste 12 månaderna redovisade de finländska kreditinstituten 134 miljoner euro i nedskrivningar och kreditförluster av företagslån (0,22 % i förhållande till utlåningen till företag i augusti 2023). Under de föregående 12 månaderna redovisades mest nedskrivningar och kreditförluster av lån till företag inom byggbranschen (2,26 % i förhållande till utlåningen i augusti 2023). För andra branscher var relationstalet klart mindre jämfört med byggbranschen (som högst knappt 1 %). Även för byggbranschen är de relativa nedskrivningarna och kreditförlusterna emellertid fortfarande klart mindre än 2020, när relationstalet översteg 3 %.

 

De oreglerade lånen inom byggbranschen ökade i augusti

 

Utlåning

De finländska hushållen lyfte i augusti 2023 nya bostadslån för 1,1 miljarder euro, vilket är 340 miljoner euro mindre än vid motsvarande tid för ett år sedan. Av de nya utbetalda bostadslånen stod investeringsbostadslånen för 110 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på nya bostadslån var oförändrad från juli och var 4,55 % i augusti. Det utestående beloppet av bostadslån uppgick vid slutet av augusti 2023 till 106,7 miljarder euro och årsökningen var -1,6 %. Investeringsbostadslånens andel av de utestående bostadslånen var 8,6 miljarder euro. Av utlåningen till de finländska hushållen bestod 17,2 miljarder euro av konsumtionskrediter och 17,8 miljarder euro av övriga lån vid utgången av augusti.

De finländska företagen lyfte i augusti nya lån för 1,5 miljarder euro, och av dem utgjorde bostadsbolagslånen 400 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på nya utbetalda företagslån steg från juli och var 5,57 %. Det utestående beloppet av lån som beviljats finländska företag uppgick vid slutet av augusti till 105,4 miljarder euro, varav andelen lån till bostadsbolag utgjorde 43,4 miljarder euro.

 

Inlåning

Inlåningen från hushållen i Finland uppgick totalt till 109,3 miljarder euro vid slutet av augusti 2023 och genomsnittsräntan var 0,85 %. I beloppet ingick inlåning över natten för 75,1 miljarder euro och tidsbunden inlåning för 8,3 miljarder euro. De finländska hushållen tecknade i augusti nya tidsbundna inlåningsavtal för 880 miljoner euro. Genomsnittsräntan på ny tidsbunden inlåning var i augusti 2,97 %.

 

Utlåning och inlåning till Finland, preliminär uppgift*
  Juni, mn euro Juli, mn euro Augusti, mn euro Augusti, 12 mån förändring1, % Genomsnitts-ränta, %
Utlåning till hushåll, utestående belopp 141 896 141 675 141 676 -1,3 4,28
    - varav bostadslån 107 092 106 855 106 749 -1,6 3,73
    - varav investeringsbostadslån 8 638 8 622 8 640   3,92
Utlåning till icke-finansiella företag2, utestående belopp 105 688 105 263 105 407 -0,1 4,44
Inlåning från hushåll, utestående belopp 110 877 109 878 109 278 -3,4 0,85
Nya utbetalda bostadslån till hushåll 1 313 1 005 1 139   4,55
    - varav investeringsbostadslån 106 86 112   4,73

* Omfattar utlåning och inlåning i alla valutor till Finland. I Finlands Banks statistikpublikationer till och med januari 2021 och i ECB:s statistikpublikationer presenteras utlåning och inlåning i euro för euroområdet och hushållen omfattar också hushållens icke-vinstsyftande organisationer, varför siffrorna i tabellen avviker från uppgifterna i dessa publikationer.
1 Den procentuella förändringen är beräknad på månatliga stockförändringar som är justerade för omklassificeringar och omvärderingar.  
2 Till de icke-finansiella företagen räknas bostadssammanslutningar.

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Antti Hirvonen, telefon 09 183 2121, e-post: antti.hirvonen(at)bof.fi,

Usva Topo, telefon 09 183 2056, e-post: usva.topo(at)bof.fi.

 

Nästa månadspublicering 31.10.2023 kl. 10.

 

Statistiksiffror och grafik som utgör underlag för meddelandet kan läsas på https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/.

 

[1] Ett lån betraktas som oreglerat när det har förfallit för mer än 90 dagar sedan eller det finns anledning att anta att gäldenären inte kommer att fullgöra sin betalning.

[2] Kultur, nöje och fritid.

[3] Av det utestående beloppet av företagslån i augusti 2023 (62,0 miljarder euro, exkl. bostadsbolag) utgjorde utlåningen till byggbranschen 3,0 miljarder euro, inkvarterings- och förplägnadsbranschen 785 miljoner euro, sektorn för hälsovårds- och socialtjänster 775 miljoner euro och sektorn för kultur, nöje och fritid 467 miljoner euro.

[4] Exkl. bostadsbolag.

[5] Nedskrivningar av lån redovisas på basis av modeller för förväntade kreditförluster. Den förväntade kreditförlusten är bankens uppskattning av det lånebelopp som kunden inte betalar.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/monetara-finansinstituts-balansrakning_new/2023/de-oreglerade-lanen-inom-byggbranschen-okade-i-augusti/ Statistik Thu, 28 Sep 2023 07:00:00 GMT
Olli Rehn är tjänstledig https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/olli-rehn-ar-tjanstledig/ Finlands Banks chefdirektör Olli Rehn har ansökt om tjänstledighet hos bankfullmäktige från den tidpunkt då han ställs upp som kandidat i 2024 års val av republiken Finlands president. Bankfullmäktige har beviljat honom tjänstledighet enligt ansökan. Tjänstledigheten började den 23 september 2023 och pågår till den 30 januari 2024.

Under Olli Rehns tjänstledighet sköts uppdraget som Finlands Banks direktionsordförande av direktionens vice ordförande Marja Nykänen. Olli Rehn har utnämnt direktionsmedlem Tuomas Välimäki till sin ersättare i Europeiska centralbankens råd. I enlighet med de ställföreträdararrangemang för direktionsmedlemmarna som bankfullmäktige har beslutat om blir direktionens rådgivare Kimmo Virolainen ställföreträdande direktionsmedlem i Finlands Bank.

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av bankfullmäktiges ordförande Antti Lindtman, telefon 040 577 62 55.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/medier-och-publkationer/pressmeddelanden/2023/olli-rehn-ar-tjanstledig/ Pressmeddelande Mon, 25 Sep 2023 10:00:00 GMT
Antalet kortbetalningar ökade under andra kvartalet 2023 https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/betalnings_new/2023/antalet-kortbetalningar-okade-under-andra-kvartalet-2023/ kuva_1_sv_20230921.png

 

Under andra kvartalet 2023 gjordes med finländska betalkort sammanlagt 595 miljoner kortbetalningar, vilket var 30 miljoner (5 %) fler kortbetalningar än vid motsvarande tidpunkt ett år tidigare. Det totala värdet av kortbetalningarna utgjorde det andra kvartalet sammanlagt 17,8 miljarder euro, vilket var 4 % mer än för ett år sedan.

 

kuva_2_sv_20230921.png

 

Fler kortbetalningar initierades med dator eller mobil enhet än för ett år sedan

Med dator eller mobil enhet initierades 88 miljoner kortbetalningar på distans under andra kvartalet 2023, vilket var 16 % mer än under motsvarande period för ett år sedan. Det totala värdet av kortbetalningar på distans (3,5 miljarder euro) var 21 % större än vid motsvarande tidpunkt för ett år sedan.

Det totala värdet av kontaktlösa betalningar ökade med 912 miljoner euro (19 %) från första kvartalet 2023 och uppgick till 5,8 miljarder euro det andra kvartalet. Samtidigt gjordes 369 miljoner kortbetalningar med kontaktlös betalning, vilket var 17 % mer än under det första kvartalet innevarande år.

Antalet kortbetalningar med chip eller magnetremsa ökade med 15 % från första kvartalet 2023 och uppgick till 136 miljoner transaktioner det andra kvartalet. Det totala värdet av dessa kortbetalningar ökade med 1,3 miljarder euro (19 %) från första kvartalet 2023 och uppgick till 8,4 miljarder euro.

 

Färre betalningar gjordes med utländska kort i Finland än under första kvartalet 2023

Med kort utgivna i ett annat euroland än Finland gjordes i Finland 20 % färre kortbetalningar i värde under andra kvartalet 2023 än under det första kvartalet, och det totala värdet av betalningarna var 0,2 miljarder euro. Med kort utgivna utanför EU gjordes i Finland under andra kvartalet 2023 kortbetalningar till ett värde av sammanlagt 0,2 miljarder euro, vilket var 6 % mindre än under andra kvartalet 2022.

Det sammanlagda värdet av korttransaktioner som gjorts med finländska betalkort i övriga euroländer uppgick till 1,4 miljarder euro andra kvartalet 2023, vilket var 20 % mer än under det första kvartalet. Det sammanlagda värdet av korttransaktioner som gjorts med finländska betalkort utanför EU var 0,4 miljarder euro andra kvartalet 2023, vilket var 1 % mindre än under det första kvartalet.

 

De siffror som behandlas i detta meddelande har publicerats i en ny dashboard för betalningsstatistik. Dashboard innehåll utökas senare.

 

Närmare upplysningar lämnas av

Tia Kurtti, telefon 09 183 2043, e-post: tia.kurtti(at)bof.fi,

Tuomas Nummelin, telefon 09 183 2373, e-post: tuomas.nummelin(at)bof.fi.

 

Nästa publiceringstillfälle december 2023.

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https://www.suomenpankki.fi/sv/statistik2/statistik-meddelanden_new/betalnings_new/2023/antalet-kortbetalningar-okade-under-andra-kvartalet-2023/ Statistik Fri, 22 Sep 2023 07:00:00 GMT